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Abstract 
This thesis explores the relationship between environmental activism, environmental 
politics and the mainstream media. In exploring the power relations between government, 
activists and the media, this work draws on Foucauldian theories of governmentality, 
power and space (heterotopia). The central hypothesis is that environmental politics has 
witnessed a shift in power away from activism and towards environmental governance and 
free-market economics, nestled in a media discourse that has depoliticised many 
environmental activist movements. Foucault’s theories on power, biopower and 
governmentality are combined with a critical discourse analysis (CDA) of newspaper 
reports and original empirical research derived from a focus group with environmental 
activists. The empirical data and analysis provides original knowledge on relations 
between environmental activists and journalists. The premise that economics has become 
the dominant solution to the detriment of environmental activism movements is argued 
through a historical analysis of advanced liberal governments’ role in creating new green 
markets and instruments (‘green governmentality’ in Luke’s terms). The shift towards 
green governmentality has been accompanied by an increased application of state 
measures, from legislation and surveillance, to conflating environmental activism with 
terrorism, and the neologism of eco-terrorism. Journalists reaffirm such governance, and 
the critical discourse analysis charts the shift from positive to negative reporting in the 
mainstream media. However, activists also contest such power relations through social and 
new media, alongside traditional repertoires of protest within the space of activism, to 
challenge such advanced liberal discourse, and bypass traditional media practices.  
As neoliberalism has increasingly become the main position in environmental politics, it 
places activism into a discourse of deviance. The activists’ movement counters this 
measure through new media, liminoid practices and repertoires of protest.  
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Chapter One: Introduction  
 
In the ongoing struggle over economic competitiveness, environmental 
resistance can even be recast as a type of civil disobedience, which 
endangers national security, expresses unpatriotic sentiments, or embodies 
treasonous acts (Luke, 1999: 125). 
 
In terms of media, it’s clear for movements in general, all social movements, we need 
a massive increase in the quality and quantity of citizen media; we need to 
saturate the airwaves. 
(Interview with activist Richard Herring) 
 
 
Introduction 
“#Rio+20 was a rescue mission, but not for the planet. Its objective was the salvation 
of the neoliberal model” (#OccupyNeolibs Tweet). And so, the global plan to address 
climate change is summarised in less than 140 characters. This thesis is about the 
numerous nuances epitomised in this single tweet. The role of governance and 
environmental politics is seen in the #Rio+20. Rio + 20 was the United Nations (UN) 
conference on sustainable development. The conference marked twenty years since 
the first United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), 
and ten years since the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in 
Johannesburg. As the term neoliberal signifies, and the above quote by Luke also 
highlights, economic competitiveness through neoliberal concepts is increasingly 
seen as a solution to environmental problems. Whilst analysing why neoliberal 
models have become increasingly central to environmental politics, this thesis will 
examine what consequences this has for environmental politics and grassroots 
activism. 
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Global calls to address environmental problems were, until the mid 1990s, 
predominantly the province of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), Green 
parties, grass-roots and activists’ networks. The growth of environmental 
governance, along with technological developments in communication, has provided 
a wider platform for diverse voices. In the UK, mainstream party political co-
optation of environmental politics has created diametrically opposed views between 
politicians, the media, environmental non-governmental organisations (ENGOs), 
green parties, climate deniers, climate sceptics, multinational corporations, 
institutions, social movement organisations (SMOs) and radical activists’ 
movements, the latter being the focus of this thesis. Importantly, the opening-up of 
alternative media and political platforms has also created new fields of study, and 
opportunities for new contributions to existing academic fields. Relations between 
the fields of media, radical environmental activism and the state are the focus of this 
study, whilst acknowledging the other elements listed above. At the same time, this 
thesis is about the relationship between journalists and radical environmental 
activists. To clarify terms of reference, ‘radical environmental activists’ refers to 
non-hierarchical collectives, sometimes referred to as “horizontal networks” (such as 
Reclaim the Streets or Plane Stupid in the UK). The thesis will examine this 
relationship to find out why newspapers report radical environmental activism in 
certain terms.  
 
On 24 May 2007, the London Evening Standard newspaper led with a front-page 
headline “Eco warriors to hit Heathrow” (Rosser, 2007). Three months later, on 13 
August, the same newspaper’s front page declared “Militants in plot to paralyse 
Heathrow; extremists to hijack climate change demo” (Mendick, 2007). Both 
headlines were referring to the Camp for Climate Action, more commonly known as 
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the Climate Camp, an environmental activist protest against the proposed expansion 
of London’s Heathrow Airport. The owners of Heathrow Airport (the British 
Airports Authority – BAA) were seeking government planning permission to build a 
third runway. A collection of different environmental groups (Climate Rush, So We 
Stand, Rising Tide, Camp for Climate Action) and NGOs (including HACAN,
1
 
NOTRAG
2
 and FTF
3
), along with local residents from Sipson and Harlington 
villages (whose homes were to be demolished), converged to protest against the 
plans, culminating in a week-long environmental camp against the proposal.  
 
The articles encapsulate themes and concepts connecting the action with earlier 
protests. There are references to a “Greenham-style protest camp”, a nod to the anti-
nuclear protest at the Greenham US airbase in the 1980s (Mendick, 2007), the anti-
car collective Reclaim the Streets as “hardcore protesters”, and veterans of “clashes 
at the G8 summits”, referring to the protests at the meeting of the world’s top eight 
countries in Scotland two years earlier in 2005. The drawing on earlier protest camps 
(such as Greenham Common Peace Camp) is indicative of the news practices and 
concepts identified in this thesis, which tend to conflate environmental activism with 
fear and acts of terrorism. Journalists define some activists as “extremists” who will 
“hijack” the camp (Mendick, 2007). Mendick outlines how activists plan to 
“infiltrate the terminal buildings by posing as passengers”; echoing the language of 
the 11 September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York. The sub-
headline reads “Hoax packages to cause security alerts”, as activists plan an “assault 
on airport fences and shops” (Mendick, 2007). Activists are defined as “militant”, 
“eco-warriors” and “anarchists” (Rosser, 2007). A third article, “Eco-protesters 
                                                   
1 Heathrow Association for the Control of Aircraft Noise – Clear Skies. HACAN – Clear Skies began in the 
1960s as HACAN. Its aim is to represent the concerns of residents under flight paths. For more information, 
see HACAN (2011).  
2 No Third Runway Action Group – Heathrow Airport. For more information, see NOTRAG (2011).  
3 Fight the Flights.  
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target school-run mothers” (Rosser, 2008: 17) makes claims that protesters plan to 
“deflate tyres of 4×4s in areas such as Kensington and Chelsea, by jamming the 
valves open with mung beans” (Rosser, 2008: 17), a claim challenged by the Camp 
for Climate Action.  
 
The Press Complaints Commission (PCC) found that neither Mendick nor Rosser 
had any basis for either the headlines or the stories, on the grounds that Mendick’s 
story was based on the journalist overhearing a group of four people when “a man in 
his late 20s” said “We need to make people sit up and take notice. Leave some 
packages around Heathrow. That’ll make them take notice” (PCC, 2008). This quote, 
from an unnamed source, was the basis for the front-page headline.  
 
The London Evening Standard example is not unique; the Daily Telegraph and The 
Sun newspapers applied similar language: “Anarchists plotting to disrupt flights” 
proclaims the Daily Telegraph (Milward, 2007: 1) by “disguising themselves as 
holiday makers to cause havoc”, “planning bomb hoaxes”, “assaulting Heathrow’s 
perimeter fence”, and “boarding planes and then refusing to take their seats” 
(Milward, 2007). The Sun headline “Camp Crustie” (Francis, 2007: 20) defines 
activists as “irate”, “hippy crusties” and “strangers to soap”. Readers are told “The 
worst thing you can do is make eye contact with one – they’ll have you doing jobs in 
no time”. One activist is described as “Claire, but who looked more like a rainbow or 
babbling brook” (Francis, 2007: 20). These examples highlight how contemporary 
news reports link activism with acts of terrorism, equate modern protest camps with 
earlier protest camps, and show why journalists remove activists from debates on 
governance and economics (such as the Rio+20 tweet). How and why journalists 
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label environmental activists in such terms and portray them as deviants is the focus 
of this thesis. 
 
“Deviancy” is difficult to define, because there is never a consensus of opinion in 
society – there are various levels of “acceptable” morality. It could be said that 
deviance is “nothing less or more than it has always been: rule breaking” (Box, 1981: 
9). Political deviancy is understood as anything outside the political electoral system, 
which does not make a contribution to party politics or is not “governed by 
procedural norms”, and is by definition “deviant with respect to politics” (Hall, 1971: 
2). But Hall’s explanation does not give a clear definition of deviancy. Another way 
is to differentiate between political minorities and political deviancy. The difference 
between political minorities and deviant groups is “organisations and no structure” 
(Lembert cited in Hall, 1971: 3) and, as this thesis will show, for Hall, it is the lack 
of top-down hierarchical political structure which makes social movements such as 
environmental activism politically deviant. This is reaffirmed by the state 
criminalising activism through legislative measures (see Chapter Four). However, 
activists have developed strategies, tactics and skills to counter this (see Chapter Six) 
and, in the process, have created the politicisation of deviant subcultures. The issue 
of how the state applies regulations and laws that prevent and restrict activism is 
examined through an analysis of governmentality (see Chapter Three) and Chapter 
Six examines how the various environmental activist movements have developed a 
series of strategies of counter-governmentality approaches. 
 
The emergence of political deviancy is linked to “movements involving students and 
young people” who engage in political acts such as protests and demonstrations 
(Hall, 1971: 9), often expressed through lifestyle and social attitudes that exclude 
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“normative” behaviour. These attitudes are often formed as a response to a set of 
circumstances and a reaction to a “specific stage of evolution of modern capitalism” 
(Hall, 1971: 15). The politically deviant are placed in opposition to capitalism: 
 
consensus politics…is the form in which elite class power manages 
the consent of “masses’ in socially stratified, differentiated, so-called 
pluralist societies. In the ideology and rhetoric of consensus politics, 
the ‘national’ interest is represented as transcending all other 
collective social interests. (Hall, 1971: 14) 
 
This may be an unintentional consequence of prioritising national interest over 
individuals, but the effect becomes a “determinate negation” of a movement towards 
the institutionalised life and management of advanced capitalist societies (Hall, 1971: 
16). As Chapter Four will show, this increasing institutionalisation of advanced 
capitalism reinforces the deviant character of activism as being outside normative 
behaviour. Through Foucault’s notion of biopower this thesis understands that any 
group or individual whose behaviour is deemed deviant or delinquent is defined as 
“abnormal”. This work links deviancy to environmentalism, by drawing on Luke’s 
interpretation of governmentality through a green lens. The conscious decisions of 
some environmental activists to remain “outside” of society and the criminalisation 
of some types of activism, as Nealon (1984) notes, places such individuals outside of 
normative behaviour. People outside (through choice or state regulation) are (via 
biopower) identified as abnormal (see Chapter Three). This thesis will argue that 
media representation, along with some activists’ practices, places environmental 
activism into a discourse of political deviancy (see Chapter Five). This binary 
position between abnormal/normal and deviant behaviour is iterated by the media’s 
setting of boundaries to what is “acceptable and what is not” (Halloran, 1978: 299). 
The media’s framing of political deviance can sometimes act a tool to 
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reinforce the world-taken-for-granted by restating social rules and 
warning subjects that violators will not be tolerated. In this way, the 
wayward are cautioned and the righteous are comforted. (Box, 1981: 
39) 
 
Journalists’ coverage of deviant behaviour is often a way to clarify and “legitimate 
power to shape and define a political reality” (Hall, 1971: 20). News production 
practices reaffirm and legitimise actions by governments to maintain the status quo 
of power, by “managing conflict and dissent in the interest of the establishment” 
(Halloran, 1978: 299). Journalists’ articulation of state (or establishment, to use 
Halloran’s term) rhetoric filters down to individual activists, who, once labelled as 
politically deviant, apply this to a “fixed point of evil, external to the self, they 
[people] use this as a scapegoat, which helps them maintain their own particular view 
of self and society” (Halloran, 1978: 288). There are two points to raise here in 
relation to the observations above. 
 
Firstly, although Hall’s and Halloran’s definitions of political deviancy relate to the 
media, they emerged at a time when their hypotheses were yet to be tested. As this 
thesis will show, many of these ideas can be applied to the representation of 
environmental activism today. At the time of Hall’s and Halloran’s writings, 
advanced capitalism had less of a global hold on world economics, and 
environmentalism was a fledgling term (McCormick, 1991). However, through the 
theoretical work of Luke on green governmentality, which draws on Foucault’s 
conception, this thesis will show how through the lens of media representation, 
environmental activism is understood as an act of political deviancy. Secondly, as the 
reporting in the London Evening Standard and other newspapers indicates, media 
reporting of environmental activism has increasingly been framed as politically and 
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socially deviant and defined in terms of acts of terror and anarchy, and a 
depoliticisation of activism. 
 
To find out if environmental activism is placed into a framework of political 
deviancy, this thesis will examine numerous examples of environmental activism 
protests since the 1970s, mapping out how the UK environmental activist movement 
has evolved. Charting each “moment”, or evolution, of environmentalism can reveal 
wider issues which result in environmental activists being identified as “extremists”, 
“militants” and “anarchists”, regardless of their individual or collective status. In 
doing so, this thesis will address four research questions:  
 
1. How do the mainstream media frame environmental activism?  
2. Are there nuances and linguistic traits specific to the journalistic practice of 
report environmental protest? 
3. Are environmental protests contextualised within wider political 
discourses, when  reporters construct narratives around environmental 
activism in the mainstream media? 
4. Is there any relationship between environmental activism and mainstream 
politics? 
 
The main argument of this thesis is that a shift in power has occurred between 
environmental activists and mainstream political parties. This is reflected in how 
journalists report environmental protest. Each of these questions will be explored in 
detail, but before dissecting them and their relevant theoretical perspectives, it is 
important to establish what is meant by the terms “environmental activism”, 
“environmental politics” and “representation” as set out in the title.  
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Environmental Activism 
The term “environmental activism” is central to distinguishing what form of 
environmentalism is being referred to. “Environmentalism” became a political 
battleground in the late 1960s. Prior to this time, environmentalism often focused on 
conservation, with the creation of national parks. (The Peak District became Britain’s 
first national park in 1951, while Yellowstone Park in the U.S., created in 1872, is 
“dedicated and set apart as a public park or pleasuring ground for the benefit and 
enjoyment of the people” (Benton and Short, 2000: 99). Yellowstone is the world’s 
oldest national park with an emphasis on ecology over a socio-ecology position 
(Robbins, 2004). National Parks signalled the first move towards taming the 
wilderness, before “we abuse land because we regard it as a commodity belonging to 
us” (Leopold, 1994: 75). The relationship between people and the planet was 
changing, no more so than with the Earthrise image.  
  
Earthrise was the first view of the Earth from space, taken by the 1969 Apollo space 
mission. This image of the Earth is believed by many to have changed how the 
human race perceived the Earth, nature and man’s relationship to the planet (Dryzek, 
1997; Doyle, 2007; Gore, 2007; Lester, 2010). The effect of Earthrise saw a shift in 
the concept of “environmental issues” from “the environment” (as in conservation) to 
“the environment” as a social issue (Hansen, 2010). “Environmentalism” came to 
mean a politics which raised problems around the “intersection of ecosystems and 
human social systems” (Dryzek, 1997: 8), in other words, a politics which 
problematised how humans relate to nature. 
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When referring to “environmentalism” as a social issue, this thesis agrees with the 
findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) that the Earth’s 
climate is changing. Increases in global temperature are affecting the atmosphere as a 
result of anthropogenic high-carbon industrialisation of natural resources. We are 
living in a society founded on high carbon production. The increase in consumption 
means that “increases in energy use, the transportation of goods, the heating of 
houses, the powering of industries, and so on” all call into question our use and abuse 
of fossil fuels (Newell and Paterson, 2010: 14). The fourth IPCC report clearly lays 
the blame for climate change and global warming on anthropocentric 
industrialisation, noting that “most of the observed increase in global average 
temperatures since the mid 20
th
 century is very likely due to the observed increase in 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations” (Solomon et al., 2007: 10). The IPCC 
and other large organisations are accepting that mass production on a global scale has 
led to an increase in greenhouse gases that affect the global climate.  
 
Environmentalism is viewed as light green, shallow, as opposed to deep ecology 
(Næss, 1989; Porritt, 1984) and it refers to a reformist, managerial approach to 
conservation, with a focus on green consumption (see, for example, Elkington and 
Hailes, 1988). Shallow ecology is an anthropocentric approach that places human 
needs at the forefront of engagement with nature, whereas deep ecology (Næss, 
1989) is the reverse, putting the case for nature, animals and “all that supports life” 
first (Wall, 1994: 67) and anthropocentric needs second. Deep ecology calls for 
radical measures to counter problems of vast consumption, especially in the Western 
world, and increasingly in Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (the BRICS 
countries). However, decreasing capitalist-led population and human growth would 
19 
 
place less strain on natural resources. An ecological movement could create a 
“harmonious balance with nature” (Torgerson, 1999: 29).  
 
The effect of a high-carbon economy and an increase in global temperature has been 
described as causing climate change, global warming, greenhouse effects, acid rain, 
ozone depletion, deforestation, desertification, pollution and even nuclear winter 
(Hansen, 2010). The term “climate change” has many labels and there is 
considerable ambiguity as to whether it refers to the actual phenomenon of rising 
global temperature, the scientific thesis, or the discourse that constitutes our political 
understanding. Those who challenge whether an increase in temperature is connected 
to human-led industrialisation are commonly termed either “climate sceptics” – 
someone who “seeks the truth but who has yet to be convinced that the available 
scientific evidence supports a particular claim or hypothesis” – or “climate deniers” – 
who will “ignore or undermine scientific evidence for political ends” (Humpreys, 
2006: 83).  
 
According to Dryzek (1997), environmental activists can be categorised as “realos” 
and “fundis”. The German Green party,4 Die Grünen, was divided into these two 
main factions. Realos are activists who believe in action through the political system, 
“organisations” that combine direct action with political lobbying (such as 
Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth and many of the global charities), while fundis are 
those groups which are a social movement rather than a political party, where direct 
action is a political tool (Dryzek, 2000: 174). The latter form of environmental 
activism is central to this thesis. Dave Foreman, founder of the environmental 
                                                   
4 The German Green Party (c. 1972) is often credited as being the first green political party. However, 
the United Tasmanian and New Zealand’s Values parties also began around the same period. Die 
Grunen is the largest green party (Dryzek, 1997: 173). 
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activist movement Earth First!, says that all too often “political movements become 
more debating societies where the participants engage in philosophical masturbation 
and never get down to the vital business at hand” (Foreman, 2005: 352). In contrast, 
“activism means action” (McKay, 1998: 5). Moreover, part of the activist movement 
is in reaction to the “professionalization of environmentalism” (Foreman, 2009). 
Professionalism is one dividing line between the “radical” activists (fundis) and the 
environmental NGOs (realos), a theme discussed further in Chapter Six. 
 
The difference between the two forms can be explained through their organisational 
structures. Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth and those that influence environmental 
policy are top-down hierarchical bodies, some with charitable status. For the purpose 
of this thesis, these groups will be referred to as professional environmental activists. 
The focus of this thesis is on activist collectives that are made up of individuals at a 
grass-roots level, which “operate under a variety of organisational (and 
disorganisation) banners depending on the action concerned” (Anderson, 2004: 107). 
The second form is represented by non-hierarchical, horizontal collectives of like-
minded individuals that form together either ontologically to create new activist 
movements, or as part of the wider environmental activist movement as a whole. For 
the purpose of this thesis these groups will be referred to as radical environmental 
activists. This form of environmental activism focuses around “personal 
responsibility for political action and personalised ‘ecocentric’ values” (O’Riordan 
quoted in Anderson, 2004: 107). It is about being part of a society, but making your 
own guidelines, taking responsibility for your own actions – without leadership, 
negotiation or regulation by other human beings. What connects the two, hierarchical 
and non-hierarchical, is environmentalism or, more precisely, environmental politics; 
the second term in the title.  
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Environmental Politics 
Dryzek and Schlosberg’s (2009) opening salvo in Debating the Earth: The 
Environmental Politics Reader defines environmental politics as “how humanity 
organises itself to relate to the nature that sustains it” (2009: 1) and this will be the 
context in which the term is used in this thesis. Moreover, environmental politics are 
defined in terms of relations between people, the natural environment and economic 
governance in a highly industrialised society.  
 
Governance is not government or the art of government but “governance and 
government are often regarded not as discrete entities but two poles on a continuum 
of different governing types” (Finer, 1970). Pierre and Peters (2000) note “the term 
governance derives from its capacity – unlike that of the narrower term – government 
– to cover the whole range of institutions and relationships involved in the process of 
governing” (Jordan, Wurzel and Zito, 2005: 478). The word “governance” is not a 
neologism, but has increasingly grown in usage since the 1990s (Pierre and Peters, 
2000). Bevir and Rhodes (2003: 45) observe that “governance is a change in the 
nature or meaning of government”, and this is expanded in Stoker’s definition (1998: 
17) that  governance refers to the emergence of “governing styles in which the 
boundaries between the public and private sectors are blurred”. Rhodes calls such 
governing styles a “new operating code” (1996: 47)  that works as a “self-organising 
and co-ordinating network of societal actors” (Schout and Jordan, 2005 in Jordan, 
Wurzel and Zito, 2005: 480). Despite these varying definitions, Jordan, Wurzel, and 
Zito (2005), echoing Schout and Jordan, offer a useful interpretation of governance 
that it is “synonymous with a change in the meaning of government, a new process 
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of governing, or a changed condition of ordered rule, or a new method by which 
society is governed” (2005: 477). This thesis argues that how governments have co-
opted a environmental governance through biopower, (see Chapter Three) by 
introducing an economic approach, to include entrepreneurial discourse, to aid 
market-driven interests into environmental discourse.  
 
This has been achieved through “steering (setting policy goals) and rowing 
(delivering steering goals through use of instruments) societal actors, individuals and 
collectives of people” (Osbourne and Gaebler, 1992 cited in Jordan, Wurzel, and 
Zito, 2005: 480) as techniques or technologies of self. The self, the individual is 
guided to act in certain ways that benefit the collective or societal whole. As Luke 
mentions, any rejection of such codes, rules, or policy is administrated through 
stronger direct legislative measures such as new laws, restrictive measures and, in 
some cases, incarceration. For example, HACAN Chairman, John Stewart was 
refused entry in the United States of America (September 2011) because of his 
association with anti-aviation collective Plane Stupid (Lydall, 2011).  
 
Emerging at the same time as the activist movements, economic and political 
environmentalism developed in reaction to a “more accelerated industrial 
development” (Finger, 2008: 44). An increased concern about green issues, 
environmental problems and the social and economic impact of environmental 
disasters (such as floods and famine) began to be defined and discussed in two 
meaningful ways – at institutional level and through activism.  
 
The environmental movement rapidly took shape following the first Earth Day in 
1970, and within the emergence of a green political discourse (Torgerson, 1999). The 
23 
 
early 1970s saw the first environmental activism, when Rex Hunter along with 
fellow academics and journalists formed Greenpeace. Having chartered a boat from 
Vancouver, they attempted to sail into a nuclear-testing zone off the coast of Alaska. 
Although this direct action failed when the USA tested the bomb ahead of the 
scheduled time, it created a media frenzy (Hunter, 2004). The controlled and 
calculated release of information to the press by journalists aboard the Phyllis 
McCormack meant they maximised the amount of coverage.
5
 Each journalist on 
board the boat was assigned a specific role to gain the most exposure:  
 
Cummings would file his stuff with Vancouver’s underground paper, 
The Georgia Straight, which would pass it on to all the underground 
papers in Canada, the US, and Europe via the Liberation News 
Service. I would pump out a daily column in the Vancouver Sun. 
Fineberg would get stories out to papers in Alaska. (Hunter, 2004: 43) 
 
Hunter et al. reinforced their media message with the support of the students’ 
movement (Hunter, 2004). Linking with the student movement guaranteed coverage, 
as the New York Times newspaper declared “Students protest A Test” (Reuters, 1971: 
55). The small article notes that: 
 
Nearly 9,000 elementary and high school students gathered at the 
United States Consulate…in peaceful protest against the planned 
nuclear test …no serious incidents occurred at the demonstration, 
although the police said that a few youths tried to remove an 
American flag. (Anon, 1971: 55) 
 
The article raises some of the themes that this thesis will examine – the students are 
referred to as “youths”; there is a clear statement that no disturbances occurred, but 
the journalist felt it necessary to note the removal of a flag. As this thesis will show, 
this language pattern can be identified from the 1970s to recent protests. 
                                                   
5 Robert (Bob) Hunter was a journalist with the Vancouver Sun and, influenced by media commentator Marshall 
McLuhan, he understood how important media coverage was in raising awareness of eco-political issues. The 
boat was later renamed Greenpeace.  
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However, Greenpeace’s mistake over the Brent Spar oil rig debate, led many 
journalists to question the relationship between journalists and activists. Although the 
Brent Spar protest by Greenpeace is rejected as a sample of CDA, or for the focus 
group, it has importance, in highlighting relations between NGOs and journalist. Up 
until the mid-1990s, Greenpeace continued to spoon feed journalists ready-made new 
packages (Anderson, 1997), and many television executives were seduced by 
Greenpeace’s media set-up, until the Brent Spar campaign. Royal Dutch Shell 
planned to sink a decommissioned oil rig in the Atlantic Ocean. Greenpeace argued 
that  sinking the rig would coause greater environmental damage that dismantle the 
rig. The protest began an international event, as  activist from “six North Sea 
countries staged an on-site protest with Greenpeace offices around the worlds 
publicising the event from their respective home countries” (Wapner, 2002: 44). 
Greenpeace supplied journalists with images from Greenpeace ships  who “circled 
the rig with photographers producing images of the occupation that were sent out 
electronically to media sources throughout the world” (Wapner, 2002: 44).  The 
protest led to debates in Parliament. The media campaign put pressure on BP and the 
Conservative government to support the dismantling of the rig  on land, over BP’s 
plans to sink the ring in the North Sea (Anderson, 2003:123).  Ironically, the 
journalist showed little interest in  “the proposed deep-sea dumping of the derelict 
North Sea Brent Spar oil terminal  (until Greenpeace’s action), it was a non-issue as 
far as the British news media were concerned’ (Hansen: 2000: 58). Yet, with a 
constant stream of news ready footage, journalists took “films of its direct action” 
that were  immediately relayed by satellite telephone to newsrooms across northern 
Europe” (Rose, 1998) from Greenpeace’s new hub. Greenpeace’s aim was to “guide 
inter-state behaviour with regard to environmental issues” as many “NGOs try to 
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shape the quality of these regimes” (Wapner,2002: 41). The continuing direct action, 
media pressure and international pressure from Germany (which has the highest 
percentage of Greenpeace members worldwide) (Rootes, 2003) led to a u-turn by the 
Prime Minister and the backing of Greenpeace; which led to the “abandonment of 
plans to sink a redundant oil installation in the Atlantic Ocean” (Anderson, 
2003:123). Shell issued a press statement announcing that due to a lack of “wider 
government support… it had abandoned deep-sea disposal” (Rose, 1998:120).  
 
The Daily Mirror newspaper claimed victory and the news-reading public (rightly or 
wrongly) interpreted the combined protest of media pressure and direct action as 
having achieved political change. Rose (1998) attributes the changes to a sympathetic 
European press, xenophobic reporting by British journalists and a ‘public campaign 
had created the largest environmental issue for years… [and] it touched a raw anti-
European sore spot in the British body politic and the ‘Spar got ‘cross over, 
awakening views and opinions that had very little to do with the environment – and 
everything to do with politics, even identity of Britain as a nation’ (Rose:1998:138). 
A consequence of mixing environmental politics with poor media practice was that 
journalists failed to question Greenpeace, the protest or the environmental harm or 
benefits of either dumping or dismantling the rig.  
 
When Greenpeace admitted it had “made wrong claims about toxic waste” allegedly 
encased in the rig, they apologised to “Shell, the Government and, on 16 June, the 
UK media’ (Rose 1998:144).  The Times newspaper editorial led with “Grow Up, 
Greenpeace: a little more responsibility is now required” (1995: 21); as the Daily 
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Mail   newspaper ran with “Red-faced Greens admit: We got it wrong” (Hughes and 
Norris, 1995: 11). Head of BBC newsgathering, Richard Sambrook told the 
Edinburgh Television Festival, “It was our own fault, the media’s fault. We never put 
enough distance between ourselves and the participants. I’m left feeling Greenpeace 
was pulling us by the nose” (Rose 1998: 159). Greenpeace retorted by claiming the 
media were to blame, “The media got drunk on the drama of the Brent Spar story and 
now they blame us for the hangover’ (The Independent cited in Rose 1998: 161).  
Moreover, as Glasgow Media School academic, Greg Philo notes:   
 
TV News Executives are apparently horrified that Greenpeace supplied video 
material to them on their campaign over the Brent Spar. But for years now 
defence contractors, drug companies and other vested interests have supplied 
video news releases directly to television news… Her Majesty’s Government 
had also dipped its toe in the waters of achieving favourable media coverage 
by spending money. In the 1980s it became the biggest spender on 
advertising in the country…All this passed without mention by TV executive 
until Greenpeace and the Brent Spar (Philo, cited in Rose 1998:162) 
 
Journalist struck out at Greenpeace’s mistake, and the backlash led to a break down 
in trust between NGOs, activists and journalists. Rose singles out the BBC as failing 
to “testing any claim Greenpeace makes, it tends to raise the issue of the Spar to cast 
any doubt on a claim or a statement without testing it. It is as if the BBC feels it has 
to make up for transmitting the footage of the Spar campaign by repeatedly attacking 
Greenpeace for it” (Rose 1998:164-5). 
 
Whilst eco-activists and social movements were grabbing the headlines for the wrong 
reasons, governments and global institutions’ nascent steps towards biopolitical 
policies were emerging in the form of green capitalism. The period from mid 1970s 
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to early 1980s, is generally accepted as the time of social movement development 
(Anderson, 1997) within environmental discourse. The era was marked by the 
increased politicization of the environmental lobby, as mass media, youth culture and 
large scale consumption aided the civil rights, feminist and environmental 
movements. At the same time, the global economy underwent a series of major 
restructuring processes meant “by the 1970’s the environment had to a large extent 
becomes institutionalised” (McCormick, 1989: 81).   
 
Since the end of World War II, global environmental governance, has been 
“governed by what academics and policy makers called the Bretton Woods system” 
(Newell and Paterson, 2010: 18). The Bretton Woods system (founded in July 1944) 
comprises of two financial organisations – the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), which later 
became part of the World Bank. Wall (2010) argues that “neoliberal globalisation 
such as the International Monetary Fund and World Trade organisations” increases 
corporate-led globalisation, which “pushes countries into adopting policies which 
hurt the poor and wreck the environment” (77).  
The 1970’s oil crisis (1973-1974, and the Iran revolution, 1979) provided an 
“impetus to changes in energy policy, [and] had a significant  impact on the global 
economy” (Newell and Paterson, 2010: 19). The oil crisis made a significant impact 
on global environmental governance as Newell and Paterson (2010) notes as  
 
…the ideological fixation with markets, the dominance of finance, the 
widening global economic inequalities, and the focus on networks as means 
of organising- have all combines to shape the character of responses to 
climate change (23-24) 
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The World Bank was originally set up as a “development institute, not a crisis fighter 
[whose] focus on project leading and structural reforms enhance long running 
development and poverty elimination” (Stiglitz in Chang, 2001: 191). By the mid 
1990s the World Bank, alongside the launch of the World Trade Organization 
(1995), meant that “neoliberal economic reforms were well underway in many 
developing and ex-communist economies” (Chang, 2001: 2). The effect was a 
recognition of new markets and a need for new policies, including environmental and 
educational policies to ensure the elimination of poverty and environmental 
problems. Moreover, the effect of a “neo-liberal world order” was that it produced a 
set of “attitudes that begin to dominate the world stage after the fall of Keynesianism 
in the developed countries in the 1970s and the collapse of the state-led 
industrialisation models in developing countries” (Stiglitz in Chang, 2001: 2), no 
more so than in environmental policy and governance.  
 
A series of key global summits produced a series of codes, rules and forms of 
conducts for both states and individuals. The United Nations Conference on the 
Human Environment (Stockholm 1972)- that included a “call from a ‘loyalty to the 
earth…the adoption of  global (as opposed to national) responses to environmental 
problems, and massive changes in over-consumptive lifestyles of the wealthy” 
(Bernstein, 2002: 3). By the 1980s, sustainability became a buzz-word for 
environmental discourse, propelled with the ratification of the Montreal Protocol. 
Montreal Protocol of 1987 banning the use of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). The next 
significant summit, leading to Agenda 21, was ratified at the Earth Summit in Rio De 
Janeiro, Brazil, in 1992. Agenda 21 sets out for the UN “the first draft of the ‘Earth 
Charter’, a vision for an environmentally sustainable planet” (Cox, 2010: 78). 
Agenda 21 charter placed international pressure upon large organisations to adopt an 
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environmental policy. At the Rio Earth Summit, the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED) passed a motion to ratify Agenda 21, 
which “propelled and justified the terms sustainable development into common 
currency” (Buckingham and Turner, 2008: 50).  
 
Bernstein notes, by the time Rio had occurred there emerged view which supported 
the “view that liberalisation in trade and finance is consistent with, and even 
necessary for, international environmental protection” (2002:4). Increasingly, this 
view led to the “promotion of global free trade and open markets on the economic 
side, and the polluter pays principle” (2002: 4). Agenda 21 signalled the emergence 
of neoliberal capitalism within environmental discourse. The objectives of Agenda 
21 were to “promote market instruments an the integration of environment and 
development in decision making related action programmes” (Bernstein, 2002: 7) 
Thus, the environment became “not only an additional investment opportunity, but 
also an opportunity for Transnational Corporations (TNCs) and governments to 
offset some of their environmental wrongdoings” (Finger, 2008: 51). The UK 
government’s development of alternative energy markets, including carbon and 
emissions trading schemes, was introduced with little regulation by the state. With 
limited government regulation, an “advanced liberal government” (Rose, 1993) 
enabled market forces to move into a leading role. Supported by Western 
governments and institutions, at the same time successive UK governments were 
introducing legislation that prevented and curtailed the use of protest and direct 
action. By focusing on economic as the key solution to climate change,  diminished 
the public voice of environmental activists, and increasingly placed it into a politics 
of deviance, as the opening quote of this introduction indicates, repeated here: 
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the ongoing struggle over economic competitiveness, environmental 
resistance can even be recast as a type of civil disobedience, which 
endangers national security, expresses unpatriotic sentiments, or 
embodies treasonous acts. (Luke, 1999: 125) 
 
Luke’s analysis looks at American environmental politics, with a close reading of 
former Vice President Al Gore’s and President Clinton’s attempts to create a “green” 
global Marshall plan, but his observations can be applied to the current and historical 
specificities of the UK environmental activist movements. This work considers that a 
similar pattern emerged in the UK media’s representation of environmental activism. 
Applying Luke’s concepts to an analysis of the environmental activists and 
journalists at this “specific stage of evolution of modern capitalism” (Hall, 1971: 15) 
reveals a stigmatisation of activists by placing them into a framework of deviance. 
This discursive challenge over environmental politics creates a new language that 
“produces both explanations and justification” (Hall, 1971: 18). In Foucauldian 
terms, the discursive challenge led to a form of truth (“Regime of Truth”) (Rabinow, 
1984), where discourse may not be “true”, but will nevertheless have consequences 
for the subject in the discourse (Hall, 1997: 49). As Chapter Three will argue, 
advanced liberal government juxtaposed environmental solutions with an increased 
curtailing and restriction of environmental protest. The use of language shows how 
media discourse frames activists as delinquent deviants. Thus, referring to 
“environmental politics” in the title of this thesis focuses on the relationship between 
state and activists in the public domain. The third term in the title, “representation”, 
in this context, stands for discourse.  
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Representation as Discourse 
Language gives us the tools to understand how a topic is constructed and reasoned 
with, to give meaning (Hall, 1997), where “meaning depends on the relationship 
between things in the world” (Hall 1997: 18). “Language provides the tools for 
discourse as a system of representation” (Hall, 1997: 44). Foucault claims that 
language is a way of constructing meaning through a group of interrelated statements 
which collectively constitute a discourse (Foucault, 1972). Each statement constitutes 
a meaning or knowledge about a topic or subject. The function of “discourse” is to 
produce knowledge through language, and how that language is constructed is how 
knowledge is formed. Thus, discourse is a group of statements that provide a 
language in which to represent knowledge about a particular historical moment (Hall, 
1992); and it is “about the production of knowledge through language” (Hall, 1984: 
291). A semiotic approach could help us to understand how journalists denote 
meaning in the representation of eco-activism, but revealing how language constructs 
or imposes meaning neither contextualises it nor gives any historical context. 
Foucault (1972, 1977, 1991, 1997), however, focuses on how meaning is produced 
(“discourse”), which will go some way in answering the research questions of the 
thesis. 
 
To unravel how meaning is produced through a Foucauldian lens means adopting a 
more historically grounded approach. Doing so will help reveal relationships 
between discourse, power relations and how journalists use language to produce 
meaning (Chapter Five). This work argues that it is necessary to examine historical 
periods in order to contextualise the present. A historically grounded approach will 
also reveal how power relations shift over time, from environmental activists 
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attaining positive news coverage (positive to a certain degree) to being framed as a 
negative representation.  
 
Media and Protest Power Relations 
This thesis will explore how changes in media discourse have provided  some 
opportunities for social movements that have traditionally been denied. Traditional 
media practice has relied on a one-to-many model. The one-to-many is led by 
journalists, editors, media houses and broadcasting companies. Originally 
newspapers were “gatekeepers of information” – David White coined the term 
“gatekeeping” to mean the series of people and processes (in the media) that 
information passes through before becoming public knowledge. White notes that 
before an event is given news value “a story is transmitted from one gatekeeper after 
another in the chain of communications. From reporter to rewrite man…the process 
of choosing and discarding is continuously taking place” (Dexter and White, 1964: 
163). In relation to state and the media, Becker terms this gatekeeping as a 
“hierarchy of credibility…In any system of ranked groups, participants take it as 
given that members of the highest group have the right to define the way things 
really are” (1967: 241). Thus news production becomes a top-down stream of 
information, from one to the many, passing from one gate through to another. That 
was the dominant model until the internet, which changed the top-down, one-to-
many, to horizontal one-to-one. 
 
The internet was initially created as a communication tool by the American military; 
it has subsequently aided the advance of both capital accumulation and global 
communication. Creating new forms of communication and developing new 
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technologies as part of “capital’s dream of superfast networks that will spread 
consumerism across the planet” (Notes from Nowhere, 2003: 65), the internet and 
later the world wide web (in the 1990s) gave new opportunities for wider 
communications, greater networks and organisational structures – not just for 
capitalists but also for protest movements. The internet changed modes of 
communication, from one-to-one (such as the telephone), one-to-many through print 
and broadcasting media, to many-to-many (Gilmore, 2006).  
 
The relationship between the web and mainstream media practice led to an increased 
interaction between media houses and the general public. Consumers could now 
react quickly to a story or news event. More co-operations emerged, and there was 
less suspicion between the general public and the media. The web also shifted the 
way news is consumed. With the development of smart phones, tablets, and the 
internet, news can be consumed 24 hours a day, from anywhere in the world. No 
longer do consumers have to wait for the six o’clock headlines or next day’s 
newspaper to gain information. The result is that the “internet meant journalism 
became an old practice in a new context – a synthesis of tradition and innovation” 
(Kawamoto, 2003: 4). Technologies enabled consumers to access news at any time. 
Moreover, the internet makes journalists out of everyone. As well as consuming the 
news, the web and internet enables citizen journalism (through blogs, video-apps, 
and smart phones), but often at the cost of diminishing the authority of traditional 
journalism in ways that are not always desirable (Newlands, 2010). 
 
In addition, it must be acknowledged that, as Gilmore (2003) notes, “the 
development of the personal computer may have empowered the individual, but there 
were distinct limits” (2003: 16). Such limits are defined by the concept of “digital 
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divide”. Digital divide is a term that emerged in the mid 1990s. It refers to the 
inequality between those who have “ever”, and those who have “never” had access to 
the internet. This inequality can be polarised through educational opportunity, 
wealth, age, urban/rural location, and physical ability. The internet also brings with it 
divides in democracy. As Norris notes, the internet creates a “divide between those 
who do and do not use the multiple political resources available on the internet for 
civic engagement” (2001: 12). Moreover, although journalism may have been 
opened up, it was still regulated and moderated by the organisations and individuals 
that had access to their websites. However, one group that has heavily utilised the 
internet for civic engagement is the new social movement associated with 
environmental activism.  
 
The growth of the internet has worked to the benefit of new social movements, by 
expanding their numbers and aiding the easier co-ordination of tactics and skills. The 
year 1999 saw the explosion of technologically led social movements across the 
globe. Following protest outside the World Trade Organization meeting (on 1 
December), the world awoke to media images of protesters and rioters clashing on 
the streets of Seattle, USA. Newspaper images of handcuffed activists, tear gas 
clouds and police standing over protesters were already familiar in the UK. Six 
months earlier a similar event had taken place in London, with the Global Justice 
Movement’s J18 protest, Carnival of Capital. Seattle and London were united by 
what appeared to be a spontaneous anti-capitalist protest that emerged from nowhere. 
In reality, the two events were a highly organised protest as a “result of clear sets of 
mathematical principles and processes that govern a highly connected network” 
(Notes from Nowhere, 2003: 68). The protest had been co-ordinated through a 
network of internet sites, emails and websites.  
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New social movements and users of cyberspace involve interactions between like-
minded people, with shared interests, often operating in non-hierarchical ways. 
Indeed, as Jenny Pickerill notes, “cyberspace has been likened to that of a rhizome” 
(2003: 24), in that a “rhizomatic structure provides multiple entryways, facilitating 
potential participants’ entry into environmental activism through connections to their 
rhizomatic online networks” (Pickerill, 2003: 24). The hypertextual architecture 
(Kahn and Kelner, 2003) of the internet has been referred to as a non-hierarchical 
“rhizome” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1989: 7). Such non-linear networks connects any 
point to another point, understood in terms of a non-signifying system that is neither 
singled down to one aspect or multiple aspects (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987). The 
rhizome has been defined as: 
 
[A] multiplicity that has no coherent and bounded whole, no 
beginning or end, only middle from where it expands and overspills. 
Any point of the rhizome is connected to any other. It has no fixed 
points to anchor thought, only lines; magnitudes, dimensions, 
plateaus, and they are always in motion. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1996: 
377)  
 
This rhizomatic approach helps us understand why the internet might be an 
appropriate communication tool for protest movements, as it is not hierarchically 
structured nor organised, mirroring the make-up of radical protest movements. The 
term ‘radical protest movements’ refers to protest collectives that exist outside of 
NGOs, single-issue protest movements or lobbyists, such as the vertical network of 
Greenpeace. Vertical networks, which favour linear developments, are not often 
found in new social movement organisations and environmental activist collectives. 
Rather, protest movements are often characterised by horizontality. Actions are 
arranged through consensus politics, which is why the term “rhizome” is useful in 
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understanding how technology is used by activist movements. Emails, blogs and 
forums are all used in the decision-making process, alongside face-to-face meetings. 
So, the internet echoes the rhizomatic networks that shape the environmental protest 
movements, making it an attractive technology for protest. In addition, new 
technological developments in modes of communication narrow the division between 
mainstream and alternative media forms. The effect is that activists have a new 
platform through which they can bypass traditional media, with its often 
unsympathetic messages, and produce their own websites, blogs and media. It also 
means they are able to produce their own media on a global scale – important 
examples here include indymedia.org.uk or SchNews.org.uk.  
 
Furthermore, by bypassing traditional media, activist media is free of the “order of 
discourse” that favours state over activists, and in which activism and protest 
reportage is often unfavourable to protest movements. The creation of alternative 
media (such as Indymedia) means that activists can be both producers and consumers 
of news. The symbiotic relationship between activists and the internet shifts any 
action from local event to, potentially, global news. Websites enable activists to 
provide information direct to journalists, and document protests themselves and post 
their own coverage. ELZN’s application of internet as a tool for bypassing state  
regulations, for Castells, informed global networks, as messages about protest 
generated by Indymedia, “numerous hacklabs, temporary or stable, populated the 
movement and used the superior technological savvy of the new generation to build 
an advantage in the communication battle against their elders in the mainstream 
media” (Castells, 2009: 344). 
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This has led to new techniques that draw on the notion of “cyberlibertarianism” and 
the ability to develop “electronically mediated forms of living with radical libertarian 
ideas about the proper definition of freedom, economics and community” (Heath and 
Potter, 2004: 301). However, while the creation of the internet was a facilitating 
device for consumer capitalism, it also meant that activists could flourish in the 
“public part of cyberspace” (Lovink, 2002: 254). This growth in communication 
meant activists’ networks in the UK could learn from other activists’ movements 
around the world, as “global networks of power and counter-power landed 
simultaneously to confront each other in the spotlight of the media” (Castells, 2009: 
340). The most notable example is the Zapatista movement, which partly inspired the 
Global Justice Movement. Briefly, the Zapatista movement emerged when Canadian, 
Mexican and American governments drew up the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), framing it as an opportunity to lower trade barriers. However, 
it led to lower subsidies to the indigenous populations, whilst opening up 
opportunities for large corporations. To appease their indigenous population, the 
Mexican government agreed to an amendment to the Treaty, and when newly elected 
President Fox sent the Indigenous Rights Bill to be passed in 2001, the Zapatista 
army (a group of farmers) travelled the 2,000 miles to the capital to address 
Congress. When they reached Mexico City they were greeted by 100,000 people. 
Bringing thousands of people together through the internet showed the potential 
organising possibilities of the world wide web. By 2001, details of the Zapatista’s 
protest against NAFTA had spread around the world via email, websites and blogs. 
The Zapatista movement is significant for its use of news lists and homepages to 
mobilise support (Krøvel, 2011). News lists and web pages are increasingly key 
sources for many activism movements. Such new technology is, as Krøvel notes, 
laying: 
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The foundation for global networks undermining much of the 
Mexican state’s formal and informal control over production and 
distribution of information. Slowly, radio, newspapers and television 
also became less inclined to simply repeat official information. (2011: 
131) 
 
For the Zapatista, technology and the internet provided one way to  disseminating 
information outside the hierarchy of credibility and gatekeeping practices. The 
Zapatista movement was effective for its combining of “broad-based, local and 
national networks, run by communities, and linked internationally, by the Internet, 
have proved themselves capable of bringing together very large groups of people in 
very short spaces of time” (Kingsnorth, 2003: 75).  
 
Castells argues a growth in communication technology founded on Internet tools 
meant collective such as the Zapatistas benefited when “global networks of power 
and counter-power landed simultaneously to confront each other in the spotlight of 
the media” (Castells, 2009: 340).  Castell’s cites the Zapatista movement as an 
example of the internet providing a platform to challenge international policies.  
Castell, (2009), Collier and Collier, (2007) and Klein (2002) believe the internet 
provide the platform for the EZLN social movement to shift power away from 
journalists and into the hands of activist. Klein argues that “Marcos himself was a 
one-man web: he is a compulsive communicator, constantly reaching out, drawing 
connections between different issues and struggles” (2002: 217).  Naomi Klein 
echoes Castell’s romanticises the Chiapas “ the strategic victory of the Zapatistas 
was to change the terms: to insist  that what was going on in Chiapas could not be 
written off as a narrow ethnic struggle, that is was both specific and universal” 
(Klein, 2002: 217). 
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In contrast, Krøvel asks, why then do we need journalists if power relations shifts to 
the point society is based on a network of information that “participants themselves 
can distribute…directly to their audiences without the mediation of journalists” 
(Krøvel, 2011: 135). Yet, as Krøvel  (2011) notes, it was not the network of 
information and independent journalism that challenged the government’s position, 
but the physical ‘caravan’  that travelled from Chipas to Mexico City, traversing 
from state to state, with “journalists from dozens of countries following the caravan” 
(Krøvel, 2011: 136). When the caravan reached Mexico City some “200,000 people” 
greeted the numerous Nobel Prize winners, authors, artists and musicians that had 
travelled with the EZLN.  Thus, Castell’s interpretation of the ELZN as largely 
successful due to its virtual presence could be seen as romanticising new technology 
roles within social movements.  The ELZN media event occurred due to the physical 
procession, which garnered media attention over the networks of information. The 
Internet did play an important supporting role, to disseminate information “so that 
speeches and announcements could be published almost without delay” (Krøvel, 
2011: 136).  
 
However, critiques Berger, (2001), Chandler, (2004) and Krøvel,(2011) argue there 
were several other factors that bough the ELZN into the world’s spotlight. Whilsts, 
ELZN activists relied on a listserv method (Chipas-L) to disseminate information. 
What was problematic with listserv  Chipas-L was EZLN  found it more useful 
“when trying to gather information to correct or repudiate claims in the mainstream 
media” than to disseminate information to supporters and the press. (Krøvel, 2011: 
133). Activists learnt the Internet often provided a breeding ground for “spreading 
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unsubstantiated rumours” and that is was “of great importance that the information” 
put out via the Chipas-L listserves was “trustworthy” (Krøvel, 2011: 133).   
Castells argues that “EZLN’s success was founded upon their information strategy” 
and that along with Cleaver, Castells had “tried to show that information technology” 
provides a platform to “alter fundamental power relations in society” (Krøvel, 2011: 
135).   
Chandler argues such power relations emerge from a series of local protest that links 
together the various other national or domestic protest across the globe. In sharing 
similar characteristics that challenge power- whereby power is “conceptual shorthand 
for capitalism and its enforcers at a global and national level” (Baker, cited in 
Chandler, 2004:  327), local protest are able to “transgress traditional political 
boundaries, whether conceptual or spatial” (Chandler, 2004:  328).  Moreover, 
Graeber notes “more and more, activists have been trying to draw attention to the 
fact that the neoliberal vision of ‘globalization’ is pretty much limited to the 
movement of capital and commodities, and actually increases barriers against the 
free flow of people, information and ideas—the size of the US border guard has 
almost tripled since the signing of NAFTA” (2002, 65) . Not until the global justice 
movement protest in Seattle, that followed the J18 and N30 protests in London as the 
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most noted example of global civil society globalisation from below was the 
Zapatista, whose use of the internet to promote their struggle over land rights 
was picked up by Western academics, who turned the limited success of the 
Chiapas rising into a revolutionary ‘postmodern social movement (Chandler, 
2004:  326).  
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Chandler draws on Klein’s interpretation of the Chiapas rising as “ rather than 
political leadership, the Zapatistas argue they offer a mirror
6
 reflecting the struggles 
of others…the message is that subaltern subjects should celebrate difference rather 
than seek integration on the terms of power” (Chandler, 2004:  326). Chandler goes 
on to say, “the Zapatista understood that an attempt at changing power relations was 
“their weakness vis-à-vis the state and, instead of challenging governing power, 
follow the less ambitious project of creating autonomous counter-publics” (Chandler, 
2004:  327).  
Despite  journalists from around the globe covering the caravan, a “large number of 
news outlets [were] also in tow, producing relatively independent and reliable 
information” (Krøvel, 2011: 137), then power relations remained the same between 
activists and the mainstream media. Journalists were no longer reliant on the list-
serves or government rhetoric for information, and could produce their own version 
of events , meaning “there was less need for the production of alternative news” 
(Krøvel, 2011: 137). Moreover, the listserv were reliant on mainstream media 
reports, with every fourth article cut and paste from mainstream media outlets. Power 
structures remain the same between activists and journalists, but the internet did 
enable ELZN to challenge the earlier press releases by the state, to help develop 
“robust modes of independent and critical journalism with the traditional institutions 
of profession news production” (Krøvel, 2011: 137). 
 
Moreover, Castells and Klein overlook several influential factors that contribute to 
the global phenomenon of the Zapatista and their impact on other social movements 
and protest collectives. Although the internet aided the flow of information to 
                                                   
6 The notion of social movements acting as mirrors to society is explored through Foucault’s concept 
of heterotopia in Chapter six.  
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journalists and fellow activists around the globe, the post-modern discourse of the 
Chiapas, their engagements with NGO’s, indigenous discourse, and women’s rights, 
along with a lack of desire to seek state power and significantly the actions of the 
Zapatista was reflective of resistance towards global neo-liberal political shift 
moving placing local issues onto the global stage, along with the internet shifts 
relations of power between journalists and Chiapas.  Networks of activist movements 
develop over the internet because there is a symbiotic relationship in the 
organisational structures and networks of both the internet and established protest 
movements. Thus there are some advantages of Internet, but it is dangerous to 
romantises the Internet as the solution to power relations between activists and the 
state.  
Thus activists have utilised the rhizomatic, horizontal architecture of the internet, 
new technologies, smart phones and Web 2.0, in order to organise their protests there 
is a necessity for both virtual and physical networks. The internet has become a 
pivotal tool for organising protests, informing the media or voicing opinion, and has 
become a “key ingredient of the environmental movement in the global network 
society” (Castells, 2009: 316). The World Wide Web provides the tools to enable the 
activist movements to develop their own media and political strategies, and has 
extraordinarily “improved the campaigning ability of environmental groups and 
increased international collaboration” (Castells, 2009: 316). Activists are now able to 
use a new “global communications infrastructure for something completely different, 
to become more autonomous” (Notes from Nowhere, 2003: 65). The capacity of new 
technologies to support and sustain dispersed coalitions of protestors and new forms 
of political organisation has been witnessed in the anti-capitalism protests (J18 and 
Seattle in 1999, the May Day protests between 2000 and 2004) and similar “summit 
sieges” at the G8 Conference in 2005 and G20 Conference in 2009.  
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The G8 meeting was targeted as a media event by activists as it was “viewed as part 
of an ongoing series of international mobilisations which have been on the 
mainstream media radar since 1999” (McCurdy, 2009: 44). Some environmental 
activists movements echoed the early practices of the ELZN, namely the use of 
listserv as a way of communicating. At the G8 (2005) action, listserv served as a 
media strategy by the Dissent! network in order to communicate with journalists and 
other global justice movements. Dissent! Activists also developed media practices 
more commonly applied in the US and Australia eco-activisms movements. 
Listssserv were useful for initiating action, by the Dissent! Network, as there was a 
slow realisation that Internet communication needed to be supported with a physical 
media space. Whereas Castell’s romantics the internet as the one-stop shop solution 
to bypassing mainstream media practices. For example, during the G8 camp, 
Scotland, activists created a media gazebo specifically placed outside the G8 Hori-
Zone camp, with an independent media centre inside the camp. The effect of placing 
activists inside, and traditional media outside was akin to “mainstream media front 
stage, radical allowed backstage” (McCurdy, 2010: 48). 
 
Moreover, the G8 (2005) protest was part of a wider global movements, and the 
Zapatista encapsulated the wider, global discord, over the technological advances. 
Collier and Collier note “the Zapatistas have come to stand for radical challenges to 
globalisation…and have contributed to the critiques of global institutions such as the 
World Trade Organisation and the World Bank” (2005: 451). Unlike Castell’s 
interpretation of technology and media activists, it wasn’t the internet that aided the 
Zapatista, but the timing as part of a new global agency. Chandler (2004)  notes “the 
world is allegedly in revolt…for many commentators [Monbiot, 2004, Greaber, 
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2002],this global revolution is different: its membership is found largely outside the 
West, and much of its politics and its techniques were first developed in the global 
South” (324).  Chandler notes how other academics (Hardt and Negri, 2000, Shaw, 
2000) observe  such a “global revolution”  has no collective conscious agency, but 
exists as a “new pluralists agency” which involves the radical redefining of the 
parameters of revolution. (Chandler, 2004:  325). Despite the localisation of protest 
such as the Chiapas, it connects with other local protest movements by a “universal 
character, in that they challenge facets of global capitalist domination” (Chandler, 
2004:  325). For examples the Chiapas movement in contesting the NAFTA 
agreement aimed to “challenge the regional construction of world markets” 
(Chandler, 2004:  325). “if the  Zapatista rebellion was caused by global restructuring 
in the 1980s, its course and prospects have been shaped by international discourse of 
democracy and the rule of law in the 1990s” (Collier and Collier, 2005: 451). Thus 
the Zapatista message over land rights was held at the global level. Moreover, the 
local protest Chandler outlines (LA Riots, 1992, the Palestinian Intifada (1987-1993)  
are organised through local level politics yet reflect global capitalists practice. Thus 
Castell’s argument of protest are a network of power can be challenged.  Berger 
(2001) summarises the argument well  “The world-historical trend towards 
neoliberalism has been characterized by both a  shift in international power relations 
from nation-state to increasingly mobile types of capital and increasingly pronounced 
inequality in  the distribution of wealth world wide” (160). The independent media 
centre provided internet access and computers for anyone wanting to blog or update 
Indymedia websites. Later, at the Camps for Climate Action, the media centre 
became the media tent and centre for workshops on citizen journalism (see Chapter 
Six). 
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However, in 2005, at the G8 protest camp, activists engaged in media relations 
realised that a lack of media strategy, with no formal hierarchical structure, meant 
there was no one to defend or challenge the media representation. The lack of a 
spokesperson, single representative, sound-bites or figurehead to speak on behalf of 
the activists meant that journalists could be libellous without any repercussions. The 
intentional rejection of engagement with journalists jarred with contemporary media 
practices. Journalists rely on simple, snapshot messages of information to turn into a 
story. The lack of any spokesperson or political objectives, as well as the presence of 
numerous different collectives, each with slightly differing objectives (such as Plane 
Stupid’s anti-aviation expansion and Rising Tide’s concern about increased global 
temperatures) made for a plurality of voices, and the irregular pattern of protest 
contrasted with contemporary journalistic practice. Given the incompatibility of 
journalists’ working practices with activism, it was easy for reporters to frame radical 
protest groups in terms that labelled them deviant. Coupled with competing 
discourses within the various movements, and a lack of engagement between the 
mainstream media and each cycle of protest, a media framework was formulated that 
relied on representation through a discourse of deviance and violence – at least, until 
recently. In a mediatised society, today’s protest collectives understood that a 
conscious lack of engagement with professional journalists was potentially 
detrimental to the representation of their own activism. The result was that “media 
movement[s]” (Lester, 2010) have come to accept that there needs to be a 
relationship between activists and journalists. This makes the “media-movement 
relationship a necessary, but uneasy one” (Lester, 2010: 110). As the Heathrow 
protest and many other examples show, how journalists frame environmental 
activism not only affects public perceptions, but gives power to those defining the 
terms of reference. How the language creates meaning, and how that meaning is 
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applied (discourse) to the reporting of environmental activism is the subject of 
Chapter Five.  
 
Theoretical Approaches 
The guiding theories that this thesis will return to draw on Foucault’s concept of 
discourse, power, biopower, governmentality, and heterotopia (1971, 1977, 1982, 
1991). The thesis will develop Luke’s interpretation of governmentality (see Chapter 
Three) and his theory of green governmentality (Luke, 1999). Green 
governmentality, or what Oels (2005) terms eco-governmentality, helps chart shifts 
in power within environmental discourse.  
 
Governmentality can be a concept that both facilities a way to describe a neoliberal 
or advanced liberal rule, and also as a framework or method that examines 
“mentalities or rationalities of government” (Death, (a): 12). Governmentality can be 
a specific form of power, held by the state over the populations. Governmentality can 
also be a way of analysing relations of power in general. In this thesis 
governmentality is applied a framework for analysing relations of power between the 
state, media discourse and environmental activists, and alludes to the role of 
neoliberal and advanced rule as a foundation. This thesis will draw on concepts 
linked to green governmentality literature, as an instrument in which to examine 
relations of power. In doing so, the thesis will not be a Foucauldian governmentality 
interpretation, such as Darier (1996) study of the Canadian governments ‘Green 
Plan’ for a sustainable nation.  
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Luke’s and Oels’ notion of green or eco-governmentality is combined with a critical 
discourse analysis (CDA) (Fairclough, 1995) of newspaper reports of environmental 
activism. This thesis chose to apply a critical discourse analysis over a 
straightforward media discourse analysis as the former provides analytical tools that 
contextualise theoretical positions. Media discourse analysis helps unpack how 
sentences structures (Van Dijk, 1988a), framing (Gamson and Modigliani, 1989) and 
linguistic traits can produce discourse and meaning. In addition to this, CDA 
provides the intertextual tools to examine both the mechanics of meaning and the 
theoretical context in order to address the research questions. Therefore, Fairclough’s 
critical discourse analysis is the preferred empirical research tool for analysing 
newspaper reports. 
 
Power and biopower are understood in a Foucauldian sense, as being omnipresent. 
Foucault (1977), McNay (1994) and Nealon (2008) interpret power as a subtle 
process that is less about obvious and direct mechanisms and techniques used by 
governments to control the population, and more about persuasion and almost 
subliminal levels of power. Power creates “regimes of truth” to shape knowledge, 
and such knowledge can be used to “regulate the conduct of others” (Foucault, 1997: 
27). This regulation is, in Foucauldian terms, biopower – the administration  of the 
body (1976, 1977, 1982, 2002). Power relations between activists, the media and the 
state create truths – which may or may not be true (regimes of truth in Foucauldian 
terms). Power and biopower are “technologies” or “techniques” of governmentality 
to influence individual behaviour.  
 
Governmentality is a means of examining power relations between governments and 
the individual. Individuals’ capacity for self-control and their ability to take control 
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can be influenced by government steps and suggestions (Lemke, 2000). The art of 
government is enacted through what Foucault terms technologies or techniques – 
regulatory modes of power. This work will examine shifts in power and the role of 
regulatory modes of power between environmental governance and activism. In 
unpacking the multifarious levels of power, the work will show that political policy 
criminalises elements of environmental activism, which influences the media 
discourse (see Chapters Four and Five). 
 
Governmentality helps to examine how the state governs environmentalism. This 
thesis argues that successive governments’ interpretations of environmentalism has 
shifted focus away from relationships between people and the natural environment 
and towards a discourse that centres on the administration and regulation of life 
(biopower). The administration and regulation of the body emerges from government 
departments (such as the Department of the Environment), Multilateral 
environmental agreements (MEAs), environmental protocols (such as Basel, 
Montreal and Kyoto) and global institutions and organisations (such as the IPCC, 
UNEC) and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCCP) to guide and direct the body towards individual responsibility for 
climate change. Foucault argues that the state can control individuals through 
coercion and persuasion (technology of the self) by “certain truths and their 
circulation via normalising and disciplining techniques, methods, discourses and 
practices…extend beyond the state and stretch across the social body” (Foucault, 
1990, cited by Rutherford, 2007: 293). Those who challenge or question should be 
contained and controlled (technology of dominance) through legislation and 
regulation; and a technology of the self allows the state to encourage the individual 
to be green through individual consumer behaviour.  
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Luke (1999) terms this “green governmentality”, and this thesis draws on Luke’s 
work and applies it to the successive UK governments’ economic approaches to 
environmentalism (such as The Stern Report, the Conservative Party’s “Vote Blue, 
Go Green” election campaign and the Climate Change Bill). A consequence of such 
a green governmentality approach is an increase in legislative measures (technology 
of dominance) that restrict environmental activism, shifting it into a discourse of 
violence and deviance. At the most threatening level, eco-activism has been equated 
with pre-9/11 threats of terrorism. For example, the term “eco-terrorism” originated 
in the UK, from a link between animal liberation movements and environmental 
action, and, as Chapter Four will show, post-9/11 there is an increasing conflating of 
environmental activism with terrorism.  
 
The theoretical approaches for this thesis combine Foucault’s notion of 
governmentality and biopower with media analytical theory critical discourse 
analysis (Chapter Five). In unravelling how journalists represent eco-activism, this 
work has chosen to concentrate on how activists, media and political discourses 
interrelate. The research reveals how discursive struggles over environmental 
discourse can be defined as falling between social or economic solutions. The result 
is a contestation between these social and economic discourses that is played out in 
the mainstream media. Governmentality is applied to these discursive struggles. 
 
However, the development of the internet, new media and Web 2.0 provided new 
tools for activists to challenge the environmental discourse by inverting and 
subverting media practice. New and social media enable activists to invert media 
practice, such as “media eye” (Couldry, 2000). Moreover, through Foucault’s notion 
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of heterotopia, the thesis will explore how environmental activism continues to 
control its own space in order to remain a challenge to the political and media 
discourse. Within the space of protest camps a number of repertoires of protest and 
media practices have developed. This work will argue that the space is a heterotopia 
– the space of an alternative, not counter means of creating a society (Foucault, 
1986). Activists might argue the space of protest is more a “temporary autonomous 
zone” (TAZ) (Bey, 1991). However, this work argues that in the space of 
environmental activism it is more appropriate to use the term “heterotopia”.  
 
In examining the historical practices of environmental activists, there emerges a 
pattern of protest tactics and strategies that remains within the space of the camps 
and action. Borrowing from other protest movements in Australia and America, the 
UK activists movement has developed a series of liminoid social practices (see 
Hetherington, 1997) that enable activists to invert power relations between activists, 
politics and the media. For example, most camps are marked by a tripod at the 
entrance. The tripod is a three-piece scaffold placed to form a seating space at the top 
that works as a look-out but also as a demarcation tactic for the entrance of the camp. 
This is a tactic borrowed from the Australian movement, which also symbolises the 
“inside” of the camp and the “outside”. The concept of inside/outside is explored by 
Roseneil (1995) and will be examined in the context of the environmental activists’ 
movement (see Chapter Six) with reference to the way it frames the activists’ 
relationship with the media and state.  
 
Combined with the physical space of an action is the use of the internet as a further 
method of disseminating information away from the media eye. The rhizomatic 
make-up (Deleuze and Guattari, 1996) of new media discourses and activism enables 
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counter-political discourses to challenge the dominant discursive position (Death, 
2010b). However, as Castells (1999) notes, not all online activism is beneficial, and 
Chapter Six will explore how the internet aids the profile and transnational 
collaboration of many protests but still creates challenges in attempts to reverse 
power relations between activists and the government.  
 
Method 
The methodological innovations guiding this thesis are drawn from media discourse 
analysis. Chapter Two outlines the various theoretical and empirical methods this 
thesis will apply. For now, suffice to say there are two key points to mention. Firstly, 
due to the time-span of the examples, and in light of emerging technologies, 
newspaper reports will form the basis of the empirical research. The print media has 
been chosen as it is the most consistent form of media used since the early 
environmental activists’ protests. The reporting covers wide dimensions of 
environmental activism and environmental politics. In light of this, and to narrow 
down the empirical data being analysed, this thesis follows what Chilton (1987) 
terms “critical discourse moments”. Carvalho interprets critical discourse moments 
as events or moments which involve “specific happenings that can lead to challenges 
to the ‘established’ discursive position” (2000: 5). The second rationale is simple 
mathematics, looking at the examples which received the largest percentage of 
newspaper coverage (based on Nexis database searches). This allows the data 
analysis to answer the wider research questions by a “combination of comprehensive 
(exhaustive) analysis in selected periods with the analysis of ‘critical discourse 
moments’” (Carvalho, 2000: 4), in establishing the key themes and concepts drawn 
out of newspaper reports. 
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A second empirical method is the qualitative analysis technique of face-to-face 
interviews and a focus group. Interviews were conducted with individuals who had a 
direct dealing with the mainstream media and aimed to gain their personal insights. 
Two empirical research methods are used for this thesis – the qualitative analysis of 
interviews and a focus group. A focus group was chosen in order to judge the overall 
motivation of the activists and canvass their opinions on the movements’ 
relationships with the mainstream media.  
 
The group was shown five newspaper clippings: “The green revolution” (Brown, 
Cornwell, and  Gumbel The Independent, 2006), “Militants in plot to paralyse 
Heathrow” (Mendick, 2007), “Climate Camp gets a lesson in citizen journalism” 
(Lewis, 2009), “How do you glue Mr Brown” (Anon, Daily Mail, 2008) and “It’s BP 
party and we’ll protest if we want too” (Waller, Times, 2009). The objective in 
showing these articles was to establish (a) how activists involved in the direct action 
felt they were represented; (b) what kind of relationship they had with journalists; 
and (c) in what ways did they feel the narrative reflected the objectives of the camps.  
Contribution to the Field  
This thesis will differ from the current literature in the field by providing new 
knowledge about the UK environmental activist movement. It develops earlier work 
on the media and the environment, but unlike that other work, this thesis also 
explores the important role of the state between the media and environmental 
activists. This thesis explores how political discourse impacts on the media 
representation of environmental activism. The thesis also differs from the other work 
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in the field in focusing on radical environmental activists, on horizontal and not 
vertical environmental activism.  
 
The thesis will develop the ideas from a handful of seminal texts that directly address 
the subject (Hansen, 1993; Anderson, 1997; Deluca 1999; Lester, 2007; Cox, 2010; 
Hansen, 2010; Lester, 2010). Anderson’s Media, Culture and the Environment 
(1997) was the first significant contribution to the literature which examined how the 
media reports environmentalism. Anderson’s work offers an insight into the working 
practices of journalists, NGOs, and social movement organisations such as 
Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth, and draws on significant examples to show that 
environmentalism in the 1990s, although important to news agendas, often struggled 
to retain a place. Anderson applies Fowler’s (1991) studies to analyse how discourse 
shapes news by relying on taken-for-granted assumptions in news practice. Anderson 
unpacks the questions of ideology, objectivity and impartiality to ask if media 
practitioners can be impartial or independent when targeted by environmental 
pressure groups. Anderson’s empirical research consists of face-to-face interviews 
with leading environmental journalists to reveal the key characteristics of 
environmental news items. This thesis differs from Anderson’s method of content 
analysis by looking at discourse through CDA, with the addition of a Foucauldian 
theoretical approach. Unlike Anderson’s interviews with journalists, this thesis has 
chosen to conduct empirical research with activists. This rationale for focusing on 
activists was because Anderson’s work, and later works by Hansen (2010) and 
Lester, 2007 and 2010), have extensively interviewed journalists, whereas talking 
directly to activists about media relations has been limited (see McCurdy’s doctoral 
thesis (2009), Schlembach (2011) and Saunders and Price (2009)). Moreover, 
Anderson’s work focuses upon a period during the mid to late 1990s, when 
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environmental pressure groups had greater access to journalists. Since Anderson’s 
book there have been major environmental protests, both globally and domestically. 
The emergence of the internet has also changed relations and practice between 
journalists and activists. Therefore, this thesis offers new knowledge on activists’ 
movement relationship with social media as an organising tool, and its problematics in 
organising protest in the virtual world.  
 
This thesis also develops Hansen’s reworking of his 1993 book, Environment, Media 
and Communications that offers new insight into the relationships between the media 
and environmentalism. Similarly to this thesis, Hansen looks at how media messages 
come to shape our knowledge of the environment, as well as how environmental 
problems are defined. Whereas this thesis focuses on the UK movement, Hansen 
draws upon the experience of different countries to reveal how different theoretical 
approaches can unravel the relationships between the meaning of the environment 
and the media. Both Anderson’s and Hansen’s works offer a good overview of 
journalistic practices in iterating environmental issues, as does Lester’s most recent 
work Media and Environment (2010). Here, Lester examines why environmental 
issues are often moved down or off the news agenda. The premise of Lester’s 
argument is it is easier to get the word “spondulicks” into a news story than it is to 
get an environmental story into the news agenda. Both Hansen and Lester offer 
valuable new knowledge about discursive changes in environmental discourse. 
Lester’s first work (2007) has similarities with this thesis in the exploration of 
relations between activists and the media, whereas her second book (2010) focuses 
more on journalistic practice and less on activists’ experience. Anderson, Hansen and 
Lester have focused on the media and environmentalists, without exploring how 
political discourse impacts on environmental news stories.  
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This thesis will provide a new way of understanding the relations of power between 
activists and political movements. Examining relations of power through a 
governmentality lens will show how the historical shift in power occurred to conflate 
activism with deviance. It will offer a new perspective on environmental activism by 
charting why environmental discourse is linked to advanced liberal government and 
market-led solutions to environmental issues. The CDA will show that journalism 
has moved from relatively sympathetic stories to conflating activism with militancy, 
fear and terrorism. Through the mechanism of CDA, the work will show how the 
shift in power is played out through media representations. Once the theoretical 
perspective is established, and reinforced through the CDA, the work will examine 
how the environmental activists’ movement has been able to challenge and contest 
environmental discourse. The final section will explore how activists built up a 
toolbox of tactics, both virtual and physical, to remain active. In doing so, this work 
will offer new knowledge on how Web 2.0 and social media impacts on power 
relations between political and media discourses. This thesis presents the data 
obtained by the focus group, which draws together a unique collection of people who 
have played important roles in the relationships between the radical environmental 
activist movements and journalists. However, this work will argue that activists must 
remain within a heterotopia, or, as the final section shows, there is a risk of 
conformity that removes all power from the movement. 
 
Outline of Chapters 
There are seven chapters in total. Following this Introduction, Chapter Two focus on 
methodological approaches of discourse analysis, critical discourse analysis and 
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original empirical data. Chapter Two then sets out what is meant by the term 
“discourse”, and why discourse analysis and CDA are suitable tools to establish how 
journalists report on environmental activism. This thesis is in effect drawing on 
media and political discourse to understand how and why journalists frame activists 
as deviant. Thus, Foucault’s notion of governmentality was chosen as a basis for the 
development of a broader theoretical approach.  
 
Chapter Three explores Foucault’s concepts of power, biopower and 
governmentality. The chapter develops Luke’s notion of green governmentality to 
offer new analysis of the UK environmental discourse. The thesis explores the 
impact of environmental governance and shows how the development of market-led 
eco-schemes (such as doorstep recycling), eco-taxes, new environmental policy 
instruments (NEPI), carbon tax, emissions trading and global environmental 
governance, often financed through public–private partnerships alongside businesses 
development of “green” products, persuades individuals to be environmentally 
aware. In doing so, the thesis is using the tools Foucault provides to interpret state 
and media representation of environmental activism.  
 
Chapter Four argues that technologies of dominance in the discursive struggle and 
the role of political policing is a mechanism through which radical environmental 
activism is placed in a discourse of deviancy. The chapter will provide a series of 
examples to highlight how state legislation through bio-political discourse 
criminalises some types of environmental activism. The chapter draws on Hall’s 
“signification spiral” (1978) to show that both political and media discourse place 
activists at the most extreme point as a homogenised position. It also explores 
relations of power through Foucault’s discussion on resistance and counter conducts.  
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Drawing on critical discourse analysis, Chapter Five examines newspaper reports of 
environmental activism and uses a series of examples to show how shifts in power 
are reflected in media discourse. This thesis has chosen CDA as a method because it 
is important to fully understand the socio-political context in which these reports are 
written. A textual analysis will reveal the linguistic traits a journalist applies, and a 
content analysis will show the difference between text and meaning, but this thesis 
argues that a CDA will reveal the social, cultural and political context in which 
journalists report on environmental activism. By analysing the discourses at play, this 
thesis aims to identify any patterns found in the representation of environmental 
activism.  
 
Chapter Six, titled “Fighting Back: The Internet and Heterotopia”, charts how, 
through various liminoid practices, environmental activists are able to counter green 
governmentality. By understanding protest camps as heterotopic space (Foucault, 
1986; Hetherington, 1996), contextualises them as alternative spaces. A heterotopia 
acts as an alternative, although not utopian, space. The chapter argues that the space 
of environmental activism (such as camps and social spaces/squats) has built up a 
repertoire of protest to challenge the dominant discourse. For many activists, the 
identifying of a site of protest is part of an ongoing acknowledgement of the 
historical importance of trying to create a heterotopic space. However, the 
identification and reinforcement of any temporary autonomous zone often, as 
Roseneil (1995) notes with reference to the women’s peace camp at Greenham 
Common (1982–2000),7  creates friction between those based permanently at the 
                                                   
7 The dates given are sourced from the National Archives, held at The Women’s Library, London Metropolitan 
University. Available at http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/a2a/records.aspx?cat=106-5gcw&cid=-1#-1 
(accessed Feb 2012).  
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camps (inside) and those who visit (outside). Protesting at the site of contestation not 
only shifts the media and political hierarchy, but also alters power relations between 
activists, the media and political discourse. By shifting journalists and politicians 
from their traditional space, it alters the relationships between dominant and minority 
political movements, hence giving greater power to the protesters.  
 
The thesis concludes by summarising the central arguments and indicating the 
contribution to the field. The conclusion returns to the original research questions, to 
see how they have been addressed. It will bring together the key themes of the thesis 
in light of broader discussions of environmental discourse. The work will offer 
suggestions on what the future holds for the UK’s environmental activist movement 
in light of such shifts in power in environmental discourse.  
 
Having introduced the research questions, topics and methodology, this thesis will 
now turn its attention to the notion of discourse. Exploring discourse will provide 
evidence of those journalistic traits that frame environmental activism, and the 
importance of gathering original empirical data to answer the research questions.  
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Chapter Two: Methodology  
 
Introduction 
In order to address the research questions that drive this thesis this chapter will 
explore three key fields – media, political and environmental discourse. What links 
these three fields of discourse is language and knowledge. Therefore this thesis will 
apply various types of discourse analysis. To explore the role of political discourse, 
this chapter draws from Foucault, Hall and Dryzek. The methodological innovations 
are supported by empirical research based on Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis 
and data from interviews and a focus group. The purpose of this chapter is to explore 
the various different discourse analysis techniques to address the research questions.  
 
The chapter will examine how journalistic language shapes meaning and knowledge 
of the environmental activist movement. Understanding journalistic language is 
central to unpacking power relations in environmental discourse. It will do so by 
taking the theoretical standpoint of discourse as a methodological approach. The 
methodological innovation of this thesis is to examine the various and competing 
discourses that shape public understanding of environmentalism. As Chapters Three 
and Four will show, political discourse is central in analysing how political processes 
impact on the representation of environmental activism, whilst Chapter Five will 
apply Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis (1995) to newspaper reports of 
environmental activism. The discourse analysis of political policy, and critical 
discourse analysis of newspaper reports will be supplemented with in-depth semi-
structured interviews with activists in the movement. A focus group was used as a 
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further methodological approach to supplement the interviews and address criticisms 
of critical discourse analysis. 
 
The chapter will begin with an interpretation of Foucault’s analysis of discourse. 
Given that this thesis will illustrate how political decision-making processes impact 
on the representation of environmental activism, this chapter will also examine 
relations between media and environmental discourse. This chapter will explore why 
language and discourse is important in unpacking how and why journalists report on 
environmental activism. Before unpacking the significance of language and 
discourse, it is necessary to unpack the different interpretations and meanings of the 
term discourse. Discourse can often be used to refer to language. Discourse is also a 
theoretical position that identifies codes, meanings, and rules about how we 
understand the world. Thus discourse can mean both language (in a linguistic sense) 
and the formation of socio-cultural knowledge. Discourse forms not just through the 
“order of language or representations”, but “it is a structuring principle which govern 
beliefs and practice, ‘words and things’, in such a way as to produce a certain 
network of material relations” (McNay, 1994: 69).  
 
A discursive formation is the outcome of a set of rules that coalesce to form a 
discourse. The criteria for a discourse to form is a  
 
set of conditions which must have been jointly fulfilled at a precise 
moment of time, for it to have been possible for its objects, operations, 
concepts, and theoretical options to have been formed. (Foucault, 
1991: 54) 
 
These conditions include internal/external factors; changes in the interpretation, 
meaning and generalisation of verbs and nouns; how words are attributed; and the 
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significance of how language can exclude or include a new system of representative 
signs. Each of these criteria coalesces to form a discourse, to “constitute the set of 
derivations characteristics of a discursive formation” (Foucault, 1991: 56). Thus 
analysing the different discourses between activists and journalists is a useful tool to 
unravel the relationships between the three objects.  
 
The chapter will examine how systems of representation emerge to shape the 
knowledge of a subject. Once knowledge is formed then, as Foucault (1991) argues, 
power and knowledge can limit and expand how a topic is constructed. Foucault’s 
interpretation of discourse establishes how language and practice are built on 
historical “facts”. Foucault’s work is challenged by a number of cultural theorists 
(notably Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe and Jacques Derrida), and each of these 
challenges will be considered. The works of Darier (1999) and Dryzek (1997) are 
important as they explore how environmentalism as a set of political ideas becomes a 
discourse. This chapter will draw on Dryzek’s theories on green radicalism as a 
discourse, and propose an additional list that defines radical environmental activism 
as a discourse.  
 
Journalists and activists have a somewhat symbiotic relationship in that each relies 
on the other for stories and publicity. Before radical political collectives embraced 
the internet, environmental activists’ engagement with the media worked at a very 
simplistic level. Some collectives released press releases, informally contacted 
journalists about planned direct action, offered invitations to “trusted” journalists to 
join protest camps (Barry, 2001), and gave the occasional interview to lifestyle 
magazines. Overall, although journalists and activists kept each other at arm’s length, 
when they did engage with each other, activists had to rely on journalists to turn their 
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press releases into news stories. Activists were, and to some extent remain, heavily 
dependent on journalists, often resulting in the detrimental reporting of events 
(Sobieraj, 2011). Activists rely on journalists to translate and frame environmental 
activism, and to shape public opinion. The reporter’s words paint a picture from a 
specific “angle” or hook that sets the theme of the story. What emerges is a set of 
linguistic codes and rules which shape a discourse (Hall, 1997), built on a 
relationship between environmental activists and journalists (from 1970 to the 
present).  
 
The discussion of critical discourse analysis sets up the mechanism for the analysis 
that follows of newspaper reports (in Chapter Five). The importance of examining 
how journalists use language and linguistic metaphors is central to this chapter, so it 
will also unpack the different approaches to media discourse. Journalists’ tools are 
the words they use; how they place words together when creating a media discourse 
analysis is important in order to answer the research questions. Mills notes that any 
analysis of journalistic discourse shows that they do not literally translate reality into 
language, but rather “discourse should be seen as a system which structures the ways 
we perceive reality” (2004: 55). This chapter will first look at Foucault’s 
interpretation of discourse from his archaeological phase, before moving on to 
analysing different interpretations of discourse. The next section will contextualise 
the discursive themes that shape environmental discourse. Drawing on Dryzek 
(1997), it will examine the multifaceted aspects of environmental discourse. This 
thesis is exploring discourses from many angles – political, environmental and the 
media. Therefore it will explore media as a discourse, and why critical discourse 
analysis was chosen as a method (Fairclough, 1995). However, both Foucault’s 
interpretation of discourse and Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis have been 
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criticised for assuming cognitive knowledge. Therefore the final section of this 
chapter will explore ways of addressing these critiques through empirical research.  
 
Foucault, Discourse and his Archaeological Phase 
Foucault is less concerned with the linguistic construction of meaning and more 
interested in examining how meaning is recorded through language historically. 
Foucault situates this approach in his “archaeological” period, as he aims to unravel 
the past through codes, symbols and representations of a society. How ontological 
meaning of words, knowledge and historical influences creates knowledge is central 
to Foucault. As McNay notes, for Foucault, what comes “prior to language…is the 
origin of all meaning” (1994: 49). An archaeological approach is linguistic analysis 
of historical documentation, but also involves the “analysis of a series of 
heterogeneous elements: institutions, techniques, social groups, perceptual 
organisations” (McNay, 1994: 69). In The Order of Things (1970), Foucault claims 
that the rules of discursive formation are never formulated in their own right, but are 
to be found only in “widely differing theories, concepts, and objects of study, that I 
have tried to reveal, by isolating, as their specific locus, a level that I have called, 
somewhat arbitrarily perhaps, archaeological” (Foucault, 1970: xi). Foucault (1970) 
argues that language in the sovereign classical system of knowledge was a 
transparent form of representation – it gave signs and signifiers; but by the 
 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries it was the immediate and 
spontaneous unfolding of representations; it was in that order in the 
first place that representations receive their primary signs, patterned 
and regrouped their common features. Language was a form of 
knowing and knowing was automatically discourse. (Foucault, 1970: 
295) 
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Language becomes a form of primary signs to shape knowledge so that it “forms the 
locus of tradition, of the unspoken habits of thought, of what lies hidden in people’s 
mind; it accumulates an ineluctable memory which does not even know itself as 
memory” (Foucault, 1970: 297). For Foucault, language moves through history 
starting in a horizontal/transparent position and over time moves into a 
vertical/opaque position. The effect of this metaphorical shift is that language 
becomes a method of “understanding in general to a particular domain of objectivity” 
(Foucault, 1970: 296). Thus, Foucault’s observations raise the question whether 
language can provide objective, transparent discourses? Can there ever exist a 
genuine, “true” discourse?  
 
For Foucault, the only way to find out if a discourse can be “true” is by looking at the 
historical processes that shape discourse through language – to establish a 
“manifestation of truth” (Foucault, 1991: 8). Examining discourses from historical 
empirical data can provide the mechanisms to unpack how rules, concepts and 
objects of study emerge by an examination of what constitutes knowledge and how 
that knowledge relates to the historical context from which it emerges (Howarth et 
al., 2000). Foucault sets out three “great systems of exclusion which forge discourse 
– the forbidden speech, the division of madness and the will to truth” (Foucault, in 
Young, 1981: 55). The “will to truth” is central to his interpretation of the orders of 
discourse, where will to truth “attempts to assimilate the others, both in order to 
modify them and to provide them with a foundation” (Foucault cited in Young, 1981: 
56). Therefore, as Foucault notes  
the will to truth has its own history, which is not that of constraining 
truths…this will to truth, like the other systems of exclusion rests on 
an institutional support: it is both reinforced and renewed by whole 
strata of practices, such as pedagogy, of course; and the system of 
books, publishing, libraries; learned societies in the past and 
laboratories now. (Foucault in Young, 1981: 55) 
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The will to truth forms a system of exclusion, by way of “controlling and delimiting 
discourse” (Foucault in Young, 1981: 56) as a narrative that shapes society. Such 
narratives are “recounted, repeated and varied…[as] ritualised sets of discourse 
which are recited in well defined circumstances” (Foucault in Young, 1981: 56) so as 
to give rise to “new speech-acts which take them up, transform them or speak of 
them [discourses]” (Foucault in Young, 1981: 56). According to Foucault, these 
narratives are found in cultural systems presented in “religious or juridical texts” but 
also literary and “to a certain extent scientific texts” (Foucault in Young, 1981: 57). 
This thesis will expand this list to include media texts, such as newspaper and 
broadcast journalism.  
 
How commentary works is central in establishing the relations between 
environmental activists and the media. Foucault sees the primary text as one which 
creates a truth, or knowledge, and secondary as the interpretation or reworking of a 
will to truth. For example, Homer’s Odyssey is the primary text, with Joyce’s Ulysses 
as the secondary (interpretative) text. Thus commentary is the:  
 
hierarchy between primary and secondary text plays two roles which 
are in solidarity with each other. On the one hand it allows the 
(endless) construction of new discourses: the dominance of the 
primary text, it’s permanence, its status as discourse which can always 
be reactualised, the multiple or hidden meaning with which it is 
credited, the essential reticence and richness which is attributed to it, 
all this is the basis or an open possibility of speaking. But on the other 
hand the commentary’s only role, whatever the techniques used, is to 
say at least what was silently articulated ‘beyond’, in the text. 
(Foucault, in Young, 1981: 57–58) 
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Meaning that emerges “beyond” the text can be also understood as an exclusionary 
measure. By repeating what has already been said, commentary “must say for the 
first time what had, nevertheless, already been said, and must tirelessly repeat what 
had, however, never been said” (Foucault in Young, 1981: 58). Chapter Five will 
examine what commentary primary text (that is newspaper reports) produces 
between the state, activists and journalists. In doing so, the chapter will aim to 
establish if news journalists both define and interpret primary text. In other words, 
through critical discourse analysis this work will aim to establish if there is a primary 
meaning that creates an “infinite rippling of commentaries…worked from the inside 
[the state] by the dream of repetition in disguise” (Foucault in Young, 1981: 58). Is 
there a “will to truth”, a discursive narrative, about environmental activism that is 
repeated through secondary texts? Moreover, the critical discourse analysis will test 
Foucault’s theory that commentary acts as a system of exclusion that forges 
discourse. (Foucault in Young, 1981). Critical discourse analysis helps provide the 
tools to answer these question due to the similarities between Fairclough’s and 
Foucault’s understanding on the order of discourse.  
 
Foucault believes that, in addition to the three great systems of exclusion, there is a 
“third group of procedures that permit the control of discourse” (Foucault in Young, 
1981: 61), namely the “order of discourse”. The order of discourse is a means of 
control that excludes anyone who “does not satisfy certain requirements or is not, 
from the outset, qualified to do so” (Foucault in Young, 1981: 62). Who satisfies or 
even defines the requirements is, for Foucault, established through “ritual”, that is: 
 
the qualification which must be possessed by individuals who speak 
(and who must occupy such-and-such a position and formulate such-
and-such a type of statement, in the play of a dialogue, of 
interrogation and recitation); it defines the gestures, behaviour, 
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circumstances, and the whole set of signs which must accompany 
discourse. (Foucault in Young, 1981: 62) 
 
For Foucault, political discourse is a ritual that shapes the order of discourse, as it 
“can scarcely be disassociated from this deployment of ritual which determines both 
the particular properties and the stipulated roles of the speaking subjects” (Foucault 
in Young, 1981: 62). This thesis will argue, through critical discourse analysis, that 
in a mediatised world, media discourse holds a similar position to Foucault’s 
interpretation of political discourse. Chapter Five will argue that journalists straddle 
political discourse to define environmental activists from a political “will to truth”, 
iterated through a media discursive narrative that iterates political discourse to 
exclude environmental activists as qualified to speak. Through a critical discourse 
analysis this thesis aims to establish who is determined as qualified, and how that 
shapes the order of discourse. 
 
According to Foucault, discourse is:  
not the system of its language, nor, in a general sense, its formal rules 
of construction…the questions I ask…[is] about events: the law of 
existence of statements, that which rendered them possible…their 
correlation with other previous or simultaneous events, discursive or 
otherwise. (Foucault, 1991: 59) 
 
Foucault interprets power, not as top-down practice, but diffused and practised 
through discourse, knowledge and regimes of truth “like discourse the 
conceptualisation of power is founded on an historical awareness of our present 
circumstances” (Foucault in Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982: 778). Thus, Foucault’s sees 
the term “truth” as defined, shaped and coded by those holding power:  
 
each society has its regime of truth, its general politics or truth; that is 
the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as 
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true…the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as 
true. (Foucault, 1980: 31) 
 
Discourses place individuals into categories that frame cultural and social 
understanding to create a “regime of truth”. Therefore, each society is founded on a 
regime of truth that generates a “general politics of truth” (Foucault in Rabinow 
1991: 32) and once these truisms are accepted by the majority of society, then they 
become  
 
types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true, the 
mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and 
false statements, that means by which each is sanctioned. (Foucault in 
Rabinow 1991: 131)  
 
In analysing relationships between institutions, society, etc., one should “uncover the 
expressive value or truth of a ‘document’ that is always referred back to a controlling 
notion of consciousness” (McNay, 1994: 55). As Foucault notes:  
 
History now organises the document, divides it up, distributes it, 
orders it, arranges it in levels, establishes series, distinguishes between 
what is relevant and what is not, discovers elements, defines unites 
describes relations. (Foucault, 2008: 7)  
 
The rules of discursive formations provide “the conditions of possibility of discourse 
in a given period” (McNay, 1994: 52) (“episteme” in Foucauldian terms). Episteme 
is “an open and doubtless indefinitely describable field of relationship…not a slice of 
history common to all the sciences; it is a simultaneous play of specific remanences” 
(Foucault, 1991: 55). Here Foucault means that history is defined not as key points 
on which to hang facts, but as a series of events that is both constant and 
simultaneously generating knowledge. McNay (1994) interprets episteme as an “a 
priori set of rules of formation that allow discourse to function, that allow different 
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objects and different themes to be spoken at one time but not at another” (1994: 52). 
In other words, discourses are formed from the situation and circumstances in which 
they emerge, and are independent of other discourses or events. Thus discourse 
produces knowledge relative to a historical period as a “historically specific, 
coherent configuration of how knowledge is organised” (Howarth et al., 2000: 4), 
and knowledge is more significant than how language produces meaning (Foucault, 
1970). To reveal truths that shape knowledge, Foucault appropriates his 
archaeological method to “take a step beyond the creating consciousness in order to 
examine the formal relations that exist between apparently disparate and unrelated 
utterances or texts” (McNay, 1994: 55). The deciphering of documents or text will, 
for Foucault, indicate how discourses are formed and what their relationships are to 
each other.  
 
However, critics (McNay, 1994; Hajer, 1995; Darier, 1999) find the archaeological 
approach problematic. A critique of the archaeological approach is the abandonment 
of a chronology whose aim is “advancing closer to the truth” (McNay, 1994: 54). 
Instead, the archaeological approach entails that any “theories of truth, any system of 
knowledge must be studied in terms of its own internal and relatively contingent 
rules of formation” (McNay, 1994: 54). Foucault might defend himself against such 
criticism by arguing that instead of ontologically charting the history of discourse he 
is writing “history from a radically different perspective” (McNay, 1994: 61), that is, 
the examination of historical documents from a non-chronological perspective. 
Foucault iterates the notion that an archaeological approach means the set of rules 
which at a given period and for a given society defines that society (Foucault, 1972). 
An archaeological approach to discourse identifies how individuals have access to a 
particular type of discourse, and importantly how struggles for control of discourses 
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are conducted between classes, nations, linguistic, cultural or ethnic collectives 
(Foucault, 1991). What emerges are discourses that define what it is possible to say 
and what is not; what limits and forms conversation, and “what utterances are put 
into conversation…what are repressed and censored” (Foucault, 1991: 60). Wherever 
possible, to define a set of rules, a discourse emerges (Foucault, 1991). The work  
described on this thesis supports Foucault’s approach and will apply a similar 
method to examine how struggles for control of environmental discourse can be 
charted through historical analysis (see Chapters Three and Four).  
 
Thus, Foucault’s interpretation of discourse goes beyond how language creates 
meaning, to contextualise language from a historical position. How words are given 
meaning, and how that meaning is interpreted as a truth when language moves from 
clear, horizontal understanding to an opaque, vertical use, leads to meaning being 
blurred in favour of setting the rules of discourse. A discourse defines a given period, 
and that discourse changes or dissipates outside of that time. Foucault’s analysis of 
discourse shows that, without an understanding of the historical process that gives 
language meaning, discourses are formed from language that favours the hegemonic 
position. Others have drawn on Foucault’s archaeological base of discourse, and the 
next section examines how scholars (such as Derrida, and Laclau and Mouffe) 
interpret discourse theory through deconstruction and articulation. 
 
Different Interpretations of Discourse  
Derrida, and Laclau and Mouffe offer different approaches to understanding what 
constitutes a discourse. Discourse Theory is the study of how conceptual frameworks 
are built around “the primacy of political concepts, logistics such as hegemony, 
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antagonism and dislocation” (Howarth et al., 2000). Derrida and Foucault agree that 
“questioning the idea that a single meaning or subject or object can hold for all time” 
(Smith, 1998: 255) should be central when theorising how discourse creates 
meaning. Derrida’s claims are similar to those of Foucault, in that without 
“deconstructing” a language meaning is never fixed or true. The definition of 
“deconstruction” is the interrogation of a text in order to establish its organisation 
around certain binary oppositions, such a true/false, rationality/irrationality (Smith, 
1998). To fully understand any meaning, language should be deconstructed because 
“language itself…articulates the difference of the moments, the ‘surrogate’ for 
something that perhaps does not exist (the phenomenon it points to), always differs 
with respect to the moment it names” (Hahn, 2002: 13). This is rather rigid. 
Discourse on the other hand, is more helpful for this project, being fluid, altering and 
challenging as new knowledge and new “truths” emerge. Moreover, as this thesis 
will show, the discursive challenge between activists and the greening of the state 
alters the context and meaning of discourse.  
 
Laclau and Mouffe claim that language only shapes a discourse when juxtaposed 
with other language, so that meaning comes from the positioning of words in a text. 
For example, the word “father” is only given meaning when placed next to the words 
“son” or “family”. This is an “articulation”, which is “any practice establishing a 
relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the 
articulatory practice” (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001: 105). Laclau and Mouffe’s concept 
of articulation is interesting, but, as this thesis will show in Chapter Five, how 
discourses are constructed is dependent on contestation between discourses and 
external elements. Discourse cannot contain everything, as external factors also 
influence meaning, despite Laclau and Mouffe’s belief that we only understand 
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events, depending on “the way the discursive field is structured” (Laclau and 
Mouffe, 2001: 105). The idea that discourse is shaped through articulation, although 
articulation and meanings constantly change or are never set, shows that there is 
always a “differential ensemble of signifying sequences in which meaning is 
constantly renegotiated” (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001: 153). Thus, meaning comes 
from the articulation of words, and such articulation shapes normative behaviour, 
either consciously or unconsciously, to create discourses. Language creates 
discourses when words are juxtaposed with other words, and how words and 
grammar are articulated places everything into a discourse. Laclau and Mouffe 
(2001) believe that all discourses compete, and there is nothing outside of discourse. 
Based on Laclau and Mouffe’s articulation, discourse would be a language-centred 
deconstruction of the text, similar to Derrida’s. The articulation of language shapes a 
discourse, but lacks any analysis of what is missing in the text – which or whose 
voices are present or absent? What is, or is not, said? (“sayable/unsayable” in 
Foucauldian terms). As Chapter Five will show, the notion of sayable/unsayable is 
interpreted by Fairclough as having similar attributes to the order of discourse 
(Fairclough, 1995).  
 
What is problematic about Laclau and Mouffe’s approach is the need to understand 
why the “unsayable” occurs – and this is occasionally a deliberate position of the 
activists’ movement. Some remain unconvinced by Laclau and Mouffe’s argument 
that everything is discourse, or that (according to Foucault) we need discourse to 
understand language. However, the view of everything as discourse is a 
humanocentric perspective that excludes nature. Laclau and Mouffe’s account only 
considers relations of power between humans, as a concept conceived by man about 
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man. Such a perception that man is understood as superior to nature is central to 
debates on industrialisation (see Chapter Three). 
 
Laclau and Mouffe (2001) and Foucault (2007) hold the position that language 
reveals how discourse shapes social rules of conduct, while Foucault argues that we 
need discourse to understand language. Moreover, as well as negating any analysis of 
the voices excluded in a text (intentionally or not), Laclau and Mouffe’s position 
does not separate discourse from non-discursive dimensions, instead claiming that 
everything is discourse where “discourse itself is fully constitutive of our world” 
(Philips and Jørgensen, 2004: 19).  
 
Laclau and Mouffe (2001) and Foucault (2007) are useful in understanding how 
political discourse shapes social practice, and how meaning is formed into 
institutional policy and agenda. However, this thesis leans more towards Foucault’s 
position over that of Laclau and Mouffe, in that actors and subjects exist outside of 
discourse. Yet, without discourse and language there are no tools to interpret what is 
outside of discourse. Despite these criticisms, examining environmentalism through 
different events from the environmental movement guides the understanding of 
environmentalism as a discourse. The argument to be developed here follows 
Dryzek’s (1997) contention that environmentalism is a discourse. The next section 
will examine how environmentalism and environmental activism became discourses, 
by expanding Dryzek’s (1997) definition of green radicalism in relation to the UK’s 
environmental activism movement. Having set out how discourses are formed 
through language, this chapter now sets out to show how environmentalism as a 
concept became a discourse.  
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Environmental Discourse  
Drawing on Dryzek’s (1997) and Darier’s (1999) work on environmental discourse, 
discourse analysis reveals how language, codes, knowledge and meaning shape 
environmental discourse. Here, three key components will be identified: new social 
movements, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and grass-roots politics. Each 
component is differentiated by its organisational structures, yet they are unified by an 
urge to prioritise an environmentally just society over a high-carbon society.  
 
Environmentalism as a social discourse emerged from the 1960s. The formation of 
knowledge around an environmental discourse
8
 includes defining environmental 
activism. As Wynne and Shackley (1994) note, the influence of politics, science and 
economics forms part of the wider discourse of science, the state, capitalism, 
economics, nature, industrialisation, high and low carbon, economics and sociology. 
Environmental activism, as opposed to environmentalism through a conservation 
lens, emerged in the post-war economic boom, the former focusing on social values, 
and the latter on conservation. However, the label “environmental movement” is not 
a neologism, as Foucault notes:  
there has been an ecological movement – which is furthermore very 
ancient and is not only a twentieth century phenomenon – which has 
often been, in one sense, in hostile relationship with science or at least 
with a technological…in terms of truth [nature-endorsing]. However, 
in fact, ecology also spoke a language of truth. It was in the name of 
knowledge, concerning nature, the equilibrium of the processes of 
living things, and so forth, that no-one could level criticism. (Foucault 
cited in Darier, 1999: 4)  
 
                                                   
8 For this thesis, the term environmental discourse also includes the nomenclature “climate change’. 
Climate change is a discourse founded on scientific language. Environmental discourse includes 
language from politics, the media, science and social science.  
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As the previous chapter mooted, the environmental activism movement took hold 
with the Earthrise image (1969). Images of the earth broadcast from space
9
 were 
“widely published in the news media, the images soon became the mainstay of 
advertising and publicity copy” (Lester, 2010: 141). Two years later, the inaugural 
Earth Day (1971) witnessed 20 million American people “lifting the status of 
environmental issues on to the world stage” (Castells, 2009: 322). Earth Day raised 
awareness of environmentalism as a social event, and helped instigate the creation of 
an environmental activist movement. Castell notes the “widespread rise in deep 
ecological awareness” that was quickly “seized by grassroots organisations, 
environmental NGOs and media activists and made into a major issue” (Castell, 
2009: 322). Greenpeace sums up Castell’s observation, beginning as a grass-roots 
NGO when a group of journalist and activists attempted to halt Nixon’s nuclear plan, 
and signals environmental activism as a discourse.  
 
Along with the Earthrise image, the seminal texts of Silent Spring (Carson, 1962) and 
The Monkey Wrench Gang (Abbey, 1978) introduced new knowledge around 
environmentalism. Carson’s book looks at the consequences of using the chemical 
DDT
10
 in food production. Abbey’s work signals the beginning of tactics and 
strategies that were shaping the environmental activist movements. Earth Day, the 
Earthrise image, Greenpeace, Carson’s and Abbey’s text all introduced a new 
language around environmentalism and people’s relationship to the environment and 
activism. A new lexicon emerged through documents connected to these and other 
events that shaped environmental discourse. The term environmentalism no longer 
meant the single issue of conservation (see discussion on national parks in Chapter 
                                                   
9 These first clear images of the earth were taken by the Apollo space mission (1969) and broadcast via 
television. 
10 DDT – dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane – is a pesticide commonly used in food and agricultural practices. 
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One) but became a debate around the cost and consequences of maintaining a high-
carbon economy.  
 
A slow realisation that a post-war economy relied on nature to fuel the industrial 
boom (Stern and Romani, 2011) also meant an increase in language around 
industrialisation, economic growth, and market development. At the same time, 
environmental activism was juxtaposed with economic growth as anti-growth 
(Arnold, 1987). What emerged was a debate between acceptable and unacceptable 
environmental discourse. Thus, environmental activism, as revealed in its prominent 
discursive positions (that is, environmental justice and anti-nuclear debates) is pitted 
against discourse of capitalist nature – a highly industrialised discourse around 
human relations with nature in which “environmental discourse begins in industrial 
society”, which then positions “itself in the context of the long dominant discourse of 
industrial society, which we call industrialism” (Dryzek, 1997: 12). Environmental 
discourse is couched in terms of the resources needed for industry, such as minerals, 
fish stocks and wood. Dryzek sees this juxtaposition as what he terms a “prosaic 
departure”, an acceptance of a political-economy as a “truth”. And even those who 
call for a curb in growth often revert to a call for a central administration informed 
by scientific expertise – the same approach that industry applies to problem-solving. 
The result is that “environmental problems are seen mainly in terms of troubles 
encountered by the established industrial political economy. They require action, but 
they do not point to a new kind of society” (Dryzek, 1997: 13). Moreover, 
“environmental problems by definition are found at the intersection of ecosystems 
and human social systems” (Dryzek, 1997: 8). This is important to establish how the 
different discourses for this thesis, that is, problem-solving through technological and 
industrial advancements as opposed to environmentalism as justice and social 
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discourse, shape the knowledge or “regime of truth” about environmental activism. 
Two further issues that are factors in shaping environmental discourse are the role of 
institutions and the climate deniers or climate sceptics.  
 
Global environmental governance, such as the Brundtland Report in 1987, the 
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer in 1989, and the 
Kyoto Protocol in 2005, became an affirmation of a discourse that “rests on 
assumptions, judgments, and contentions that provide a basic term for analysis, 
debates, arguments, and disagreements, in the environmental area” (Dryzek, 1997: 
8). This led to global environmental policies and practices that were founded on a 
“truth” that the global climate is changing because of human impact. So climate 
change aggregated by human industrialisation became a discourse based on a 
scientific truth, reinforced by government and institutional policies. This created new 
discourses that challenged the state’s acceptance of the causes of climate change. It 
was the emergence of a climate sceptic (see Lomborg, 2007; Lawson, 2009) 
discourse that challenged the science that climate change is man-made. Lomborg 
specifically argues that the climate change debate is a combination of hysteria and 
natural weather cycles.  
  
The age-old media focus on bad news about the natural world 
received a strong revival when, by the 1960s, environmentalism could 
also display conflict and allocate guilt. This is perhaps most evident in 
the founding of environmentalism by Rachel Carson. (Lomborg, 2009: 
184) 
 
As well as associating Carson with “bad news”, Lomborg also argues that media 
hysteria has exacerbated environmental debate.  
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As a society we use large amounts of resources to regulate both health 
risks and environmental risks. But if media attention to small but 
highly hyped risk – like Carson’s poisons – makes us over focus on 
some issues, we end up underfocusing on other issues that attract less 
attention but where we could do more good…there is a real risk that 
with global warming we are moving down the same path of scary 
stories, outlining a conflict between fossil fuels and human survival, 
blaming big oil companies. (Lomborg, 2009: 187) 
 
Discursive challenges by NGOs, activists, sceptics, climate deniers, institutions and 
economic positions jostle to hold power – and maintain a “regime of truth” – in 
environmental discourse. The state would argue that economic solutions are the only 
way to address climate change (as Chapters Three and Four will show), whereas 
activists would argue that it is economic and global industrialisation that has 
contributed to climate change. These challenges between solutions can be understood 
in Dryzek’s notion of environmental discourse. However, before turning to Dryzek, 
the next section will briefly look at the differences between discourses and concepts, 
before looking in detail at the mechanics of environmental discourse through an 
interpretation of Dryzek’s understanding of environmental discourse.  
 
This thesis argues that discourse is about knowledge, and that concepts provide the 
tools and mechanisms with which to address discursive challenges. Different 
discourses apply different concepts to problem-solving solutions, such as capitalism, 
socialism, autonomy, anarchy. For example, economic discourse would apply 
capitalist concepts (such as hedge funds, capital gains), defined by Dryzek as 
problem-solving (Dryzek, 1997: 12), whereas environmental activism is often 
aligned to social and cultural solutions and seeks answers to climate change and 
environmental problems in eco-socialism or deep ecology concepts. Dryzek notes 
that environmental discourse emerges when “the environment is brought into the 
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heart of society and its cultural, moral, and economic system, rather than being seen 
as a source of difficulties standing outside of the system” (1997: 13).  
 
Moreover, Dryzek (1997) lists “problem-solving”, “survivalism” (or reformism), 
“sustainability”, and “green radicalism” (or radical discourse) as “the four basic 
environmental discourses” (Dryzek, 1997: 15). Problem-solving requires a central 
administrative, political–economic approach. Survivalism is a discourse that emerged 
out of the Treaty of Rome (1951) and the Limits to Growth (1972) to include 
sustainability (the Brundtland Report of 1987) and ecological modernisation (Mol 
and Sonnenfeld, 2000). Ecological modernisation is an argument that solutions can 
be found between capitalism and sustainability.  
 
The final category includes “realos” and fundis” under the rubric of green radical 
discourse. Hunold and Dryzek (2005) separate out the various categories from 
Dryzek’s earlier definition into state-based and non-state-based strategies for green 
activists by drawing on the German political debate of realos and fundis. Realos is a 
word used to describe those whose green activism is through “party politics and the 
institutions of governments”. In contrast, fundis follow a path of “grassroots 
organising, protest, and confrontation” (Hunold and Dryzek, 2005:75). This division 
can also be understood as vertical (Realos) or horizontal (Fundis) green politics. As 
in France, the student movement of the late 1960s had a strong influence on later 
political parties and social movements. Despite the student movement’s inability to 
make an “impact on formal political institutions…it definitely influenced the 
political culture and, more specifically inspired a subsequent wave of social 
movements” (Rucht, Teune and Yang, 2007: 159). Die Grünen (German for “the 
green”) emerged as a green political party that “coalesced around resistance to 
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nuclear power” (Hunold and Dryzek, 2005: 87). Die Grünen was “characterised by 
fierce battles over policy and elements of a radical and more moderately reformist 
agenda” (Cudworth, 2003: 85). Realos were focused on “mobilising a host of 
marginalised groups: women, gays, blacks, immigrant workers, homeless people, in 
addition to the working class…and argued the necessity of participating in formal 
politics due to the immediacy of the environmental crisis” (Cudworth, 2003: 87). The 
politics focused on parliamentary activism, lobbying, electioneering, and 
parliamentary representation that drew from “Marxist influenced eco-socialists and 
the pragmatic Realos” (Cudworth, 2003: 87). Fundis, in contrast, were a collective 
who favoured “ideological purity” (Cudworth, 2003: 87) over engagement with party 
politics. They consisted of grass-roots collectives that concentrated on 
“consciousness-raising through direct action and educational initiatives rather than 
electioneering” (Cudworth, 2003: 87).  
 
However, in reality, it is not as simple as a division between realos versus fundis, 
because activists such as Greenpeace and other NGOs use tactics and strategies that 
straddle both approaches. For example, Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth and other 
hierarchical NGOs use lobbying and electioneering alongside direct action and 
activism. Indeed, although some horizontal collectives can be determined as fundis, 
there are also slippages in the interpretation. As Chapter Four will discuss, when the 
Metropolitan Police took court action to prevent the monthly Critical Mass cycle 
rides, activist Des Kay went to court to defend the collective with the backing of the 
Friends of the Earth legal team. Thus the boundaries between realos and fundis are 
often blurred and interwoven.  
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However, what connects realos and fundis is the various “green” politics of 
environmental discourse. Moreover, “green radicalism, problem-solving and 
survivalism are united through a determined rejection of industrialism, but all four 
engage with the discourse of industrialism – if only to distance themselves from it” 
(Dryzek, 1997: 15). Hence, problem-solving and green radicalism are important to 
this study, for they show the various positions between environmental activists and 
state-led environmental governance. Each of Dryzek’s categories helps us to 
understand relations within environmental discourse. On the one hand, governments 
have to perform a number of basic functions irrespective of any discourses. These 
include setting out policies for economic growth and protecting the environment 
(Dryzek, 1997: 11). In the Western capitalist countries, “the first task of 
governments, in environmental policy, and everything else is to keep actual and 
potential corporate investors happy” (Dryzek, 1997: 11). It is the relationship 
between these two discourses that is the focus of this work.  
 
The role of agency is also important in understanding how “political agency is 
granted to a variety of actors” (Dryzek, 1997: 185), individuals and collectives. The 
significance of agents is that:  
 
agents themselves are historical and political products whose identities 
are contingent upon their relation to other identities [and] social 
identities thus involve the drawing of boundaries between ‘insiders’ 
and ‘outsiders’ and requires the construction of ‘others’ or 
‘scapegoats’ that are presented as blocking the full constitution of an 
agent’s self-identity. (Howarth and Griggs, 1998: 55–56) 
 
This thesis endorses Dryzek’s view that “the storyline of green radicalism points to 
multi-faceted social and ecological crisis which can only be resolved through radical 
political action and structural change” (Dryzek, 1997: 185). However, it also notes 
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that Dryzek focuses on NGOs such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth over the 
more radical, horizontal networks of radical environmental politics (fundis). Echoing 
Dryzek’s study, this thesis argues that the role of the media needs to be considered 
when examining environmental discourse. How realos, fundis, problem-solvers and 
survivalists communicate their values is central to understanding the shaping of 
Dryzek’s environmental discourse. The following section will unpack how the 
competing discourses work in tandem to influence media discourse. 
 
The Language of Mediatised Environmental Discourse 
Language does not define or, as Laclau and Mouffe claim, create a discourse, but 
instead it constructs a topic (Hall in Smith, 1998: 273) through “episteme” (to 
borrow a Foucauldian term). The grouping of discursive formations and the 
relationships between discourses at any one time (Mills, 2004: 62), is a way of 
interpreting and analysing the data. Laclau and Mouffe (2001), Dryzek (1997, 2000), 
Hall and Gieben (1994) and Foucault (2007) are all useful in unravelling how 
meaning is generated through discourse, but they may lack any method for analysing 
the important linguistic method of news reporting, or how “a particular framing of 
the discussion makes certain elements appear as fixed or appropriate while other 
elements appear problematic” (Hajer, 1995: 54). The framing, intonation, narrative 
and actors are all important in exploring meaning from newspaper texts. The works 
of Van Dijk (1988a), Gamson and Modigliani (1989), Fairclough (1995) and 
Carvalho (2000) focus specifically on discourse analysis of media text and are useful 
in addressing the research questions. 
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Hall’s studies of discourse (1992, 1997) argue that language is constructed in such a 
way that it gives us a set of codes and rules in which to reason. The rules of any 
language provide meaning dependent on the relationship between things (Hall, 1997: 
18). Codes provide a means to communicate. Codes are founded in a culture that 
constructs meaning and allows us to “communicate because we share broadly the 
same conceptual maps” (Hall, 1997: 18). Different cultures have varying sets of 
codes that denote meaning, and these meanings/codes define social norms. Language 
can also be a series of signs and signifiers that represent meaning, via “systems of 
representation”. The point is that each system constructs a set of codes to signal that 
“they belong to a culture” that is unified through “roughly the same conceptual or 
linguistic universe” (Hall, 1997: 22). Language gives meaning, and meaning emerges 
via “reflective” representations, whereby meaning lies within an object, person, idea 
or event (Hall, 1997).  
 
How language is constructed, and consequently how knowledge is formed, is central 
to the “concept of discourse [which] is not about whether things exist but about 
where meaning comes from” (Hall, 1997: 45). How meaning emerges is not simply a 
case of “translating reality into language”, but “discourse should be seen as a system 
which structures the way we perceive reality” (Mills, 2004: 55), about “the 
production of knowledge through language” (Hall, 1984: 291). Discourse is also a 
“specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorisations that are produced, 
reproduced, and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which 
meaning is given to physical and social realities” (Hajer, 1995: 44). Thus by drawing 
on Foucauldian approaches around language and discourse, this chapter has thus far 
shown that language creates meaning. The next section will examine discourse in 
order to establish how journalists apply language to give meaning and knowledge of 
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environmental activists’ movements. This chapter will now explore media discourse 
by drawing on a Foucauldian approach that is similar to that used in earlier 
discussions. Just as Foucault argues that discourse should be explored historically as 
opposed to chronologically, so too will this work look at the different media 
discourses as a suitable method for this study.  
  
Media, Language and Discourse  
This section outlines the various approaches to media discourse analysis, and 
justifies this thesis’s use of Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis as the central 
methodology. Before exploring the different media discourse analysis techniques, 
this section will begin by drawing on Stuart Hall’s interpretation of language and 
discourse. Hall’s work is important to this study, because language is the tool of 
journalists. Hall shows how language gives discourse meaning, hence journalists’ use 
of language provide a set of codes and knowledge about societal events. Hall’s 
interpretation of discourse analysis is the ability to examine how language constructs 
meaning (Smith, 1998; Howarth et al., 2000; Hall, 2001; Philips and Jørgensen, 
2004). Yet, discourse “never consists of one statement, one text, one action or one 
source” (Hall, 1992: 293), as it is part of a set of statements that is “characteristic of 
the way of thinking or the state of knowledge at any time” (Hall, 1992: 293). 
Language acts as a set of tools, codes and rules to represent an event, group or idea in 
a system of representation. It provides a group of statements which provide language 
for talking about something. When statements about a topic are made within a 
particular discourse, the discourse makes it possible to construct a topic in a certain 
way (Hall, 2001: 291). Language works as a linking device between statements, 
while the function of discourse is to produce knowledge through language. Thus, 
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meaning comes from language, interpreted and restructured, to convey a specific set 
of norms for understanding the everyday, so the reader can “analyse empirical raw 
material [texts, speeches, reports, etc.] and information as discursive forms” 
(Howarth et al., 2000: 4). The practical application of discourse creates power, and 
consequently reflects power relations over the historical interpretation of linguistic 
frameworks. The following section explores how journalistic language shapes 
knowledge by looking at the significance of media discourse.  
 
This chapter will now look at media as a discourse in order to explore the ways in 
which journalistic language shapes knowledge about environmental discourse. The 
work of key media theorist Van Dijk (1988a/b) centres on the structural nature of a 
text, while Gamson and Modigliani (1989) believe analysis of the frame reveals the 
discursive patterns (similar to Hall 2003). Carvalho (2000) addresses the issues of 
acknowledging the different voices in a media report (sayable/unsayable), while 
Fairclough (1995) offers a combined approach through his critical discourse analysis 
(CDA). Fairclough’s CDA is central to this thesis as a method of interpretation. CDA 
is useful in light of the theory of governmentality (see Chapters Three and Four) to 
analyse journalistic language and unpack the meaning behind the reporting. In 
drawing on critical discourse analysis, this thesis will illustrate its central argument 
by revealing how “commentary” and the “order of discourse” (Foucault in Young, 
1981: 57–62), along with journalistic practice place environmental activism into a 
discourse of deviance (see Chapter Five). By examining the use of linguistic traits 
and characteristics, the examples will suggest that  power relations between the state 
and activists can be seen in newspaper reporting over a historical period. In this, 
Fairclough’s CDA provides the tools to interpret media discourse, whilst 
contextualising the “methodological field of history” (Foucault, 2008: 12). However, 
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before focusing on CDA, this work will look at different media discourse analysis 
techniques to show how journalistic practice creates meaning.  
 
Van Dijk’s media discourse analysis (1988a) makes the “important transition from 
text analysis to discourse analysis” (Fairclough, 1995: 29) by examining the structure 
of the text and the “cognitive process involved in news production and decoding” 
(Carvalho, 2000: 6). Van Dijk’s (1988a) work looks at the mechanics of news 
models in shaping news production, by differentiating between macrostructures and 
microstructures. Macrostructure concerns how a text is organised hierarchically, 
whereas microstructures are “semantic mapping rules or transformations, which link 
lower level propositions to higher level macro propositions” (Carvalho, 2000: 6). For 
example, in news production, a journalist or editor who decides the process of 
production and news comprehension and who sets the organisational structure of the 
story sets the agenda. Van Dijk’s (1988a) macro-level approach has similarities with 
the journalistic technique of the “inverted pyramid”. The inverted pyramid places 
what are deemed the most important events first, and the least important last. In the 
inverted pyramid model, a journalist would place a state representative (such as a 
police officer), politician or local authority (councillor, local resident, etc.) at the top 
of the story, with less important actors in the body of the story. In essence, the 
inverted pyramid prioritises the key events not in chronological order, but in the 
priority that the reporter believes to be the most significant. The “micro” element 
focuses on individual words and sentences.  
 
What Van Dijk’s (1988a) idea of macro- and microstructures reveals is how the 
hegemonic discourse is prioritised over other discourses; and through microstructures 
the hegemonic position is often reinforced. However, the discourse analysis of Van 
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Dijk (1988b), like that of Laclau and Mouffe (as discussed earlier), appears to limit 
the acknowledgement of other actors or subjects. Van Dijk (1988b) favours one side 
over the other. He offers a “one-sided emphasis to news making practices” 
(Fairclough, 1995: 30) and so those with greater access to the media – politicians, 
institutions and commerce – become the only voice (or the loudest voice) and hence 
the focus of the story. As well as providing information, how that information is 
“framed” has consequences for media discourse. 
 
Gamson and Modigliani (1989) offer a series of tools to examine how meaning 
produces “frames” and how such frames may underlie a discourse. They term their 
frames “media packages” that “work as an overall interpretative principle in relation 
to the issue” (Carvalho, 2000: 9), but which suggest how the reader/viewer can think 
about an issue. Media packages take cultural codes or maps of meaning and place the 
event within a set of values that frame a discourse. The approach of Gamson and 
Modigliani echoes Hall’s earlier work (1978) on how meaning is mapped through 
news production. 
 
The maps of meanings approach shows that meaning is gained from pre-supposed, 
pre-shaped cultural knowledge (Hall, 1978). Cultural codes shape our knowledge, 
which is expressed through language. When journalists apply a set language to news 
stories, or editors reaffirm a set of cultural codes in news production, they reinforce 
cultural codes and knowledge. These codes are defined, according to Gamson and 
Modigliani (1989), through frames. Each frame acts as a series of codes, which direct 
and guide the reader/viewer to interpret the information, and thus build a knowledge 
base in a set way. Framing devices are found through metaphors, exemplars (i.e. 
historical examples from which lessons are drawn), catchphrases, depictions and 
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visual images. Visual images are important because they act as reasoning devices 
(that justify what should be done about it). 
 
The list drawn up by Gamson and Modigliani (1989) is useful, and they expand on 
the Van Dijk (1988) approach by offering a more detailed analysis, especially 
regarding the incorporation of visual imagery and media packages. However, the 
idea of the media package being a summary or “signature matrix that states the 
frame, the range of positions” (Carvalho, 2000: 9) still lacks any explanation for why 
journalists apply these techniques within a media frame. Gamson and Modigliani 
expand on the mechanics, but fail to contextualise the mechanisms of news 
production, whereas Carvalho’s approach offers a more in-depth set of analytical 
tools and aids contextualisation of the media discourse. Carvalho shows by 
“deconstruction and reconstruction of text [which] can give important indications 
about issues like the intentions of the author of a text or utterance” (2000: 3). 
 
Carvalho’s (2000) interpretation of discourse analysis is a far more detailed 
unpacking of the text than the previous works by Gamson and Modigliani (1989) and 
Van Dijk (1988). Carvalho’s emphasis on the mechanics and formulations of a text 
differentiates her work from other critical or media discourse analyses. Briefly, 
Carvalho identifies two forms of analysis, “textual” and “contextual”, by looking at 
six elements of the text. She argues that each of these elements needs to be addressed 
in any textual analysis: (1) surface depicters and structural organisations, (2) objects, 
(3) actors, (4) language and rhetoric, (5) discursive strategies and processes, and 
(6) ideological standpoints (Carvalho, 2000). Each of these six subheadings 
examines the different parts that construct a text. Carvalho first notes the importance 
of surface depicters and structural organisation (i.e. the page number and size of the 
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article, author, etc.). Secondly, she suggests that understanding how objects are 
defined (what the topics and themes of the article are) is equally important. In 
Carvalho’s study on the media reporting of climate change, she identifies objects in a 
text being the theme of “economics, government or nature, while more specific ones 
[topics] may be, for instance, climate change impacts on agriculture” (2000: 22). 
Language shapes the journalistic discourse so that persuasion is tied in with such 
issues as “truthfulness, plausibility, correctness, precision, or credibility” (Van Dijk, 
1988: 83).  
 
Extending other media discourse analysis studies, Carvalho suggests that identifying 
“who” the article mentions (the actors), the recognition of any “individuals and 
institutions” (2000: 24), alongside “social agents and characters” and their 
“perceived influence in shaping the overall meaning of the text” (Carvalho, 2000: 24) 
are all elements of discourses within a text. Moreover, the framing of an article is “a 
central organising principle that holds together and gives coherence and meaning to a 
diverse array of symbols” (Gamson,1992: 384). Labelling how an actor conveys 
“her/his view and position through the media, by having them represented by 
journalists either in the form of quotes or regular text” (Gamson, 1992: 384), is thus 
important in any textual analysis. 
 
Carvalho suggests that a series of factors need to be considered when identifying the 
discursive patterns in news reports. These factors are based on the principle that 
journalists repeat: 
 
[a] discursive re-construction of reality. Rarely do they witness events, 
or get to know reality, in a way that does not involve the mediation of 
others. A variety of social actors serves everyday as sources of 
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information for media professionals, in a direct or indirect way. 
(Carvalho, 2000: 19) 
 
However, the nature of “action” means that journalists often witness events first-
hand and these have greater news value than reports or conferences, which are often 
pushed down the news agenda while they are taking place, until a conclusion or 
decision is announced or a change in circumstances occurs. Carvalho’s discourse 
analysis is missing the difference between reconstructing a reality and how discourse 
shapes the reporting of live events. Protests are live events and, with the pressure of 
24-hour news, journalists are often in situ during them. The No Third Runway (in 
2007) and G20 Meltdown protests (in 2009) saw several journalists in different 
positions reporting on key events. When, on 15 January 2009, the then Transport 
Minister, Geoff Hoon, announced the granting of planning permission to build the 
third runway, Sky News had reporters placed at key points to capture reactions to the 
announcement. Their journalists reported from outside the Palace of Westminster, 
the two villages marked for demolition (Sipson and Harmondsworth) and Heathrow 
Airport (see Sky News report “Heathrow runway: residents react” for further details, 
2009). The G20 Meltdown protest (April 2009) saw Sky News journalists all over 
London. Journalists reported from behind the police cordon (a tactic borrowed from 
the protest movement and explored later in this thesis), a boat on the River Thames 
(Sky boat), and from the route of the march to the Bank of England. Each report was 
backed up with a live camera feed from the Sky News helicopter (Skycopter) 
hovering over the protest, at the Bank of England (see Charlie Brooker’s 
interpretation of the G20 protests, 2009). 
 
Although Carvalho’s work is useful in expanding the field of media discourse, the 
preferred method of analysis in this thesis is Fairclough’s CDA. Many of these 
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approaches, Van Dijk, Gamson and Modigliani, and to some extent Laclau and 
Mouffe, assume a passive/active relationship between the social actors in a discourse. 
Any minor actor becomes passive and the hegemonic position falls to the major 
actor. Just as Carvalho found that Gamson and Modigliani’s and Van Dijk’s 
approaches were too limited when accounting for the different actors and dialogues, 
so her work assumes that power relationships between dominant and all other actors 
shape discourses (i.e. what is sayable or unsayable). Fairclough’s approach, in 
contrast, unpacks the order of discourse to show all voices. What Carvalho, Gamson 
and Modigliani and Van Dijk all seem to miss is the deliberate decision by some 
actors to shape discourses through passive, non-confrontational action as a political 
tool. 
 
Moreover, Fairclough’s idea of boundaries between discourse helps identify who is 
representing whom, whereas Carvalho’s approach lacks any acknowledgement of the 
external factors which shape both the discourse of language and discourse as a social 
and cultural definition. Therefore, by exploring discursive position in media text, 
Fairclough’s approach is useful in deciphering the numerous actors within competing 
discourses. Different levels of engagement with mainstream and alternative media 
are central to much of the representation of environmental activism, and this is a 
theme explored later in this thesis when examining how environmental activists 
counter the dominant media position. Van Dijk (1988b) focuses too closely on the 
text, to the exclusion of social relationships or news discourse, in examining not only 
how meaning is shaped but, importantly, why one such meaning is preferred over 
another. Van Dijk and Carvalho both focus on the text and, although Carvalho 
addresses discourse in her approach, she still lacks an analysis of how social and 
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cultural discourses, along with language, affect the position of news-making 
practices in relation to environmental activism.  
 
Therefore, what is clear is that a straight media discourse analysis helps identify 
patterns in news production but fails to incorporate a theoretical position to unravel 
any social, political or cultural practices. This thesis understands discourse as a 
methodological approach to history, and this is a combination of the Foucauldian 
archaeological approach to discourse and the mechanics of media discourse analysis. 
Fairclough (1995) offers this in his notion of critical discourse analysis. 
 
Having set out the many arguments that inform discourse analysis, this chapter will 
now turn its attention to the empirical research used in this study. There are three 
parts to this: (1) critical discourse analysis, (2) one-to-one interviews, and (3) a focus 
group. The data from this empirical research will form the last third of this thesis (see 
Chapters Five and Six). The next section will firstly explore critical discourse 
analysis and discuss how CDA will be applied in this study, outlining the criticisms 
of CDA (Widdowson, 2004; Stubbs, 1996; Wodak and Chilton, 2005). In addressing 
these criticisms, the chapter will then give an overview of the interviews and focus 
groups. 
 
Critical Discourse Analysis  
Fairclough examines the complexities involved in representing “communicative 
events”. As a post-structuralist, Fairclough sees discourse as a combination of 
language and knowledge, and this view has similarities to Hall’s work set out earlier 
in this chapter (linguistic discourse), whereby language use is “conceived as social 
93 
 
practice” (Fairclough, 2003: 3). Critical discourse analysis provides a method that 
combines discourse analysis in a social and historical context. Fairclough sees 
discourses as “semiotic systems such as language and images” (Philips and 
Jørgensen, 2004: 67), whereas Laclau and Mouffe (2001) see discourses as 
encompassing all social practice. CDA is significant for this study as it provides a set 
of tools that can be used to examine the historical and social context of media 
discourse. By unpacking the historical context of events, we can uncover the role of 
discursive practices and power relations. CDA is also useful as it offers a way of 
examining both textual and social factors to understand the links between “text, 
societal and cultural processes and structures” (Philips and Jørgensen, 2004: 65) in 
news reporting. CDA builds on Gamson and Modigliani’s analysis of the image, to 
establish how different images and linguistic characteristic are repeated in the 
reporting of different versions of a story (intertextual). Fairclough’s CDA combines 
the theory of how language shapes meaning alongside how language moves from 
linguistic traits to knowledge construction and power. In applying CDA, this thesis 
aims to illustrate how journalistic language (media discourse) constitutes 
environmental governance.  
 
Fairclough proposes a similar understanding of media discourse to those already 
discussed. When a text (communicative event) is produced it passes through the 
discursive practice (language, historical factors, order of discourse, mediated quasi-
interaction) to produce the knowledge of socio-cultural practice that emerges in the 
discourse of economics, politics and culture. Communicated events are 
“recontextualised differently depending upon the goals, values and priorities of the 
communication in which they are reconceptualised” (Fairclough, 1995: 41) and are 
dependent on the “goals, values and properties of the communication in which they 
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reconceptualise” (Fairclough, 1995: 41). Access to a communication event also 
influences which “categories of social agent get to write, speak and be seen” 
(Fairclough, 1995: 40). For example, a journalist will have access to official 
spokespersons (police, army, etc.), politicians, corporate or conglomerate press 
officers, as well as the general public. Yet the general public are often excluded from 
accessing such representatives. This one-way communicative event can define media 
discourse as “mediated quasi-interaction” (Thompson, 1990: 228). It is at this point 
that critical discourse analysis explores the “tension between these two sides” in the 
use of language to unpack the “socially shaped and socially constitutive” meaning 
(Fairclough, 1995: 55). Language becomes socially and historically constructed 
(echoing Foucault in Archaeology of Knowledge), and unpacking the language 
should reveal socio-cultural practice.  
 
Where Fairclough’s CDA differs from other kinds of discourse analysis is in his idea 
of “intertextual analysis” that works as a bridging tool between text and discursive 
practice. Intertextual analysis provides the tools to “look at the text from the 
perspective of discursive practice” (Fairclough, 1995: 70), as opposed to media 
practice (as Gamson and Carvalho do, for example). Fairclough provides nine terms 
as a framework for reading the text in CDA. The categories are: heterogeneity, 
grammar, boundaries, metaphor, nominalisation, genre, glocalisation, order of 
discourse and image. The heterogeneity element of CDA (Fairclough, 1995: 15) 
reveals how a mixture of linguistic styles is used, from informal, colloquial language 
when activists are quoted, to formal, official language when quoting from official 
sources. Nominalisation is the use of noun-like terms to identify those involved (such 
as women, protesters, anarchists), while action refers to the use of adjectives to 
define the “action”; and image is also considered important for Fairclough. 
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Fairclough links the use of metaphors to his idea of intertextuality, along with 
transformation. The remaining four are all important because they raise the question 
of agency in environmental discourse. Agency is identified through the order of 
discourse (such as political, economic, environmental, radical politics); glocalisation 
from the local to global- in which context is discourse placed; Boundaries concerns 
who is represented, who are the journalists representing and which discourse is 
dominant. The last term is grammar, specifically the use of conjunctive terms. These 
last four are important and will now be looked at in greater detail.  
 
Grammatical techniques include analysis of sentences, especially the use of 
conjunctives (“but”, “however”, “meanwhile”) and presuppositions (implicit 
assumptions about events/ or the story) in news reports to establish “mechanisms for 
ordering voices” (Fairclough, 1995: 84). Conjunctives change the story, often 
working as “markers of the ordering of discourse” (Fairclough, 1995: 82). Using 
“however” or “but” can be applied to set up contrast between positive or negative 
sides. For example, a news report about a planned incinerator could contrast the 
official source of the local council (in favour), with an oppositional voice from local 
residents or businesses. Presuppositions add authority to a piece, whilst positioning 
the reader as “someone who is already familiar with the cultural and community 
depicted” (Fairclough, 1995: 107). For example, youth culture might be a “genre” 
identified through language of “hoodies”, “chavs” “yoofs”, “thugs”, “generation X”, 
etc. These terms help media discourse to organise one section of society, i.e. youth 
culture, into a genre. Other important variables in a text include the presence or 
“absences” and boundaries.  
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Boundaries are often defined through a text as being between those who are being 
represented, and those doing the representing, when “boundaries are maintained 
between the representing discourse and the represented discourse between the voices 
of the reporter and the person reported” (Fairclough, 1995: 81). Boundaries also aid 
the analysis of absences in a text to discover “things which might have been ‘there’ 
but ‘aren’t’” (Fairclough 1995: 106). Fairclough terms “nominalisations” as the 
“processes that have been turned into noun-like terms (nominals) which can 
themselves function as participants” (Fairclough, 1995: 112). Nominalisation is a 
type of “grammatical metaphor” (Fairclough, 2003: 220). This is similar to Hall’s 
signification or “amplification spiral” that “suggests an increasing of deviances” 
(Hall, 1978: 223) by labelling individuals under one generic noun “activists”, as 
opposed to distinguishing which collective or organisation the “activist” is connected 
to.  
 
Genre can be “described in terms of organizational properties” (Fairclough 1995: 56) 
that are defined through analysis of the “language associated with and constituting 
parts of some particular practice” (Fairclough, 1995: 56). From this genre knowledge 
is formed. When one genre is placed next to another, then several discourses form a 
category. In very simplistic terms, this could be the genre of youth culture juxtaposed 
with crime discourse, equalling a category of youth crime. What is central to 
Fairclough’s approach is the deconstruction of language to unpack how a journalist’s 
use of language to create genres and categories (media discourse) affects the wider 
socio-cultural (media) practice.  
 
An “order of discourse”, like the Foucauldian order of discourse, is a means of 
highlighting “the relationship between different types in such sets”, for instance, in a 
97 
 
school, the discursive types of the classroom and the playground (Fairclough, 1995: 
55). By drawing on specific communicative events over the forty-year period of 
environmental activism in the UK, this study aims to illustrate how historically 
orders of discourse have been “routinely used within the media” and how this “plays 
a part in the reproduction of the media system” (Fairclough, 1995: 72), by analysing 
power relations between the state and environmental activists. Defining an order of 
discourse, combined with Foucault’s notion of commentary (see earlier discussions 
in this chapter), serves two purposes. Firstly, the order of discourse will show which 
actors (to borrow Dryzek’s interpretation) are represented, and secondly, whether 
over time actors are excluded or replaced by journalists and state. By developing 
Fairclough’s notion of order of discourse with other CDA mechanisms, will, unlike 
Carvalho’s study, (a) reveal which actors/voices are heard, and (b) show the power 
relations between actors. Other functions of the “order of discourse” are 
identification of “specific discursive practices of the text” (Philips and Jørgensen, 
2004: 72). The combination of a communicative event with the order of discourse 
creates a dialectical position between language and social systems, with the journalist 
facilitating the conversation between activists, the state and general public. Philips 
and Jørgensen note that when a journalist draws on language “routinely used within 
the media, he or she also plays a part in the reproduction of the media system” (2004: 
72). The reproduction of a media message is further enhanced through “mediated 
quasi-interaction”. The “order of discourse” allows for “one domain of potential 
cultural hegemony, with dominant groups struggling to assert and maintain particular 
structure within and between them” (Fairclough, 1995: 56, in Philips and Jørgensen, 
2004). Therefore identifying the order of discourse in a communicative event over a 
historical period, and taking on board the mediated quasi-interaction, is useful in 
unpacking media discourse. 
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The key aim in using CDA is to use newspaper reports of environmental activism, 
over a long period, to see how journalists’ reporting of environmental activism 
reflects the political shifts and discursive power relations between activists and the 
state. In other words, by undertaking a historical analysis of environmental reporting 
from the 1980s to the 2000s, the study will illustrate that as environmental 
governance increases in social and political discourse, so environmental activism is 
increasingly placed into a discourse of deviance. Only by charting key 
environmentalism-centred protests over a long period of time will this study be able 
to indicate whether there has been any shift in power relations and environmental 
discourse from, as Dryzek puts it, fundis to problem-solving. If this research was to 
just take a series of texts without a CDA, it would not be able to identify whether 
there are any repetitive linguistic traits or a reaffirmation of a discourse of deviance. 
To establish that media reporting of environmental activism reflects the political 
discourse, it must examine environmental activists, not necessarily chronologically, 
but through what Chilton terms “critical discourse moments” (1987). If a pattern can 
be identified, then it can be argued that this pattern is reflective of political shift, and 
therefore that the media discourse supports the political but not the environmental 
discourse. As Chapter Five will suggest, journalists often refer back to earlier 
environmental protests to contextualise contemporary protest.  
 
The thesis will be focusing on empirical data drawn from what has been identified as 
“critical discourse moments” (Chilton, 1987). Critical discourse moments are events 
that bring issues into the forefront of public discourse, providing an opportunity to 
reassert existing frames or provide new frames to draw from. Critical discourse 
moments function as focal points in a discourse that “offers collective patterns of 
99 
 
orientation to the respective co-communicators (Chilton, 1987). Within an event, a 
journalist will look for a hook or peg, an element to frame the event. Carvalho (2000) 
defines critical discourse moments as “periods that involve specific happenings 
which may lead to a challenge to the established discursive positions” (34) and asks 
“did arguments change because of them? Did new alternative views arise?” (2000: 
37).  
 
Chapter Five will argue that expanding Fairclough’s CDA through a historical 
contextualisation of critical discourse moments will suggest that language “routinely 
used within the media” results in the journalist playing a “part in the reproduction of 
the media system” (Fairclough, 1995:72). The critical discourse moments that have 
been identified (and are examined in Chapter Five) are (a) the Greenham Common 
Peace Camp (1982–2000), (b) Swampy and the roads protest (1996–1997), and (c) 
the London May Day Global Justice Movement protest (2000–2002). The Camps for 
Climate Action (henceforth referred to as the climate camps) are discussed in 
Chapter Six with the focus group, and are therefore not included in the three samples. 
These three moments have been chosen because, as argued in this thesis, they were 
significant in the shaping of environmental activism within the environmental 
discourse.  
 
The early environmental movement’s objectives overlapped with resistance to 
nuclear power and nuclear weapons, and the peace movement (Hunold and Dryzek, 
2005: 86), and the Greenham Common Peace Camp was no different. The Greenham 
Common Peace Camp was the first long-term camp in the UK. Although the 
objective of the camp was to raise awareness of nuclear missiles being stored at the 
RAF Greenham base (adjacent to the camp), there was an acute awareness of nuclear 
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weapons and the link to environmental discourse. The peace camp was chosen 
because it shared similar environmental objectives to the very first environmental 
activism that created Greenpeace. Moreover, as Chapter Six will show, the liminoid 
(social) practices and tactics developed at Greenham have formed the foundation of 
media strategies and tactics in recent environmental activist camps (see Doherty, 
1999 and Plows, 2006). A further reason for the choice is that these events show how 
journalists began to view the women at the camp as violent or deviant. Sasha 
Roseneil’s (1995) study of the peace camp identified the journalistic practice of 
placing women outside of society (see Chapter Six). The female protesters were 
metaphorically placed outside of family life and traditional matriarchal roles, as well 
as being physically outside the RAF base. This resulted in the use of a language that 
masculinised the women, or framed them as outside of society. Being outside of 
society, as Chapter Three’s discussions on biopower will show, reinforces activists in 
a position of deviancy through media discourse.  
 
The rationale for the second and third examples is more closely linked to 
environmental discourse. Swampy become the poster boy for the road protest in the 
1990s. As Mathew Paterson (2000) notes, Swampy became synonymous with the 
environmental activism movement and the media. Swampy, aka Daniel Hooper, 
garnered media coverage for digging a deep tunnel (deeper than any other) at the 
A30 road protest site. The media coverage was focused around Swampy as he 
remained in the tunnel the longest of all activists. The anti-road protest created a 
tempestuous relationship between journalists and activists, with some denying media 
discourse and others giving interviews and embracing media attention. The 
movement as a whole learnt valuable lessons from the road protest, which went on to 
influence the relationship between journalists and activists (see Chapter Six).  
101 
 
 
The third sample was chosen for the environmental objective that links the activist 
movement with wider, global justice movement protests. The first May Day protest, 
titled Guerrilla Gardening, was linked to the earlier protest against the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) in Seattle, USA. This 
protest has been chosen for three reasons. Firstly, it combines UK environmental 
activism with a global anti-capitalist discourse; secondly, the May Day protest 
stretched pre- and post the 9/11 terrorism attack that led to increased labelling of 
environmental activists as eco-terrorists (see Chapter Four); and thirdly, it illustrates 
the clear demarcation of discourse between capitalism and anti-capitalism. The May 
Day protest changed the relationship between activists and the media in light of the 
9/11 terrorist attacks, but also led to the increased and open labelling of activists as 
deviant by the press. Although these three samples are chronologically aligned, they 
were mainly chosen for having significantly altered the relations between activist and 
media discourse. Critical discourse analysis will be applied to these critical discourse 
moments, through newspaper reports of each of these three events. However, other 
media forms, for example TV, online or audio, will not be entirely ignored.  
 
The criteria by which newspaper reports were chosen were that they had to appear in 
the “news section” of a newspaper (rejected articles include editorials, letters or 
comment pieces). Articles could only be sourced from UK national newspapers.
11
 
The final criterion ensured that the number of newspapers covering a 
                                                   
11 The first environmental activism that led to Greenpeace took place off the coast of Alaska will not be analysed 
because coverage occurred in North American newspapers (predominantly The New York Times and Vancouver 
Sun).  
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“communicative event” had to have been identified from academic sources or the 
nexis
12
 database.
13
  
There were 61 articles identified from the nexis database search and the actual 
articles were sourced from the British newspaper library. It was important to source 
the articles over the text, to establish where they sit on the page, size of article, if 
they are positioned next to contrasting stories. The number and length of the articles 
determines the higher or lower news value assigned to the story by editors and 
owners. This is important, because the nexis database gives no indication of the size 
or the importance of a story – where on the page it appeared (for example, the 
weekly column by Swampy against the expansion of Manchester airport (1997) was 
often placed next to a large advert for cheap flights from Manchester airport). 
Another example is Paterson’s discussion (2000) on Swampy with the headline “The 
nation digs you, Swampy” (Ed. Op. 1997: 15). Although Paterson gives the piece 
much discussion, it is only a few lines long (seven) buried on page fifteen, thus given 
less prominence (2000: 15). These criteria aim to address potential problems of using 
newspaper coverage. However, there is wider criticism of CDA that this work will 
now address.  
 
A Critique of Critical Discourse Analysis  
Critics of CDA, such as Molina (2009), O’Halloran (2003), Wodak and Chilton, 
(2005), and Stubbs (1997) argue that Fairclough’s method is problematic for 
numerous reasons. Indeed, these observations echo similar critiques of Foucault, in 
                                                   
12 Nexis newspaper database is provides full text access to all UK national newspapers, plus regional newspapers, 
international news providers and a number of trade journals and magazines. Most titles have a twenty year 
archive.  
13 Rejected moments were the first environmental activism, because it occurred in Alaska (1971), not the UK. 
The Brent Spar (1995) incident was also rejected because it centred on Greenpeace action, and the focus of this 
study is radical non-hierarchical environmental activism. 
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that CDA as an analytical tool begins from an assumed, universally accepted 
position. Fairclough and Foucault are criticised for assuming that any analysis, 
whether historical or discursive, begins from a normative position. For example, the 
Western view of society is the normative position. Secondly, it assumes that 
language is clear and not opaque (Molina, 2009:185). Language is a complex series 
of relations that produces meaning, yet this is not necessarily a discourse. Thirdly, it 
lacks any definition as to whether discourse is finite or infinite, and if so at which 
point does language stop being discourse (Molina, 2009)  
 
Wodak and Chilton argue that Fairclough’s CDA is “good at showing how particular 
language users establish exclusionary attitudes”, but it only truly works as a 
“descriptive job, not a theoretical job” (Wodak and Chilton, 2005: 24). Wodak and 
Chilton also find CDA problematic as a theoretical approach, predominantly because 
it lacks “acknowledgement of the role of cognitive knowledge in deciphering and 
interpretation” (Wodak and Chilton, 2005: 21), as it lacks “attention to the human 
mind” (Wodak and Chilton, 2005: 22). Not taking cognitive processes into account 
negates discourse as a social action (or “social practice’), ignores the fact that social 
action constructs social reality (objects, situations, identities, social relations) and 
may even deny that discourse can be defined as the use of language. For CDA to be a 
legitimate and constructive mechanism for examining language “construction can 
only be taking place in the minds of (interacting) individuals” (Wodak and Chilton, 
2005: 23). However, this thesis would argue that Wodak and Chilton are ignoring 
how journalists give an event news value, because even if Fairclough is taking an 
assumed position, how the journalist selects a communicative event as news is also 
an assumed position.  
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Depending on the value that the journalist puts on the event, they will “re-
tell/reconstruct” the story for public consumption. Thus some events have no “news 
value” whilst others have a high news value. The news value of any communicative 
event is determined by how journalists focus on the “extraordinary, dramatic, tragic 
to get their stories onto the news agenda” (Hall, 1978: 54). Some events are a “one-
off”, whilst others that occur regularly become part of social practice. For example, 
when journalists cover familiar and regular events (e.g. an annual sporting event, 
parliamentary procedures such as the Queen’s Speech, Prime Minister’s Question 
Time, the Budget), they have already identified a “range of social and cultural 
identifications” through “maps of meanings” (Hall, 1978: 58). Thus Wodak and 
Chilton are critical of Fairclough, but fail to acknowledge the assumptions made by 
journalists. 
 
Widdowson (2004) and Stubbs (1997) are less convinced that CDA even has the 
ability to do a descriptive job, because it lacks any “epistemological and ontological 
foundations” (Poole 2010: 138). Widdowson believes that “no matter how exhaustive 
the linguistic description of a text, the critical discourse analysis can never 
indisputably ‘reveal’ a particular discourse at work” (Widdowson cited in Poole, 
2010: 147). Yet with any social science research there is an element of subjectivity, 
and it is hard to avoid this.  
 
Stubbs (1997) and O’Halloran (2003) argue that there is one solution to this problem, 
“if CDA aims to show causal links between particular textual features…reader 
reactions or textual interpretations, then data is needed on readers’ thought 
processes…If language and thought are to be related, then one needs data and theory 
from both” (Stubbs in Poole, 2010: 148). Moreover, as Poole notes, in reading 
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Fairclough’s work, there is a “strong impression that it is actually his self-declared 
socialism – and the associated hostility to imperialism, neoliberalism, and global 
capitalism – rather than close linguistic analysis which is the well spring” (Poole, 
2010: 146).  
 
This thesis takes on board the criticisms of subjectivity, cognitive assumptions and 
the limited ability of CDA to provide “descriptive” analysis. However, the thesis has 
retained CDA as a method for three reasons. First, CDA provides a platform to 
contextualise media discourse within a historical framework, unlike media discourse 
analysis that takes one event and applies discourse analysis to an entire genre of 
reporting (see Carvalho, 2000). As earlier discussion show, what is problematic with 
media discourse analysis is that it only provides the tools with which to unpack 
journalistic language. Van Dijk, Gamson, Modigliana, and Carvalho all concentrate 
on the relationship between media discourse and meaning without contextualising 
such meaning. This thesis would argue that simple media discourse fails to take into 
account the source of journalistic language or the voice of all actors. Therefore, this 
thesis expands the media discourse analysis to include the role of the state, by 
charting the historical reporting of activism from three key critical discourse 
moments. A second rationale for continuing with CDA is that, unlike the other 
literature in the field, this thesis is also looking at the impact of political discourse on 
media and environmental discourse. Therefore, the  intertextuality of CDA provides 
a platform on which to include political discourse in the analysis.  
 
A third reason for retaining CDA is to apply Stubbs’s and O’Halloran’s suggestion 
that data is needed on the thought processes, production and consumption of media 
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discourse. To address the issues raised by Stubbs and O’Halloran, a second empirical 
method will be employed through interviews and a focus group  
  
The decision was made to hold a focus group with activists rather than journalists, 
NGO members or politicians. The rationale for choosing activists over journalist was 
(a) there is limited research speaking directly to activists (see Plows’ (2006) 
ethnographic study on environmental protest movements); (b) the focus of this 
research is on how activists are represented; and (c) to add new knowledge about 
why 2005 was a turning point for relations between activists and journalists in light 
of new and social media.  
Interviews and Focus Groups 
The focus group as a method is useful because, although commonly associated with 
PR and product research (Greenbaum, 1998), it also provides an opportunity to gain 
the views of a cross-section of the environmental movement in the UK. As Morgan 
(1998) notes, the “focus group is a group of interviews” (10), as opposed to one-to-
one interviews with individuals, which tend to be used to “provide personal accounts 
about the unique experience” (Morgan, 1998: 33).  
 
The focus group aimed to examine how the environmental activism movements that 
have recently emerged through the Camps for Climate Action (from 2006 to 2010) 
have shifted the political foundation of UK activist movements. The focus group 
aimed to explore whether the climate camps’ use of new media technologies was an 
attempt to challenge the “emptying out” of the environmental activists’ political 
endeavours by the mainstream press. Climate camps began to create “new hybrid 
forms of media consumption-production which challenge the entrenched division on 
labour (producer vs. consumer of media narratives) that is the essence of media 
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power” (Couldry, 2003: 45). The participants were chosen either because of their 
direct relationship with the media, or because of their role within the movement.  
 
Participants were identified through a series of stages, beginning with newspaper 
clippings. Activists who were quoted either directly or indirectly (such as a group but 
no individual names) were categorised. For example, an article on Plane Stupid’s 
action may quote activist Leo Murray or Dan Glass – so the pattern was to identify 
the individuals.
14
 Initially, newspaper clippings were chosen from 2005 onwards as 
this is the turning point when activists began engaging with the mainstream media. In 
total, 187 articles were collected about environmental activism in the media. These 
included national daily and Sunday newspapers and London regional newspapers. Of 
these 187, a total of 101 were published after 2005. The largest collection came from 
The Guardian (30 articles) and the least from The Mirror (1) newspapers. These 
articles were whittled down to those articles linked to the seven participants and 
articles that were “critical discourse moments” or focused on environmental 
discourse as a whole. This narrowed the choice down to eighty-eight articles that 
identified forty-six potential participants. These forty-six were coded as either “A”, 
“B” or “A/B”. “A” stood for priority, “B” was coded for secondary and “A/B” 
represented a secondary person from the same collective that had already been 
identified. The coding revealed seventeen potential focus group participants (coded 
A), seven were coded “B” and eight were “A/B”. The seventeen were contacted and 
confirmation was received from six activists. This number of participants adheres to 
Greenbaum’s idea of a mini group that is “limited to 4–6…with the mini group; the 
                                                   
14 The movement is relatively small, with many activists moving from one protest cause to another, or diverting 
off for a while to other issues (such as race, gender, anti-capitalism) only to return to environmental activism. 
Therefore the pool of people who have a history with the movement is fairly limited and so easier to identify. 
108 
 
time per person is doubled, thus theoretically enabling the moderator to get more 
information from each individual” (Greenbaum, 1998: 3).15 
 
The participants were chosen from news stories after 2005, as this is the point when 
they made a conscious decision to engage with the media. During this period there 
were four Camps for Climate Action, and also the emergence of the Rising Tide, 
Climate Rush, So We Stand and Plane Stupid collectives. There were also the G8 (in 
2005) and G20 (in 2009) meetings in the UK, at which a variety of activist 
collectives attended and protested. It was also felt that personality-led participants 
could detract from gaining an overview of the movement.  
 
The articles were chosen because they either contained a direct quote from the 
participants, involved activists, or were symbolic of wider movement discussions. 
Five newspaper samples were chosen as external stimulus (Greenbaum, 1998) to 
generate discussion and gather data on a) the motivation of activist, and b) their 
understanding of how they are presented. The samples were divided into two parts. 
Part one had two samples designed to give overviews of environmental discourse and 
the reporting of direct action. Part two held three samples with direct quotes and 
reference to the participants of the focus group. The first article “The Green 
Revolution” was a front image divided by two images – one with former Prime 
Minister Tony Blair, and former California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger at a 
BP press conference. This image was juxtaposed with a photograph of two female 
activists jostling with police at the Drax Camp for Climate Action. These pictures 
epitomise the key themes of this thesis: the political, market-led discourse in 
                                                   
15 The focus group was recorded with two dictaphones and a flash recorder on the table. Before the focus group 
began, each participant was also ask to record on video a short brief about themselves. They were asked about 
their background, specifically how they saw themselves in the environmental movement, and whether they are 
connected to any specific collective. 
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governmentality, and the contestation between activists and the police. The second 
sample was the London Evening Standard headline “Militants in plot to hijack 
Heathrow” (13 August  2007: 1). Rosser’s article also signalled the first challenge of 
media discourse by the activists to the Press Complaints Committee (PCC).  
 
 
Part two began with an article centred on new and social media at the Blackheath 
Climate Camp. The article carried quotes from Hamish and Richard and a 
photograph of the media tent. This sample was chosen because it was on page four of 
the Guardian newspaper. The remaining  two pieces were “It’s BP party and we’ll 
protest if we want too” (The Times, 24 March 2009: 40) and the Daily Mail 
newspaper’s coverage of Plane Stupid action to superglue Dan Glass to the Prime 
Minister Gordon Brown “How do you glue, Mr Brown” (23 July 2008: 17).  The last 
two articles were on pages 17 and 14 respectively and carried fewer than 250 words. 
Moreover, for the last two stories the activists provided press releases about the 
events. The objective of using these two samples was to ascertain how the activists 
felt they were represented and also to establish if the press released reflected the 
coverage. 
 The focus group was held at Conway Hall, Central London, on 9 August 2011. The 
seven participants were Dan,
16
 Hamish,
17
 John,
18
 Nim
19
 Michael,
20
 Richard
21
 and 
                                                   
16  Dan became interested in activism from the rave scene, and is now with Plane Stupid and So We Stand. 
17  A teenager at the Greenham Common Women’s Peace Camp, Hamish has been involved with the 
“Undercurrents’ alternative news website, the roads protest movement, Reclaim the Streets, anti-GM protests, 
Visionon.tv, and has attended all five climate camps. 
18 John is from the coalition against Heathrow’s third runway (HACAN). He works with Airport Watch and has 
also participated in roads protests. 
19 Nim Ralph is an activist with So We Stand, who has been involved with the movement since 2005.  
20 Michael was involved in the Poll Tax protests and the Miners’ Strike, and he also set up a horizontal group to 
stop building the Eurotunnel, has taken part in the People’s Global Action, the 1999 Intercontinental Caravan, 
G8 Koln, the 2010 Geneva Cop15, the 2011 Bangladesh Now, and Rising Tide. With Nim he is co-founder of 
So We Stand.  
21 Richard is also from Visionon.tv and was involved with the Miners’ Strike during 1984–85. He was one of the 
first people filming and making films about environmental direct action in the early 1990s in the UK. 
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Steve.
22 , 23
 In addition, face-to-face interviews were also conducted with John 
Jordan,
24
 Des Kay,
25
 Dan Glass
26
 and Martin.
27
 The focus group’s purpose was to 
investigate the following questions:  
1. Why are activists developing media strategies that negate earlier ideas 
around the media as a fourth estate?  
2. Does a focus on the front page depoliticise a protest? 
3. Why do activists continue to think in terms of traditional front-page 
media strategies? 
4. Do new media open up opportunities for genuine knowledge 
exchange between environmental activists and the public? 
 
Greenbaum notes that many focus groups are “conducted at 6 and 8 o’clock in the 
evening”, although there is an increasing “trend toward more use of daytime groups 
to accommodate both the needs of the respondents and the desire of many 
moderators” (1998: 36). This focus group adhered to the latter, and was held between 
two and five o’clock in the afternoon of 9 August 2011.28 As a consequence of the 
timing, the focus group ended up with 6:1 male:female ratio.  
                                                   
22  From Rising Tide, Steve was heavily involved with the early roads protest at Claremont Road (East London), 
along with activism with London Greenpeace (not corporate Greenpeace) and some activism with early Plane 
Stupid, mainly Rising Tide since. He has been involved with the climate camps from their first meetings and is 
now based at the London Action Resource Centre (LARC).  
23 These names were given in good faith. In researching potential participants some were identified after being 
named in newspaper articles. It was only when they were contacted that they gave another name or their real 
name. Giving pseudonyms is common practice in the movement. For example, Alex Harvey, the name given 
to the PCC, was a pseudonym; the real Alex Harvey was a 1960s singer who died by electrocution in 1972. 
When contact was made with LARC for assistance, the two names given were pseudonyms associated with 
local football club West Ham United FC (Tony Cottee was one name). On the day, the names given were 
taken at face value. 
24 John is involved with Reclaim the Streets and the climate camps, but now mainly focuses on the use of 
carnivalesque as a tactical political tool.  
25  From Critical Mass (the autonomous cycling collective), Des was chosen because, with the help of Friends of 
the Earth, they successfully overturned a ban by the Metropolitan Police to prevent the monthly cycle rides.  
26 From Plane Stupid, for his action of supergluing himself to the then Prime Minster, Gordon Brown. 
27 From the Whitechapel Anarchist and Class War, to gauge the views of the radical flank within the movement 
as a whole.  
28 Food and drink were provided. Unlike some focus groups, there were no plans to “feed the participants before 
they enter the room” (Greenbaum, 1998: 44), but light snacks were available during the discussion. When 
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Two other issues need brief discussion: ethics and identity. Ethics clearance was 
gained through the University of East London. Identity and anonymity were issues 
that needed addressing. Many activists are cautious about trusting new people.
29
 To 
get round this the choice of location was important. It needed to be a neutral place, 
but not a sterile environment. London Conway Hall was chosen as an ideal place to 
hold the focus group, because of its central London location, and for its historical 
place within activists’ movements. It is the home of the Ethical Society, which aims 
to “foster freedom in moral and spiritual life and thought” (Conway Hall website).30 
Finally, identification of the activists was an issue. It was decided that pseudonyms 
would be used if an activist chose to do so. Approximately half the group used a 
pseudonym. Hence the focus group and samples are applied to address the criticism 
of CDA and provide original data. The findings from the focus group are built into 
the discussion on how activists challenge the political and media discourse (see 
Chapter Six). 
 
Conclusion  
This chapter has set out the methods used in this thesis that work with discourse, 
discourse analysis, critical discourse analysis and focus groups with interviews. 
Central to this study is the method of critical discourse analysis to address the 
research questions that drive this thesis. 
  
                                                                                                                                                
booking Conway Hall we requested a tea urn, and provided comestibles for the participants. Once the 
recordings had been concluded, beer was provided for the post-focus group debrief.  
29 The openness of the movement and lack of hierarchical structure leave it open to anyone joining. A recent case 
of an undercover police officer, PC Mark Stone (see Chapter Four for more discussion on Kennedy), having 
infiltrated the movement for seven years, gave a sense of mistrust in the movement. There is also a history of 
journalists working incognito, adding to the mistrust.  
30 http://www.conwayhall.org.uk/#About-us  
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This chapter has shown how language shapes discourse, which in turn shapes 
knowledge. In expanding the ideas outlined in Chapter One on the emergence of 
environmentalism as a discourse, this thesis argues that the construction of language 
can create meaning. In addition, the different motivations (such as problem-solving, 
survivalism, realos and fundis) impact on discourse to create a discursive struggle.  
 
Language also produces knowledge, and how that knowledge is conveyed can be 
unpacked through media discourse analysis. Media discourse analysis provides the 
tools and mechanisms to understand how journalists frame stories at both macro and 
micro levels. However, critical discourse analysis also helps to contextualise 
language from a theoretical position. It provides the mechanism to unravel how 
discourse creates meaning and to identify historical practices and patterns in media 
discourse. There are some criticisms of these approaches mainly that they take an 
assumptive cognitive position that can only be tested through empirical research. 
However, this thesis will retain CDA as a central method because, despite the 
critiques, CDA provides the tools to analyse the mechanisms whilst contextualising 
language. Unlike other media discourse analysis, CDA unpacks how knowledge 
shapes discourse. Once meaning is revealed, power relations can be explored. If 
media discourse is not contextualised, and only the mechanics of media discourse 
(such as sentence structures) are examined, unpacking why such power relations 
occur becomes difficult. However, this work takes on board the criticism, therefore a 
focus group is used to address the concerns that media discourse and CDA begin 
from a set point.  
 
This project has chosen the focus group to aid in the analysis of the importance of 
changes in media discourse, such as social and new media. Significantly, activists’ 
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engagement with media discourse, juxtaposed with mainstream party politics, 
increased the news value of environmental discourse. To establish why mainstream 
political parties took a greater involvement in shaping environmental discourse, the 
next chapter will draw on Foucault’s theory of governmentality to chart the historical 
practices that led to a neoliberal engagement with environmental discourse. 
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Chapter Three: Green Governmentality, Environmental Discourse 
and Governance  
 
“Most environmentalist movements now operate as a basic manifestation of 
governmentality”(Luke, 1999: 122)  
 
Introduction  
The aim of this chapter is to show how neoliberal concepts became incorporated into 
environmental discourse. The chapter examines what has shaped the environmental 
discourse for it to become, in Luke’s words, “an ongoing struggle over economic 
competitiveness”. Luke examines this division through what he terms a “green 
governmentality” – environmentalism through the lens of governmentality (Foucault 
1977). Echoing Luke’s approach, this chapter will unpack Foucault’s idea of 
governmentality, and similar to Luke (who applies this to American politics), this 
work will apply Foucault’s governmentality approach to the UK political discourse 
around environmentalism, to examine whether environmental activism is framed as a 
politics of deviancy. This chapter will argue that environmental discourse began as 
an nascent process with activism in a dominant position to influence media 
discourse. Over time, the government’s introduction of neoliberal concepts has 
increasingly shifted power away from activists and onto the state. Thus, the chapter 
argues that since the early 1970s, there have been two forms of environmental 
discourse – activism and governance.  
 
Whilst Hunter (see Chapter One) were gaining media coverage for their protest 
against nuclear testing off the Alaskan coast (1971), bubbling under the surface was 
an environmental discourse linked to global and local governance. The first Earth 
Day (1971) signalled the beginning of the development of a global environmental 
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discourse linked to economics and global environmental policies (such as the 
Brundtland Commission). By the 1980s and early 1990s, the emergence of 
neoliberalism as a new form of economics had penetrated the environmental 
discourse. As mainstream party politics, commerce and institutions (such as the 
International Monetary Fund and the United Nations) adapt to environmental crisis 
and increased public awareness, there was a shift in power away from activist 
collectives influencing media discourse and policy, to media images of politicians 
adopting environmental discourse into party politics. This chapter will focus on this 
shift in power. Chapter Four will look in more detail at how this power shift 
impacted on environmental activism in relation to environmental and media 
discourse.  
 
In order to unpack why this shift in power emerged, this chapter will draw on the 
Foucauldian notion of power in relation to government, governance and 
governmentality (outlined in Chapter One). Applying Foucault’s theory of 
governmentality, it will chart the way environmental discourse is linked to 
neoliberalism. In order to do this, this chapter will first look at Foucault’s notions of 
power and biopower. These ideas will be followed by a discussion of the emergence 
of neoliberal economics in relation to environmental discourse. Drawing on 
Foucault’s notion of governmentality, the chapter aims to show how power relations 
between activists, individuals and governance have persuaded many to find 
economic solutions to environmental problems, through the concept of “green 
capitalism”. Green capitalism is “sometimes associated with small enterprises that 
can directly implement green criteria by, for example, using renewable energy 
sources” (Wallis, 2010). This work will apply this notion of capitalism through a 
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green lens to examine the shifts in environmental discourse through a 
governmentality approach.  
 
Foucault’s notion of governmentality argues that through different mechanisms or 
techniques individuals are persuaded to act in a set way by way of governance. 
Individuals who reject or challenge these various forms of persuasion are labelled as 
abnormal, and their actions are restricted by legislative measures, and ultimately 
through penal law. How the UK government has gone about this is the focus of this 
chapter. This chapter will examine these changes by developing a Foucauldian 
approach (outlined in Chapter Two on discourse) of examining discourse through a 
historical context.
31
 By exploring discourse in a historical context this chapter aims 
to show how language shapes knowledge and discourse. 
 
Drawing on examples from the UK Conservative Party policies, and those of the 
other two main political parties, this chapter shows how neoliberalism has become 
part of environmental discourse. In charting how environmental discourse moved 
from advanced to neoliberalism, this chapter will argue that former Prime Ministers 
Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair, along with current Prime Minister David 
Cameron, understood that applying economic solutions to environmental problems 
would have the added bonus of creating new markets. For example, London is home 
to the alternative energy markets and carbon-trading companies estimated to be 
worth $170 billion per annum (PWC, 2011). This can be contextualised in light of 
global initiatives in addressing climate change, to argue that, although party political 
and global environmental governance may have begun as an underlying theme of 
                                                   
31
 The period from the 1970s to the present has been chosen as it reflects the period when environmentalism 
increasingly centred on social and cultural relations.  
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environmental discourse, since the late 1980s it has slowly shifted power away from 
activists onto state governance.  
Was Foucault an Environmentalist? 
Although Foucault’s work lacks any specific reference to environmentalism, his 
thoughts in the History of Sexuality (1976) and the collection of essays on the “Birth 
of Biopolitics” (Foucault, 2008) provides the notion that environmental and political 
discourse are not two separate entities, but can be linked through biopower. In 
debating relations of power, Foucault draws on the example of the “atomic situation” 
(Foucault, 1976: 137), an issue closely related to the environmental activism 
movement. The analogy of a nuclear bomb allows Foucault to show how 
governments have the power to extinguish entire populations.  
 
The power to expose a whole population to death is the underside of 
the power to guarantee an individual’s continued existence…it is 
because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, 
the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population. (Foucault, 
1978: 137) 
 
The “atomic situation” is a culmination, an ultimate show of the power of one person 
over another, with the ability to take the life of another – the ultimate form of 
control. In political terms, the analogy works to reveal an underlying principle (that 
one has to be capable of killing in order to go on living) as “at stake is the biological 
existence of a population, this is not because of the recent return of the ancient right 
to kill” (Foucault, 1978: 137). In other words, Foucault’s drawing on the nuclear 
debate shows how politics and control over human life can be linked together. 
Foucault was aware of the “heated debate in environmentalism in terms not of 
epistemological options from which one has to choose, but, on the contrary, of 
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essential and necessary conditions for the emergence of an ecological/environmental 
movement in itself” (Darier, 1999: 4). Understanding the conditions in which 
environmental discourse emerges, Foucault divides the environmental realm into two 
separate but interpenetrating spheres – biological and historical. Biological 
dimensions are also seen as forces of nature, such as famine, disease, the dominance 
of human existence, death, reduced or eradicated through technological and 
agricultural development. Historically, the eradication or reduction of famine, 
disease, and so on meant a “development of the different fields of knowledge 
concerned with life in general…a relative control over life averted some of the 
imminent risks of death” (Foucault 1978: 142). The result was that “biological and 
historical became intertwined creating interlocking disciplinary expanses for the 
‘environmental’” (Luke 1999: 143). Luke (1999) and Darier (1999) note that, 
although Foucault is relatively quiet on ecological and environmental discourse, he 
did understand that in order for politics to move away from a sovereign to a political 
form, then “environmental” issues such as population, health, death and disease had 
to become part of the political spectrum. This is epitomised in his notions of power 
and biopower.  
 
Power for Foucault is neither a single entity, nor an overarching force. In The History 
of Sexuality: The Will to Knowledge: v. 1 (1978) Foucault argues that power is not a 
“group of institutions and mechanisms” (Foucault, 1978: 92); nor does he view 
power as “a mode of subjugation…a general system of domination exerted by one 
group over another, a system whose effects, through successive derivations, pervade 
the entire social body” (Foucault, 1978: 92). Instead Foucault views power as 
omnipotent, part of everything. Power neither holds a standalone position, nor is it 
something that is “produced from one moment to the next, at every point, or rather in 
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every relation from one point to another. Power is everywhere; not because it 
embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere” (Foucault, 1978: 93). 
Moreover, for Foucault, power is not something to be attained, achieved, shared, or 
held onto, but “exercised from innumerable points, in the interplay of non egalitarian 
and mobile relations” (Foucault, 1978: 94). Power is within everything, part of 
everything, yet it is neither measureable nor materialistic, and for Foucault it is 
certainly “not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are 
endowed with” (Foucault, 1978: 93). 
 
Power is a “name that one attributes us to a complex strategically situation in a 
particular society” (Foucault, 1978: 93). In other words, power could be understood 
as relations between situations, and how those relations work or resist each other 
could be labelled power. Power exists in the structures and strategies between 
relations. Shifts in power come when strategies and structures are altered, directly or 
indirectly. For Foucault, “the characteristic feature of power is that some men can 
more or less entirely determined other men’s conduct – but never exhaustively or 
coercively” (Foucault, 2002: 324). In relation to this thesis, a shift in power is viewed 
as emerging when there is a restructuring of discourse between the state and activists 
as mainstream politics develops new environmental strategies.  
 
Foucault does not reduce power to human agency as a property, rather it is the result 
of a constellation of discursive structures, knowledge and practice. These discursive 
structures then create rules and standards, which enable agents to exercise power 
over themselves and other agents. Conduct is central to how Foucault understands 
power, strategies and relations between individuals, and individuals and the state. 
However, there is no exercise of power “without a series of aims and objectives” 
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(Foucault, 1978: 95). Foucault argued that, as the population grew, the aims and 
objectives of the sovereign became outmoded, as government and discipline became 
commonplace.  
 
In Discipline and Punish (1977) and Power: Essential Works of Foucault (2002) 
Foucault outlines what he sees as three forms of power – sovereign, discipline and 
governmental. Carl Death (2010b) provides a useful definition of each form of 
power. Sovereign power is associated with the law (of the land); disciplinary power 
is associated with the “regulation of the actions of individual bodies in schools, 
barracks, and the institutions of an emerging state” (Death, 2010b: 17). The third 
category, governmental power, is associated with “techniques employed to achieve 
biopolitical government of the population…working through the conduct of conduct 
rather than ruling directly over territory and bodies” (Death, 2010b: 17).  
 
Sovereign power emerged in the Middle Ages with an objective of sustaining land 
and land ownership of the crown. Power and rules were executed through the rule of 
law. According to Foucault, sovereign power “is managed through the law to shape 
the identity of individual’s through juridical subjects such as judges, administration 
of the law, and law in general” (Foucault, 1991: 95). As Kelly notes, “In the modern 
period, according to Foucault, sovereign power has been supplemented by two new 
technologies, namely discipline and biopower, the former micro-political, and the 
latter macro-political” (Kelly, 2009: 43). Technology in this respect refers to the 
mechanisms, techniques and strategies that shift power and which act as a “body of 
technical knowledge and practices, a raft of techniques” (Kelly, 2009: 44). Such 
technologies become prevalent when society moves away from sovereign power into 
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disciplinary power. Disciplinary power is the application of technologies that begin 
to control the individual body.  
 
The discipline of the body “organizes an analytical space” (Foucault, 1991: 143) that 
acts as a parameter in which the individual is restricted in the area of their activities. 
Control of the body comes through the “art of government” (as a technique) to render 
possible the ability to “adjust the multiplicity of men and the multiplication of the 
apparatuses of production (and this means not only production in the strict sense), 
but also the production of knowledge and skills in the hospitals, the production of 
destructive force in the army” (Foucault, 1991: 219). These differing forms of power 
link into environmental discourse. Nealon notes, that:  
 
discipline, as a mode of power is nearly ubiquitous: you wake up to 
the disciplinary family, consume a breakfast purchased from the 
efficiency-saturated shelves of the grocery store, and ride the state 
apparatus – the highway, bus, or train – to school or your job, which 
in turn is also sodden with the imperatives of discipline: appointments, 
meetings, tasks, breaks, lunch. (Nealon, 2008: 34–35) 
 
Just as Nealon’s example shows how disciplinary power directs the everyday, this 
chapter argues that environmental discourse is connected to concepts of neoliberal 
economics and green capitalism. The chapter also links to the family and individuals’ 
behaviour to conduct themselves in an ecologically sound manner, almost living 
vicariously through environmental discourse. Household routines rotate around the 
individual responsibility to control their energy consumption. Low-energy light bulbs 
replace higher emitting bulbs, doorstep recycling schemes encourage individuals to 
reduce their carbon footprint. People are strongly encouraged to take public transport 
to work, school or shopping. If driving is the only option, there is a disciplinary 
measure that suggests the purchasing of a hybrid or smart car. These same 
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disciplinary measures continue at work, such as recycling office paper, and once 
home again, via public transport and the supermarket, we take our bags and buy 
products in recycled packaging to earn green reward points. Moreover, wider, global 
governance extends discipline to the art of government (the third form of power). 
 
The “art of government” also requires the establishment of a “continuity, in both an 
upwards and downwards direction” (Foucault, 1991: 91). An upwards direction 
dictates that those wanting to govern at state level must first establish the skills to 
govern themselves. A downwards direction requires the running of family and state 
to hold the same set of principles that “transmits individual behaviour and the 
running of the family [as] the same principles as the good government of the 
state…the central term of this continuity is the government of the family, termed 
economy” (Foucault, 1991: 91–92). This third element of governmentality is the 
“study the autonomous individual’s capacity for self-control and how this is linked to 
political rule and economic exploitation” (Lemke, 2000: 4), and is used “to refer to 
the government of a specific historical era, namely one characterised by bio-power” 
(Oels, 2005: 189).  
 
An example of biopower as an administrative tool comes from the governmental 
Department of Environment (DoE). The first mention of “environmentalism” in the 
Queen’s Speech took place in 1971 (McCormick, 1991) and the new government 
Department for the Environment was established in the same year as an outcome of 
the “Reorganising of Central Government” white paper (in November 1970) (DoE, 
1971), signalling its emergence as an economic and social area of policy 
development. The creation of the DoE was not just part of a reorganising structure by 
central government, more significantly, it was a reaction to increasing public concern 
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around environmentalism. The new department symbolised the “advent of a new 
political awareness which recognised the socio-economic significance of 
environmental concerns” (Robinson, 1992: 11). The DoE’s remit was to be 
responsible for the “whole range of functions which affect people’s living 
environment”. Despite its name, the role of the DoE focused less on environmental 
matters (such as conservation, air pollution, clean water supplies etc.) and more on 
overseeing town planning, housing, inner-city issues, sport, recreation and royal 
parks (McCormick, 1991). The role of the DoE was to administrate and organise 
societal structures. Although environmentalism may have been a fledgling term, both 
in political and activist discourses, it was beginning to gain support as a social 
construct. There was the realisation that environmentalism could be a suitable 
narrative upon which to hang various discourses and disciplines. The establishment 
of the DoE provided the means of governing and administrating the subject, as bio-
politics became more and more useful as a mechanism to introduce legislation and 
confer greater individual life choices. As Foucault notes:  
  
Through biopower, governments attempt to rationalise the problems 
presented to governmental practices by the phenomena characteristic 
of a group of living human beings constituted as a population. 
(Foucault in Rabinow, 1997: 73) 
 
One solution to this, as Foucault observes, is the connection between biopower and 
capitalism, as:  
 
Biopower without question is an indispensable element of capitalism; 
the latter would not have been possible without the controlled 
insertion of bodies into the machinery of production and the 
adjustment of the phenomena of population into economics 
process…it had to have methods of power capable of optimising 
forces, aptitudes, and life in general without at the same time making 
them more difficult to govern. (Foucault, 1978: 41) 
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The effect is that biological existence is reflected both in economics, via production 
and consumption, and in political discourse, via the administration of life. However, 
Foucault already has an interpretation of deviancy/normative behaviour in his earlier 
work on madness, before exploring biopower and the administration of life.  
 
Biopower leads to power being no longer reducible to dealing with legal subjects but 
with “living beings, and the mastery it would be able to exercise over them, would 
have to be applied at the level of life itself” (Foucault, 1978: 143). Such mastery over 
life identifies a secondary element of biopower, that is, the formation of the 
delinquent or abnormal in society. Whilst the concept and practices of biopower are 
useful in identifying how power relations work within environmental discourse, they 
are also useful in unpacking the shift in power relations between activists and 
mainstream politics. Biopower can also be applied to identifying and defining social 
norms in society, including environmental activists. 
 
Foucault observes that once power is understood as less about investing in 
“regulating behaviour through panoptic, institutional based training exercise” 
(Foucault, 1977: 251–52), there can also be a distinction between the criminal and 
the delinquent. Thus, for the criminal it is the act of criminality “that is relevant in 
characterising him…the legal punishment bears upon the act; the punitive technique 
on a life” (Foucault, 1977: 251–52).  
 
Kelly (2009) interprets Foucault’s approach to power as not being guided by the will 
of individual subjects, or about relations between people, but to “think of power as 
something autonomous from human subjects” (Kelly, 2009: 36). Power is decentred 
away from focusing on single individuals or classes of people, but has a 
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multidirectional meaning; it does not flow only from the more to the less powerful, 
but rather comes from below, as Foucault notes:  
 
power comes from below; that is, there is no binary and all-
encompassing opposition between rulers and ruled at the root of 
power relations, and serving as a general matrix. (1978: 94) 
 
Manokha (2009) notes that, for Foucault, power has two principle characteristics. 
Firstly, it is not possessed by agents. When agents apply power they mediate the 
dominant view of what constitutes normality or deviance. Secondly, power is 
positive, it “produces” behaviour that is in conformity with the dominant standard of 
normality or acceptability: 
 
this means that power may be exercised not only over others, but also 
over oneself, a situation in which the subject transforms himself or 
herself into an object of power and adopts a form of behaviour that are 
expected by the prevailing discourse and truth configurations. 
(Manokha, 2009: 430) 
 
Foucault notes that those who abstain from normative behaviour are often defined as 
abnormal and/or delinquent. The delinquent is still understood as “abnormal” in 
society, when biopower links together  
 
concepts and practices of potential guilt by its invention of a species 
or life lurking behind the acts of criminality, nevertheless these are 
subjects who may or may not have done anything illegal or 
transgressive, but their lives are nonetheless outside the slippery slope 
of biopolitical normativity…the disciplinary criminal is known 
through her transgressive deeds, while biopower's delinquent is known 
through his abnormal personality. (Nealon, 1984: 47) 
 
Biopower identifies those in society who are deemed – “abnormal” or “delinquent” 
and whose existence and “whose conduct is most obviously saturated and explained 
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by his or her life” (Nealon, 1984: 47). By categorising what is the “norm”, it assumes 
an opposite existence of good/bad, abnormal/ normal.  
 
The concept of biopower and definitions of normative behaviour are useful for this 
study because they help identify themes and ideas that are transcribed in the 
reporting of environmental activism. This thesis applies the concept of biopower in 
order to unpack shifts in power relations between environmental activists and 
environmental governance. Moreover, in demonstrating that activists are often 
framed by a discourse of political deviance and delinquency, we will see whether this 
shift is reflected in the journalistic language that defines environmental activists. In 
analysing such relation of power through a biopolitical lens will aim to establish how 
state governance, nestled in media discourse, strengthens the state position within 
environmental discourse. In doing so, this thesis will argue that media discourse 
places radical environmental activism into a discourse of deviance, whist reinforcing 
the state position that economics are the only solution to climate change. Hence, the 
practice of biopower increases the practice of potential guilt of anyone outside of the 
political norm (see earlier discussions on political deviancy by Hall in chapter one). 
As mainstream party politics co-opts environmental discourse, this disciplines 
individuals through the administrative role of biopower in order to alter their 
behaviour (for instance, using low-carbon initiatives to make people more 
responsible for environmental damage).  
 
Biopower as a form of discipline increases the positioning of activists as “outside” 
normative behaviour. Biopower, unlike discipline, is a form of power that works on 
entire populations, by targeting the lives of individuals. Biopower is a useful concept 
to allow us to unpack how environmental discourse has increasingly become about 
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administrating life. Government does not replace biopower, but forms a triangular 
power complex of sovereign–discipline–government or governmentality (McNay, 
1994: 1). As McNay notes, a consequence of such triangulations is that “the truth of 
‘individuals’ is no longer linked to the position they occupy in the universal order of 
things, as it is in traditional and hierarchical societies, but is constructed around a 
normalising notion of inner responsibility requiring an endless and thorough 
examination of the depths of their souls” (McNay, 1994: 28). As noted above, the 
individual is encouraged and persuaded to recycle, decrease their carbon footprint, 
and take responsibility for the environment via green capitalism.  
 
Green capitalism is the key concept in charting how neoliberal concepts became 
central to environmental discourse. As Oels notes, “climate change as framed by 
biopower creates a basis for justifying far-ranging policy intervention and even the 
extension of state power in the name of survival of life on planet Earth” (2005: 201). 
Oels argues that the result is a shift from “biopower to advanced liberal government 
in the environmental field from the mid 1980s onwards” (2005: 193). It can also 
mean neoliberalism and has the market as its central mechanism. The objective of 
advanced liberal government is to remove itself from state governance (Stephan, 
2010). The bio-political measures and instruments that dominated climate politics 
during the early and mid 1990s “moved to the background or became modified by 
advanced liberal government” (Stephan, 2010: 10). Market-driven environmental 
politics may have emerged in the 1970s (the same period as the activist movement), 
but over the subsequent 40 years, economics and environmentalism have coalesced 
in the formulation of a series of national and international policies (Agenda 21, 
Brundtland Commission, Kyoto Protocol). These polices have now become 
“embedded” in global industrial and institutional practices. The Kyoto Protocol sees 
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a shift towards advanced liberal government. The introduction of flexible 
mechanisms through the Kyoto Protocol, and market-led initiatives epitomise what 
Timothy Luke labels “green governmentality” (Luke, 1999) or “eco-
governmentality” (Oels, 2005). Although this thesis is concentrating on Luke and 
Oels application of a governmentality framework to examine environmental 
discourse led by neoliberal and advanced liberal rule, this is not the sole way of 
applying governmentality to examining environmental discourse in the UK.  
 
The literature on green governmentality covers a wide range of approaches, from 
Luke interpretation of environmental discourse through neoliberal lens, to Darier’s 
(2007) debates on ‘environmental citizen’ as a form of green governmentality. Rydin 
(2007) offers an interesting perspective governmentality as the recasting of 
subjectivities to enable “government at a distance” (611); whilst Neuman and 
Sending (2010), along with Paterson and Stripple (2009)  show that governmentality 
runs into difficulties when discussing re wider debates on global environmental 
governance.  
 
What lies at its heart are relations of power, freedom and subjectivity. When freedom 
is “a condition of possibilities for, and a product of, human subjectivity” (Death (a)), 
then relations of power between state, media and activist are not clear cut.  Although 
this thesis supports Luke and Oel’s application of a green governmentality 
framework that is not to say there is nothing but neoliberal or advanced liberal rule 
within environmental discourse. Individuals may be persuaded to support a green 
economy as a conduct to addressing climate change, yet they are not forced, 
regimented, or through acts of violence coerced into positive behaviour. Individuals 
can choose how to conduct themselves in relation to environmental discourse.  
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Freedom and violence are closely linked in relations of power, and the “presence of 
violence does not mean the absence of freedom, or the absence of government” 
(Death, (b)) 
 
For Foucault freedom as “A power relationship can only be articulated on the basis 
of two elements which are each indispensable if it is really to be a power 
relationship: that the other (the one over whom power is exercised) be thoroughly 
recognised and maintained to the very end as a person who act and that, faced with a 
relationship of power, a whole field of responses, reactions, results, and possible 
invention may open up” (Foucault, 1982: 792). Moreover, freedom is the “ability to 
exercise one’s power autonomously….the process through which individuals seek to 
influence each other should not be seen as a face-to-face confrontation which 
paralyses both sides, but rather as an antagonistic struggle in which individuals seek 
to refuse imposed forms of identity and also communicate  their differences or 
‘otherness’ to each other” (McNay,1994:128). Power works through practices of 
freedom, violence and coercion (Death, (b)). The state persuades the conduct of 
conduct through “unidirectional imposition of dominatory relations reliant on force 
and the horizontal direction of power that characterises relations between 
individuals” (McNay, 1994: 126), from individual to individual as a horizontal 
exercise of power. Violence emerges from the state through an “action upon an 
action” (McNay, 1994: 126) dichotomy.  Violence “imposes itself directly on the 
body or things…violence allows no opposition to arise” (McNay, 1994: 126). A 
combination of freedom, coercion and violence by the state results in some 
individuals’ belief they have the freedom to embrace a neoliberal, whist those that 
take ‘action upon an action’, such as direct action, than violence is applied. For 
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example, environmental activists protest against the principle of global 
environmental governance, at the global justice/ anti-capitalist protest, in Seattle, 
London, Genoa, and Evian. The effect is that freedom is suppressed when an 
activists or subjects, “exercises some kind of agency or free choice” (that is to 
publicly challenge green capitalism), they are “amenable to forms of power working 
through practices of freedom, even in the face of violence” (Death,(b)). 
 
In light of such understandings of freedom, power and subjectivity, then the concept 
of biopower provides a platform from which to administrate life and define 
normative behaviour. With neoliberal economics, biopower is reinvented as 
advanced liberal government. This introduces new techniques, encourages a green 
economy, and creates new markets and a new form of green consumption. It not only 
informs people how to behave, but equally provides the mechanisms through market-
led initiatives and green capitalism. At the same time, at one level biopower sets the 
norms and boundaries of what is normal or abnormal behaviour. The next section 
looks at how this shift from biopower to advanced liberal government also shifts the 
power relations between activists and mainstream party politics. It will do so by 
drawing on Luke’s (1999) development of Foucault, and the notion of green 
governmentality.  
Governmentality and Green Governmentality 
Governmentality is a useful approach for this thesis in order to account for the shift 
in power from activism to capital as dominant in environmental discourse, and to 
environmental discourse as a neoliberal project. This section will argue that through 
techniques, or technologies as Foucault terms them, environmental politics merges 
with advanced liberal government to generate apparatus that persuades individuals to 
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solve environmental problems through consumerism (technologies of the self in 
Foucauldian terms). At the same time, examining how activists are placed into a 
discourse of deviance, through media representation and state apparatus (technique 
of dominance in Foucauldian terms), provides a framework within which to 
understand the shifts in power between environmental activists and the state.  
 
Lemke argues that governmentality is introduced by Foucault in order to “study the 
autonomous individual’s capacity for self-control and how this is linked to forms of 
political rule and economic exploitation” (Lemke, 2000: 4). Governmentality allows 
the state to guide the self, although it does not control the self. Through different 
technologies – systemised, regulatory modes of power – such “techniques of the self 
are integrated into structures of coercion and domination” (Lemke, 2000: 4). The 
governing of the self provides individuals with the skills to govern others. Foucault 
suggests this is achieved from the level of the family up to that of the state, as 
“running a family has the same principles as the good government of the state…the 
central term of this continuity is the government of the family, termed economy” 
(Foucault, 1991: 91–92).  
 
Governmentality is defined by Dean as: 
how we think about governing others and ourselves in a wide variety 
of contexts. In a more limited sense, the different ways governing is 
thought about in the contemporary world and which can in large part 
be traced to Western Europe from the sixteenth century. Such forms of 
thought have been exported to large parts of the globe owing to 
colonial expansion and the post-colonial set of international 
arrangements of a system of sovereign states. (2003: 109) 
 
Governmentality is therefore an understanding that in order to govern, there needs to 
be an ability and understanding of how to control or govern oneself. Governmentality 
is the “modern deployment of power” which comes through control of the population 
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(biopower) and its environs (space) (Darier, 1999: 22–24). An increasing population 
means that governmentality is a form of conduct, or “conduct of conduct [which 
comes from]…governing oneself to governing others” (Lemke, 2000: 3).  
 
McNay (1994) identifies two key differences between the theories of biopower and 
governmentality as the “objectivising” and “subjectivising” of the population. 
Objectivising is a process that involves the transformation of individuals into objects 
or docile bodies; subjectivising is the manipulation of consciousness (McNay, 1994: 
123), a form of internalisation of social norms.  
 
The key principles that shape the development of governmentality are, firstly, the 
formation of: 
institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections…which has as its 
target population, as its principle form of knowledge political 
economy, and as its essential technical means apparatus of security. 
(Foucault, 1991: 92)  
 
The formation of power through a government involves “a whole series of specific 
governmental apparatuses and, on the other hand, in the development of a whole 
complex of savior” (Foucault, 1991: 102–3). This study argues that legislative 
measures and the defining of activists as delinquent and deviant is a means of re-
framing environmental activism as a security threat (this is discussed in greater depth 
in Chapter Four). When the state applies apparatus to punish or convict those outside 
normative behaviour they do so through reflexive technologies. Techniques of 
dominance relate to power relations between the state and the individual. Foucault 
argues that domination is a particular type of power relationship that is stable and 
hierarchical, fixed and difficult to reverse. The effect of domination is that “people 
are subordinated with little room for manoeuvre because their ‘margin of liberty’ is 
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extremely limited” (Lemke, 2000: 5–6). Dean defines this as a reflexive approach. 
Reflexive approaches involve conscious direct influence on subjects through force, 
leading and guidance, mainly by a: 
 
means of legislative measures. Moreover, non-reflexivity and reflexivity can also be 
understood in terms of acceptable/unacceptable behaviour, market/socially driven 
environmental solutions and mainstream/radical political ideology. The individual 
internalises their behaviour based on a ‘morality of government (Dean, 2003: 11) 
  
 
This  emerges from a series of policies and practices of governments that “presume 
to know, with varying degrees of explicitness and using specific forms of knowledge, 
what constitutes good, virtuous, appropriate responsible conduct of individuals and 
collectives” (Dean, 2003: 14).  
 
Within environmental discourse, these different technologies of biopower enable the 
state to push through an advanced liberal agenda, based on neoliberalism; at the same 
time, technologies of dominance identify environmental activists as deviant and 
delinquent. The result, as will be illustrated in the next chapter, is that shifts in power 
place advanced liberal government as dominant in environmental discourse. Radical 
environmental activism’s power becomes weakened within environmental discourse, 
in a reversal of historical practice. How this is achieved is the focus of the next 
section, which draws on Luke’s and Oels’ interpretation of governmentality.  
 
Green Governmentality, Eco-governmentality and Advanced Liberal 
Governmental Technologies 
Luke (in Darier, 1999) offers a compelling illustration of how governmental and 
commercial pressure to control ecological resources can place the “population as an 
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economic and political problem” (Foucault, 1991: 149). Quoting Luke’s opening 
argument, “harmonisation of political economy with global ecology as a form of 
green geopolitics” is the central premise of his notion of green governmentality. In 
this, ecology becomes an element of the global economy as a tool for justifying state 
intervention to “serve the interests of outsiders who want to control” (Luke, 1999: 
142). Luke identifies three principles of green governmentality: (1) geopower, 
(2) eco-knowledge and (3) enviro-discipline.  
 
Geo-power defines ecological problems as transnational security threats that require 
political, economic or military intervention. Indeed, Foucault acknowledges that 
ecology has evolved into a “public potential; it called for management procedures; it 
had to be taken charge of by analytical discourses” (Foucault, 1976: 24–5). Luke 
takes this one step further by suggesting that environmentalism has become a 
platform for framing potential economic or nature disasters as a threat to human life. 
For example, US President Clinton made geopolitics an “integral part of his global 
doctrine on engagement. [Indeed, to]…reassert America’s leadership in the post-
Cold War world” (Luke, 1999: 126). He linked American imperialism with 
environmental discourse, through the administration of political economy. Echoing 
the paradigm of governmentality, the governing of oneself before the governing of 
others could be achieved through environmental discourse. A green governmentality, 
at the level of governing oneself, is a means of:  
[advancing]…freedom and democracy – to advance prosperity and the 
preservation of our planet… in a world where the dividing line 
between domestic and foreign policy is increasingly blurred…Our 
personal, family and national future is affected by our policies on the 
environment at home and abroad. (Clinton, 1995: 43)  
 
The solution was Al Gore’s “Global Green Marshall Plan” of adopting a “strategic 
environmentalizing initiative as a central organizing principle by using every policy 
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program, every law and institution, every treaty and alliance, every tactic and 
strategy, every plan and course of action – to use, in short, every means to halt 
destruction of the environment and to preserve and nurture our ecological system” 
(Gore in Luke, 1999: 130). Gore drew on a language associated with American 
patriotism by linking geo-power to the pursuit of happiness with advanced liberal 
government: 
the task of restoring the natural balance of the earth’s ecological 
system is both within our capacity and desirable for other reasons – 
including our interest in social justice, democratic government, and 
free market economics. Ultimately, a commitment to healing the 
environment represents a renewed dedication to what Jefferson 
believed were not merely American but universal inalienable rights: 
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. (Gore, 2007: 270) 
  
Unlike biopower, geo-power is a green politics that “counters the logic of geo-
economics industrialism by moving liberal welfare states on to an ecological footing” 
(Luke, 1999: 133). Clinton and Gore utilise geo-power to attempt to position 
American policies at the heart of any emerging environmental free markets.  
 
Eco-knowledge is a way of articulating ecological problems and solutions through 
multiple discourses of sustainability concerning the e-factor. The e-factor is 
knowledge of ecology that “boils down to a new form of economic rationality” 
(Luke, 1999: 133), through a “search for the lowest-cost method of reducing the 
greatest amount of pollution…to enhance corporate profits, national productivity and 
state power, because the e-factor is not merely ecological – it is also efficiency, 
excellence, education, empowerment, enforcement and economics” (Luke, 1999: 
133). Thus,  Clinton’s and Gore’s geopolitics links solutions to counter the problems 
caused by industrialisation, and to market-led solutions. Those countries, groups or 
individuals who reject this solution, are persuaded through enviro-disciplines 
(technologies of dominance in Foucauldian terms). 
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Whereas geopolitics in relation to green politics is slightly distanced from biopower, 
enviro-discipline has closer similarities in its execution. While biopower “normalises 
individual behaviour by imposing environmentally friendly codes of conduct upon 
individual bodies and by policing the fitness for survival of all biological organisms” 
(Oels, 2005: 195), enviro-disciplines are the product of a growth in eco-knowledge, 
which provides the platform to develop a geo-power focused on “a strategic 
technology that reinvests human-bodies” (Luke, 1999: 144). The human body 
becomes another tool for economic, social and cultural development, by its 
engagement with modes of production so that “the facts of life pass into fields of 
control for any discipline of eco-knowledge and spheres of intervention for the 
management of geo-power” (Luke, 1999: 143). Put simply, eco-knowledge provides 
a platform on which the human body as both an individual and collective form 
becomes another economic tool presented through an environmental lens. Both 
individual and collective behaviour becomes “enmeshed with the tactics and 
strategies of more complex forms of power, whose institutions, procedures, analysis 
and techniques loosely manage mass populations and their surroundings” (Luke, 
1999: 145).  
  
Oels (2005) takes a similar approach to Luke, although she refers to green 
governmentality as eco-governmentality. She argues that “green governmentality can 
be understood as an instance of reinforcing the power of the administrative state in 
the name of ‘responsible stewardship of nature’, namely to legitimise governmental 
interventions” (Oels, 2005:195). Oels notes that advanced liberal government is the 
latest type of governmentality to “regard the population as a pool of resources whose 
potential for self-optimisation needs to be unleashed” (2005: 191). To unleash these 
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resources, an “advanced liberal government…employs market forces to guarantee 
freedom from excessive state intervention and bureaucracy” (2005: 191). Oels’ and 
Luke’s observations are useful as they enable us to see how market forces, advanced 
liberal government and environmental discourse converge, and can be traced, as Oels 
puts it, from “bio power to advanced liberal government in the environmental field 
from the mid 1980s onwards” (2005: 193). 
 
In adopting a similar approach to Luke’s green governmentality and the technologies 
of geo-power and eco-knowledge, this chapter will now draw on a series of examples 
to show how eco-governmentality became the prevalent position in environmental 
discourse. It is worth noting that Luke’s observations are founded on a study of 
American political discourse with an emphasis on the politics of the right, and its 
relationship with the environmental activists’ movement Earth First! The discussion 
here is centred around the emergence of UK geo-power and eco-knowledge. Despite 
the differences, the idea of green governmentality makes the state and individual 
responsible for environmental problems.  
Green Governmentality and Technology of Self in the UK 
Former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher also took an interest in climate 
change, primarily from the position of the interests of the capitalist state. Following 
the discovery of a hole in the ozone layer by British scientists in Antarctica, 
Thatcher’s “markets, monetarism and authoritative” form of government (Luke, 
1999: 159) looked towards enterprise to find solutions to global warming and the 
depleting ozone layer by encouraging business leaders to work with scientists.  
[helping] our academics to spot commercial applications…Industry is 
becoming more scientific-minded: scientists more industry-minded. 
Both have a responsibility to recognise the practical value of the ideas 
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which are being developed. (Thatcher Press Conference, 22 March 
1988) 
 
Carvalho suggests that Thatcher appropriated environmental discourse to push 
forward an agenda of nuclear power and privatisation of energy sources, in light of 
the demolition of the British coal industry (Carvalho, 2007) and a more general 
adoption of market strategies to confront the problem. Lester (2010) supports 
Carvalho’s claim that Thatcher’s “appropriation of the risk of climate change” helped 
to “support a case for nuclear energy over coal and thus weaken the coal industry” 
(2010: 67). Thatcher’s “green speech” (Anderson, 1997) to the Royal Society in 
1988 set out plans to pass the responsibility of solving “global warming” to 
businesses working with science. Thatcher’s speech had two aims, to place Britain 
on the global stage when it came to finding solutions to climate change; and to 
reinforce the  shift rightwards towards neoliberalism, deregulation of markets, 
increased freedom in regulatory rules, including oil and financial industries, and 
greater fluidity in “networks and partnerships” as “boundaries between different 
parts of companies, between different companies, and between companies, 
governments and NGOs, are broken down as actors seek new ways of solving 
problems” (Newell and Paterson, 2010: 22). However, critics argued that Thatcher’s 
proposal for business and science to find a solution to the hole in the ozone layer 
devolved responsibility from state to business. Thatcher’s speech centred on 
“addressing the absence of leadership on the international environment” 
(McCormick, 1991: 65), suggesting that British business might take leadership over 
climate change solutions. Thatcher also stressed the need for international co-
operation in tackling climate change and global warming, whilst reminding the world 
it was “British scientists [who] had discovered a thinning of the ozone layer over the 
Antarctic” (McCormick, 1991: 104).  
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The impact of Thatcher’s speech gave greater media coverage to climate change 
solutions, but to the detriment of scientists, who were replaced by “political actors 
[who] increasingly sought to shape the agenda” (Carvello and Burgess, 2005). 
Political parties came to realise that climate change solutions no longer meant 
conservation, many government policies were given a “green tinge” (Watt 1999: 86). 
Media images of Margaret Thatcher picking up litter in St James’s Park in central 
London reaffirmed her new-found alignment with environmental discourse. Thatcher 
linked climate change and environmental discourse with family values, 
“conservation, heritage and English values” (Watt, 1999: 86). This example of 
governmentality was reinforced with a media message and press conference. 
Thatcher’s speech at the launch of the Tidy Britain Campaign (1988), implied that 
the British population needed to look after itself, starting with the individual . 
 
Litter is everyone's problem in which everyone must contribute to a 
solution. It is like good manners, in my opinion…I want to see 
pressure coming from below, from street level, from village level, 
from individuals, and to see that pressure converted into action. If we 
could do this, it would make more laws and more penalties 
unnecessary. (Thatcher Press Conference, 22 March 1988) 
 
However, there was certain level of scepticism from both the press and 
environmental NGOs. Thatcher’s academic background in science enabled her to 
hold a relatively pioneering acceptance of the science of climate change, but her 
environmental discourse was greeted with caution. Former Friends of the Earth 
leader Jonathan Porritt suggests that “making statements on the international 
environment…involved far fewer policy commitments than statements on the 
domestic environment” (McCormick, 1991: 66). Indeed, until the “green” speech, it 
was clear that Thatcher’s administration in its early years had greater enthusiasm for 
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war than climate change solutions. In discussions on the Falklands War in 1982, 
Thatcher defined climate change solutions as “humdrum”, in comparison to dealing 
with conflict – it was more “exciting to have a real crisis on your hands” (Robinson, 
1992: 177). The “green” speech served a useful purpose in pushing forward her own 
“style of how the nation should be run” (Robinson, 1992: 176), and, like war, gave a 
sense of immediacy to Thatcher’s open acceptance of the scientific arguments.  
 
At the time the “green” speech was made against the “backdrop of drought in the 
United States and unusual weather patterns” (Grubb, 1998: 1), environmentalism was 
slowly becoming more prominent in the media (Anderson, 1997, Lester, 2010). 
However, it would be ten years before Thatcher’s ambition for a business-led, 
economic solution became the key approach to climate change. Climate change gave 
her the opportunity to place responsibility for addressing global warming on to 
businesses, paradoxically through the use of state mechanisms and economic 
instruments, for example, moral appeals not to use CFCs in aerosols, the banning of 
environmentally harmful activities, or improvements in recycling facilities (Jacobs, 
1991: 122–23).  
 
Thatcher’s embracing of the science behind climate change, along with the sense of 
immediacy, set in motion a shift in environmental discourse that combined biopower 
and economics. The move towards market-led solutions was supported by the global 
institutional policies of the IPCC. There emerged a clear narrative that a high-carbon 
industrialised society and the global expansion of human activities had created the 
problem of increased global temperatures. Governments proposed that this could be 
addressed only through individual and collective action, as a combination of 
problem-solving and survivalist discourse (Dryzek, 1997). This approach was 
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iterated in 2006, when two global events began to change the green political 
landscape.  
 
The 2006 local elections, the first since New Labour had won the general election in 
2005, made environmentalism a key issue. In addition, there was an explosion of 
celebrity-led events that raised the public profile of environmental discourse. Former 
special advisor to Gordon Brown, Michael Jacobs, notes that for the 2006 local 
elections all three parties were chasing the green vote (Jacobs, 2010). Making eco-
politics central to the local election campaign meant that environmental discourse 
was for a short period at the forefront of political discourse. In addition, public 
opinion around environmental discourse was being swayed by the more liberal UK 
newspapers (such as The Guardian and The Independent), and the BBC began to 
increase its reporting on climate change. At the same time, celebrities and NGOs 
were linking up, and the release of former American Vice President Al Gore’s film 
An Inconvenient Truth (2006) all influenced public opinion. Rock band Razorlight’s 
singer Johnny Borrell credited Gore’s film for raising awareness: “The whole thing 
about climate change didn’t register until I saw Al Gore’s film” (Daily Mail, 2006). 
A march through central London culminating in a pop concert at Trafalgar Square, 
was the height of a media campaign by Greenpeace, the Stop Climate Chaos 
coalition, and the Friends of the Earth (including their Big Ask campaign of May 
2005) that called for a climate change bill to be introduced into UK legislation.  This 
move by the political parties and NGOs drew together Dryzek’s environmental 
discourse of problem solving, but to the exclusion of the non-hierarchical grass-roots 
protest movements. In calling for a legislative framework to address climate change, 
the NGOs provided a platform on which governments could develop a green 
governmentality that linked individuals and collectives through tactics and strategies 
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under the rubric of the Climate Change Bill. The following section will explore how 
the UK government and other political parties combined to create legislation that 
included the “problem-solving”, “survivalist” and “realos” , but at the exclusion of 
grass-roots environmental activism movements.  
 
Vote Blue, Go Green: The “Green” Vote as an Electioneering Strategy 
Picking up from Thatcher’s “green” speech, the Conservative Party’s new Director 
of Strategy, Steve Hilton, began moving the party away from the right and into the 
traditionally liberal politics associated with environmentalism. Hilton, once 
described by the Daily Mirror as “the puppet master who has attempted to transform 
pin-striped Old Etonian Cameron into dressed down ‘Dave’, man of the people” 
(Brough, 2010), was instrumental in moving the Conservative Party towards an 
environmental discourse. The May 2006 local elections were used as a platform to 
launch a new party branding. The previous logo, a flaming torch introduced by 
Thatcher in 1977, was replaced by an oak tree (Browne, 2006). They chose an oak 
tree as it stood for “solidarity, tradition, friendliness towards the environment and 
Britishness” (Browne, 2006). The rebranding signalled a turning point in 
Conservative politics. Until 2006, the only significant time the Conservative Party 
was connected to environmentalism was Thatcher’s geopolitical speech to the Royal 
Academy in 1988. Cameron and Hilton realised that environmentalism could benefit 
the economy. Cameron, speaking in the Guardian newspaper revealed that 
environmentalism is “one way we come out of recession more strongly…you create 
green tech jobs…you kick start the investment in meters, tidal powers and electric 
cars. This is not some sort of airy-fairy lifestyle stuff” (cited in Watt and Wintour, 
2007: 6). Environmentalism gave the Conservative Party a new way of distancing 
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itself from the “sleaze” label of the 1980s, by moving towards becoming a party of 
social responsibility. At the same time, the Labour government was also promoting 
green ideals.  
 
Gordon Brown, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, called Cameron’s green ideas, 
“empty rhetoric about the Tories’ green agenda while Labour are generating firm 
policies” (Blitz, 2006). Whilst Cameron was taking a tour of a Norwegian glacier, 
Brown gave a speech to the United Nations emphasising the need for “a new 
synthesis between environmental and economic policy” (Brown, cited in Blitz, 
2006). Echoing Gore, and Thatcher, Brown placed an emphasis on the need for 
global action on climate change, as “we will need a comprehensive global response. 
We will need the co-operation of all countries…we are going to tackle the global 
challenge of climate change comprehensively and cost effectively” (Brown, cited in 
Blitz, 2006).  
 
At the same time, the Liberal Democratic Party proposed an increase in National 
Insurance contributions to address the problems associated with climate change, and 
both the Liberal Democrats and Conservatives adopted the idea of introducing a 
climate change bill. The result of the two opposition parties shifting towards 
environmental policies in their manifestos meant that New Labour found themselves 
left out in the environmental cold. Responding to changes in global governance and 
partly fearing a public backlash, the New Labour Chancellor, Gordon Brown, took 
radical steps by creating the UK’s first Climate Change Act (2008). Encouraged by 
New Labour’s former Environment Secretaries, David and Ed Miliband and Special 
Advisor Michael Jacobs (see Jacobs, 1991; Stern, 2006c), Brown took “radical” steps 
to reduce carbon emissions. 
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Economically, the business case for a climate change bill was led by the commercial 
energy sector needing fresh and new forms of investment. In creating a strong 
business agenda for climate change, green governmentality generated new markets 
and also new investment opportunities for corporations. The creation of emissions-
trading markets opened up new avenues of investment for large corporations, whilst 
fulfilling their corporate social responsibility. There was also an element of moral-
suasion (a term that has similar meaning to persuasion) in the rhetoric. The adoption 
of a green agenda by multinational corporations meant they would appear to be 
pushing a “green” agenda, whilst expanding new markets.  
 
The Climate Change Act shows flamboyant Blair bravado, as the opening statement 
declared “The threat from climate change is perhaps the greatest challenge facing our 
world” (House of Commons, 2008), echoing Gore’s earlier rhetoric. The new 
legislation was considered to be daring and radical by the Labour Party, which set 
out a number of key objectives and targets. The Act recommended that a carbon 
reduction target should be built into a statutory reform by 2050, achieved by creating 
a carbon budget system. The legislation set out a series of targets, established by an 
independent committee on climate change. The committee’s aims were a 34% 
reduction in greenhouse gas emissions in all areas, through a low carbon transition 
plan. It also gave parliament powers to establish trading schemes for the purpose of 
limiting greenhouse gas, and to formulate a green bank.
32
 
 
At the same time, economic solutions were being presented as the key solution to 
climate change. Lord Stern of Brentwood’s report The Economics of Climate 
                                                   
32
 For more information and a complete copy of the Act, see http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2007-
08/climatechangehl.html (accessed June 2010). 
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Change: The Stern Review (2006a) set out to establish the economic impacts of 
ignoring climate change. Lord Stern’s report created an economic discourse for 
markets to focus on climate issues. The findings showed that each tonne of CO2 that 
the UK emits causes at least US$85 worth of damage to the nation’s economy 
(Greenpeace, 2011). The report recommended that a cut in emissions now would 
limit the economic impact of climate change to approximately 1% of global GDP. 
Stern proposed to offset the cost by charging individuals more for carbon-intensive 
goods and by investment in new technology, “a techno-fix approach” (Stern, 2006a). 
A low-carbon economy would ultimately be less costly than the current high-carbon 
economy, which spoke to the dominant discourse, generated political agents and 
supported the climate change argument. Shifting the world onto a low-carbon path 
could eventually benefit the UK economy by $2.5 trillion a year and, by 2050, 
markets for low-carbon technologies could be worth at least $500bn a year. 
However, it was argued that subsidising or reducing aviation emissions would be too 
costly (Stern, 2006a).  
 
Lord Stern’s review also reinforced the notion of bio-politics, because it shifted the 
emphasis onto the individual through advanced liberal government. The individual 
was set renewable targets through a separate range of micro-systems. These targets 
included smaller projects aimed at promoting the increased use of renewable 
resources in homes and small businesses, and a small-scale renewable target of 6% in 
all homes by 2020. Where possible, dwellings in UK should have proper insulation 
by 2015, and each household must install smart-meters to measure energy 
consumption, an idea earlier mooted by Cameron (Cameron cited in Watt and 
Wintour, 2007). The commercialisation of electric-powered vehicles would be 
accelerated with the introduction of a low-carbon industrial strategy, and a new 
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financial institution (a green bank) would be created. Geopolitics would lead the way 
in implementing the low-carbon transmission plan. 
 
Around the same time, the Kyoto agreement came into practice, and brought free-
market economics very clearly into environmental discourse. The Kyoto Protocol 
came into effect alongside the release of the 3rd Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change report. The IPCC’s Third Assessment Report (IPCC, 2001) and two other 
reports (IPCC, 2004, 2007) raised the role of transnational institutions. Although 
Thatcher firmly believed Kyoto was an “anti-growth, anti-capitalist, anti-American 
project” (Thatcher, 2003: 453), it did generate new markets that acted as 
technologies on the individual. The key proponent was the new environmental policy 
instruments (NEPIs). 
 
New Environmental Policy Instruments and Advanced Liberal 
Government  
The development of NEPIs emerges out of regulations that command and control 
governments to set environmental goals and tell actors how to act (Jordan, Wurzel, 
and Zito, 2003). NEPIs include market-based solutions (eco-taxes or emissions 
trading), voluntary agreements (to reduce waste as an alternative to a regulatory 
approach) and moral-suasion. These three ways of reducing carbon emissions 
(market, voluntary and moral-suasion) have negative and positive elements – a carrot 
and stick approach. Governments use regulations to beat corporations, institutions 
and organisations into endorsing environmental policies. Yet, at the same time, they 
allow companies to set their own benchmarks, through voluntary agreements on 
emissions trading.  
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Trading in emissions, unlike other more tangible forms of exchange, emphasises the 
relationship between the actual and the hypothetical product. Market-driven targets 
for the reduction of pollution and emissions levels, as defined by the European Union 
(EU), literally constitute the buying and selling of the atmosphere. The air we breathe 
has a price tag (Newlands, 2012). According to the Friends of the Earth’s report 
(Clifton, 2009) carbon trading “results from action by governments to create this new 
commodity – the right to emit carbon – and then to limit the availability of this right 
in order to create scarcity and therefore a market for it” (Clifton, 2009). The report 
goes on to say, “the development of secondary markets involving financial 
speculators and complex financial products based on the financial derivatives model 
brings with it a risk that carbon trading will develop into a speculative commodity 
bubble” (Clifton, 2009: 32).  
 
Trading in emissions on a global scale was an idea first developed in the UK by 
Michael Grubb (1998), and developed by the City of London and the UK 
government. Grubb drew on an earlier North American plan to address the problem 
of acid rain and identified that any decrease in emissions needed a multilateral 
approach between countries and global companies rather than individuals, states or 
regions. Grubb proposed a new emissions trading scheme (ETS) or “cap and trade” – 
“the buying and selling of pollutant entitlements” (Newell and Patterson, 2010: 96) – 
that focused on a division of emissions between countries, through a system of 
“contraction and convergence” first developed by London company the Global 
Commons Institute (GCI).  
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Carbon trading and similar approaches offer advanced liberal governments a win–
win solution. Governments retain control of new markets through regulatory 
processes, and businesses gain greater revenue from the expansion of new markets. 
The creation of NEPIs, through voluntary schemes, produces market-driven changes 
and the mode of production to create new areas of market development. A reliance 
on technology to reduce the energy required in manufacturing and distributing goods 
shifts production from the global north to the global south and, some would argue, 
generates new wealth for developing countries. At the individual and collective level, 
NEPIs provide the mechanisms to buy our way out of climate change, through eco-
labels, green consumption practices (such as recyclable carrier bags) and doorstep 
recycling. Individuals are encouraged to “dutifully take their wine bottles to be 
recycled” (Jordan and Maloney, 1997: 50).  
 
The introduction of eco-labels introduced an ethics debate about the commoditisation 
of the environment. The targets set by the government provided a platform for the 
state to regulate the individual through economic incentives and “moral-suasion”, 
whilst providing nominal regulatory measure to the markets. Whilst the individual 
was encouraged to buy ethically labelled, green products, these products were being 
developed by large businesses (for example, Tesco’s “green” rewards scheme). The 
effect was that through bio-political decisions iterated through legislation at the 
domestic level and environmental governance at the global level (such as the Kyoto 
Protocol) capital could develop new markets that coerced individuals to conduct 
themselves in an environmentally sound way for the benefit of the whole.  
  
Market-led initiatives were supported by global environmental governance (GEG) 
policies, such as the Brundtland Commission (1989), the Kyoto Protocol (1992) and 
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Agenda 21,  which became “embedded” in global industry and institutional practices. 
Global environmental governance is governance that goes beyond the state, but not at 
the exclusion of the state; it involves multiple actors and mechanisms.  
 
A growth in  governmentality as a mechanism for guiding environmental discourse 
helped to “make sense of a changing world- that favours a view of power as 
dispersed, not statecentric”, by  grasping “ liberalism and (neo)liberalism, not as a an 
ideology or philosophy, but as a  “ arts, tactics and practices  of governing” (Larner 
and Walters, 2004: 4).  By the late 1980s a second understanding of the term 
‘neoliberlism’ emerges as in opposition to “projects of domestic governance” , 
concerned with a  series of developments  and policies that includes “privatisation, 
deregulation ….and the power of  global financial markets within  
capitalism…neoliberalism is used to denote nothing less than a fundamental 
restructuring  of the world political economy” (2004: 8). Governmentality draws 
“attention to forms of power that work through ‘rule at a distance’ and the ‘conduct 
of conduct’, the eco-governmentality literature”. Green governmentality also shows 
how power, freedom, fields of visibility, regimes of knowledge, “techniques and 
technologies and the production of subjects in contemporary environmental 
governance” (Death, forthcoming) pool together to show how environmental 
discourse can be a platform for analysing relations of power. Relations of power 
within environmental discourse as analysed through a governmentality framework, 
also draws on environmental citizenship and scientific discourse as generating 
regimes of truth. Moreover, relations of power are also central to academic debates 
on freedom, subjectivity, governmentality, and global governance.  
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The subject becomes a pawn (willing or unwilling, consciously or unconsciously) 
from “regimes of government [to] produce and work through plural and multiple free 
subjects” (Death, forthcomin: 18). Thus, “in a governmentality perspective, the role 
of IOs [international organisations] or NGOs in shaping and carrying out global 
governance functions is not an instance of transfer of power from the state to non-
state actors (Foucault, 1982, 2000, 341). Rather it is an expression of a changing 
logic or rationality of government ( defined as a type of power) by which civil 
society is redefined from a passive object of government to be acted upon and into an 
entity this both object and  a subject of government” (Neumann and Sending, 2010: 
5). A consequence is that subjectivities are recast (to borrow Rydin’s term), which 
“allows government at a distance and is the way that the problem of how to achieve 
‘conduct of conduct’ is resolved” (Rydin, 2007: 611). Governments and institutions 
recast subjectivists through mechanism and policies found in global environmental 
governance. On this basis individuals would govern or conduct their behaviour in a 
ways that reflect the priorities and rationalities defined by sustainability indicators, 
such as emissions trading schemes, or take upon eco-friendly home improvement 
schemes. The largest expansion of global environmental governance schema 
emerged as a culmination of policies and practices in the 1990s (see earlier 
discussion in Chapter One).  
 
As Larner and Walter’s note, “the paradox remains that governmentality studies 
proliferated during the 1990s, precisely at a time when the fascination with 
globalisation exploded across the social sciences” (2004: 5). However, neoliberalism 
does not sit in opposition to realism – whereby realism  as a concept takes the 
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position of political struggle acts as a homogenous and continuous barrier against 
examining the practices of specific political struggles on specific levels  (Neumann 
and Sending, 2010: 53). The structure of global environmental governance allows for 
“the international as a socially embedded realm of governmentality as the 
international as a structure (defined by relations of power) that generates different 
and change practices of political rule (defined as governmental rationality)” 
(Neumann and Sending, 2010: 68). Thus the “ emphasis on global markets and the 
new prominence of international institutions can be seen as a response to the 
problems of how to govern the world when even the poorest are no longer 
dependants or subjects but ‘citizens’ of formally independent states” (Larner and 
Walter, 2004: 9).  
 
In contrast, Joseph’s (2010) critiques global governmentality for having a western-
centric, neoliberal emphasis on governmentality. Joseph maintains that 
governmentality struggles to survive on  a global scale “because the international 
domain is highly uneven, contemporary forms of  governmentality can only be 
usefully applied to those areas that might be characterised as having an advanced 
form of liberalism” (224).  Joseph suggest that rather than a world where 
neoliberalism maintains a hegemonic role, that in fact, there is a “liberal core where 
power operates through freedom” (Death, forthcoming:  11) and in those geographies 
outside of neoliberal politics, greater disciplinary tactics are employed to manage 
populations. Consequently, power is exercised over “free subjects who are faced with 
various new possibilities in a globalising world. The exercise of freedom takes the 
form of the behaviour of a consumer expected to follow competitive rules of 
conduct” (Joseph, 2010: 228), and idea similar to Paterson and Stripple. Paterson and 
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Stripple (2009) view global green governmentality as a project that entails “a 
complex and interesting shift in the way that subjects are being formed around 
climate change” resulting in an “emergent governmentality that entails the ‘conduct 
of carbon conduct’ through moulding and mobilising a certain subjectivity (the 
individual as concerned carbon emitter) to govern his or her own emissions in 
various ways- as counter, displacers, dieters, communitarians or citizens” (342). 
Paterson and Stripple’s argument highlight how this thesis is applying the method of 
governmentality in relations of power between environmental activists and the state.  
 
Indeed, Darier’s study on the Canadian governments is a good example of how 
governments have applied alternative disciplinary techniques.  Darier’s Foucauldian 
interpretation of the Canadian ‘Green Plan’, a document to achieve sustainable 
development within the Canadian community. Darier’s application of Foucault’s 
concept of governmentality found that “environmental governmentality requires the 
use of social engineering techniques to get the attention of the population to focus on 
specific environmental issues and to instil –in a non-openly coercive manner- new 
environmental conducts” (2007:  549). However, the green plan was neither a 
neoliberal discourse, nor advanced liberal rule, instead a plan “designed to discipline 
the population into becoming an environmental population” (2007: 596) through an 
environmental citizenship discourse. Individuals would be educated through 
sustainable policies through both social spaces and time. Darier’s interpretation of 
the Green plan through a Foucauldian governmentality analysis show that 
governmentality can be more than a clear cut bifurcation between neoliberal and 
advanced liberal rule, and more about understand the relations of power of the state. 
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Thus, environmental governance is applied as a term which defines the rules, 
regulations, policies and NEPIs of environmentalism. These include, but are not 
limited to, the IPCC, the United Nations Framework Conventions on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), MEAs from Basel (1987), Montreal (1987) and Kyoto (1992), Agenda 
21, emissions and carbon trading, and the UK’s first Climate Change Act of 2008. 
 
GEG emerged out of market-driven, public and private partnerships (PPPs) as the 
main economic implementation of global environmental policies such as Agenda 21 
(United Nations, 2003) and the Millennium Development Goals (United Nations, 
2005).
33,34
 GEG acts as a bridging tool between public and private partnerships. The 
public (state) mode of hierarchical government lies within the regulation of networks 
and markets. States, at national and European levels, formulate policies and 
regulations (such as emissions-trading systems), regulated through law and city 
networks. The private sector’s role is acted out through markets and networks, 
voluntary carbon markets and corporate responsibility.  
 
Critics of PPPs argue that the division of responsibility between state and capital 
means a lack of any strong regulation. Without a state-led approach, entrepreneurs 
and business have no boundaries or regulations to adhere to. The state’s decision to 
hand over responsibility to business means the state becomes limited in how much 
regulation it can impose on business to address the problems of climate change. The 
emergence of GEG is market-interest led, and not environmentally focused, and there 
                                                   
33 In 2010, the “UN Summit on the Millennium Development Goals concluded with the adoption of a global 
action plan to achieve the eight anti-poverty goals by their 2015 target date and the announcement of major 
new commitments for women’s and children’s health and other initiatives against poverty, hunger and 
disease” (United Nations, 2011).  
34 At present there are 344 PPPs registered with the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development 
(CSD). A CSD report into the benefits of PPPs for environmental governance argues that PPPs benefit green 
issues, because they “provide incentives to the private sector to adopt green criteria” whilst avoiding 
“politically correct “add ons’ that mean nothing” (United Nations, 2009). 
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is a lack of effectiveness in measuring the success of any GEG schemes. The hybrid 
nature of PPPs absolves both state and private enterprises of the responsibility to find 
solutions to climate change. The state’s inability to regulate policy procedure leads to 
a lack of legitimacy in environmental claims, and limited accountability for the acts 
of either governments or corporations. The role of private companies means that 
GEG transgresses both national and international boundaries, and there is a gradual 
emergence of a transnational public sphere. This approach creates two problems – it 
is open to accusations of greenwashing (Beder, 2001) and corruption.  
 
Accusations of corruption emerge around companies that, after purchasing permits, 
shelve plans intended for the permits, leaving surplus permits to sell on the markets. 
For example, steel manufacturer Corus, after being given emissions permits for 
development at their Teesside plant, shelved their plans, leaving them able to sell the 
unused permits for an estimated profit of £250 million (Clover, 2010). Moreover, 
with the global recession came a decrease in demand for energy. Companies and 
institutions that could not raise capital through bank loans were able to generate 
funding by “selling their allowance – gambling that they would be able to buy […] 
back when customers returned” (Clover, 2010). Moreover, once the third phase of 
ETS comes into effect in 2013, organisations with remaining permits will “carry over 
1.8 billion permits…obviating the need to buy any new credits before 2016” 
(Schiller, 2011). This profiteering on permits shows how a reduction in energy 
consumption means a decrease in emissions freeing up more permits to sell on the 
carbon markets. Moreover, the reliance on networks and trade in non-tangible 
products leaves the systems open to abuse. In February 2011, the ETS system and 
nine participating countries were subject to a cyber-attack. A series of phishing 
emails convinced many companies to sell their emissions allowance, and the 
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“Financial Times Deutschland” reported that one firm had lost €1.5 million as a 
result (Philips, 2010). 
 
Conclusion  
This chapter began with a quote from Timothy Luke that stated “most 
environmentalist movements now operate as a basic manifestation of 
governmentality” (1999: 121). The purpose of this quote was to highlight the 
divisions between horizontal activist networks and global, local and NGO-led 
environmental governance. The purpose of this chapter has been to show how the 
state’s application of neoliberal concepts to environmental discourse has excluded 
horizontal environmental activism from environmental discourse. Over time, party 
politics, local and global institutions, large corporations and cross-party policies have 
used eco-power and eco-knowledge to create new markets in a discursive struggle 
between activist and governance. The chapter has drawn on the earlier discussion on 
discourse (see Chapter Two) to chart how environmental discourse is increasingly 
linked to neoliberal economics. Building on the discussion of environmental 
discourse by Dryzek (1997), this chapter has illustrated how the UK government’s 
co-option of environmental discourse through the scientific data around ozone layer 
depletion has combined three of the four environmental discourse categories set out 
by Dryzek (problem-solving, survivalism and realos).  
 
Developing Luke’s argument that power/knowledge in an environmental context 
translates into eco-power alongside eco-knowledge (1999), the chapter has explored 
how power relations can aid discursive shifts. As power is omnipresent, and it has 
argued that power is not about ownership or control but relations between two 
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contrasting sides. Through the discussion on biopower, this chapter has shown how 
the UK government began to persuade individuals to engage with environmental 
discourse through the concept of neoliberalism. In charting how neoliberalism 
became central to environmental discourse, this chapter has shown the increasing 
role of economics in relation to environmentalism. Moreover, shifts in power can be 
seen through technologies of governmentality that provide the mechanism to “go 
green”, whilst at the same positioning activists as abnormal, delinquent and deviant. 
Once the domain of activists through the media, environmental discourse has 
changed from activism to advanced liberal government as the leading policy. 
Biopower allows the state to frame activists as delinquent and deviant reinforced 
through technologies of dominance, whilst encouraging individual to consume 
ethical eco-friendly lifestyles. 
 
Moreover, the findings of this study show that the realos (discussed in Chapter Two) 
of Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth and the Stop Climate Chaos organisations, in 
calling for a climate change bill, provides a platform for economic and market-led 
environmental discourse. The Act provided new markets, in the form of NEPIs, GEG 
and PPP, to reinforce economics as the dominant position of environmental 
discourse. Furthermore, this action is mirrored on a global scale, with the Kyoto 
Protocol’s launching of other market-led solutions to climate change (such as EU 
ETS and carbon trading).  
 
This chapter has focused on plotting the historical process of green capitalism and its 
creation of new markets. The next chapter will look at the consequences that an 
increased economic role in environmental discourse has had on the environmental 
activists’ movements. It will explore how the exclusion of environmental activists 
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from environmental discourse that was discussed in Chapter Two, is repeatedly 
reiterated through technologies of dominance predominantly found in legislative and 
state apparatus.  
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Chapter Four: The Consequences of Green Governmentality for the 
UK Environmental Activist Movement. 
 
“…employing tactics rather than laws, and even of using laws themselves as tactics 
– to arrange things in such a way that, through a certain number of means, such and 
such ends may be achieved.” (Foucault, 1991:95) 
 
“in terms of how many people are involved, compared to the amount of 
criminalisation, it just doesn’t make sense …the kind of level of real actual threat to 
the system that these movements pose is tiny.” (Interview with activist John Jordan, 
November, 2010) 
 
Introduction 
This chapter looks at the consequences of advanced liberal government for the 
activists’ movement. The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate that “techniques” used 
by the state place environmental activists into a discourse of deviance. This chapter 
looks at the consequences and mechanisms of this shift in power to examine Luke’s 
notion that economic competitiveness means environmental activism could “be 
recast as a type of civil disobedience, which endangers national security, expresses 
unpatriotic sentiments, or embodies treasonous acts” (Luke, 1999: 125).  
 
The previous chapters have set out how discursive challenges shape the 
understanding of relations between the state, activists and the media. They charted 
how political parties have co-opted environmental discourse into an advanced liberal 
government that shapes the practice of green governmentality. Through advanced 
liberal practice such as green capitalism, individuals are encouraged to conduct 
themselves in a pro-environmental manner, for the benefit of society. The creation of 
green capitalism through techniques of (self-)investment (e.g. door-to-door recycling, 
hybrid and electric cars, bicycling campaigns) places the onus on the individual to 
reduce their carbon emissions (e.g. by insulating their houses, making fewer car 
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journeys). The objective of such an approach by state and business is to attain a 
dominant position in environmental discourse. That is not to say that a “government 
of individualisation is not understood simply in terms as domination” (McNay, 1994: 
123), but through the notion of “docile bodies” as the “disassociation of power from 
the body” (Foucault, 1991: 138). Thus, Chapters Two and Three have set out how 
language shapes discourse, and how shifts in power shape environmental discourse.  
 
This chapter will illustrate the key themes raised so far by drawing on a series of 
examples that illustrate the influence that advanced liberal government has on media 
representations of environmental activism. As the two quotes above show, there is a 
sense from activists that the police believe a large percentage of them are intent on 
violence. The chapter will argue that individuals and collectives that reject 
governance are treated as criminals and subjected to “techniques of dominance” in 
Foucault’s terms. Through the concept of resistance (that is resistance by the state to 
radical politics, and resistance by activists towards political discourse) and power 
relations, this chapter will examine how the state applies both resistance to power in 
environmental discourse, and resistance from the activists’ movement against 
advanced liberal solutions to environmental problems. The chapter will also draw on 
Stuart Hall’s concept of the signification spiral to explore how bio-political actions 
place activists into a discourse of deviance. The signification spiral is evidenced in 
legislative measures, such as the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, the Serious 
Organized Crime and Police Act and the Terrorism Act, which increase the 
criminalisation of environmental activists and radical politics. The conflating of 
environmental activism, deviance and criminalisation is evident in the neologism 
“eco-terrorism”. In drawing on media representation of environmental activism as 
eco-terrorism, this chapter will highlight how legislative measures that link the 
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animal liberation movement to environmental activism increase the labelling of 
environmental activism as eco-terrorism. Moreover, the increased use of “political 
policing”, a term activists apply to secret or undercover police officers, will be 
briefly discussed to illustrate how political policing increasingly places 
environmental activists in a discourse of terrorism and deviancy.  
Resistance and Signification Spirals 
As already discussed in Chapter Two, Foucault acknowledges that ecology has 
evolved into a form of management and administrative procedure (Foucault, 1978). 
Luke connects his post-structuralist analysis (concerned with power, knowledge and 
discourse) to show how governmental discourses place individuals as “dynamic bio-
economic units” (1999: 134), via a neoliberal discourse that is “willing to feed green 
industrialisation” (1999: 134) that generates new markets.  
 
Power relations of resistance are dependent on a “multiplicity of points of resistance: 
[but] there is no single locus of great Refusal, no soul of revolt, source of all 
rebellions, or pure law of revolutionary. Instead there is a plurality of resistances, 
each of them a special case…by definition, that can only exist in the strategic field of 
power relations” (Foucault, 1978: 95). As Foucault observes, “resistance really 
always relies upon the situation against which it struggles” (1978: 168). Resistance is 
often found against or in reaction to altering strategies or situations.  
 
Power relations cannot exist if society is not free to formulate either compliance or 
resistance. In environmental discourse, resistance comes from radical, and at times 
professional environmental activists’ movements through direct action and civil 
disobedience. Foucault (1991) believes that resistance is addressed and curtailed 
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through “tactics of law” (Foucault, 1991 95) to constitute a technique of dominance 
(Foucault, 1977) that places environmental activism into a discourse of deviance. For 
example, during the Camp for Climate Action (2007) at Heathrow, owners British 
Airport Authorities gained a court injunction to prevent any environment-related 
groups from disrupting the business of the airport. The injunction included activists 
from Plane Stupid, Climate Camp and HACAN, as well as environmental and 
conservation groups, the Woodland Trust, the Royal Society for the Protection of 
Birds and the Campaign to Protect Rural England. The conflating of such diverse 
groups within a “tactic of law” can be understood in terms of power relations of 
resistance. 
 
This chapter will argue that governments and the mainstream media place activists 
within a “signification spiral” (Hall, 1978) as a way of “signifying events which also 
intrinsically escalates their threat” (Hall, 1978: 223). The signification spiral is 
similar to the “amplification spiral” taken from sociologists of deviance (Wilkins 
1964), whereby “amplification suggests an increasing of deviances” (Hall, 1978: 
223). It will then draw on a series of examples, starting with legislative measures 
such as the Criminal Justice Bill, and other laws that criminalise radical 
environmental activists.  
 
Hall’s work on the signification spiral argues that the media and the state link 
together two or more events, groups, or collectives and take the most threatening 
point as defining a group of people. This is known as “convergence” – “when two or 
more activities are linked in the process of signification so as to implicitly or 
explicitly draw parallels between them. …this links the manner in which new 
problems can apparently be meaningfully described and explained by setting them in 
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context of an old problem” (Hall, 1978: 223). Hall cites the example of linking 
student protest and hooliganism to form “student hooliganism”. Thus “in using the 
imagery of hooliganism, this signification equates two distinct activities on the basis 
of their imputed common denominator – both involve mindless violence or 
vandalism” (Hall, 1978: 223). The net effect “is amplification, not in real events 
being described, but in their ‘threat-potential’ for society” (Hall, 1978: 223). 
Moreover, it “take[s] place when political groups adopt deviant life-styles or when 
deviants become politicised. They occur when people thought of in passive and 
individual terms, take collective action, or when supporters of single issue campaigns 
enter into a wider agitation or make common cause” (Hall, 1978: 224). The 
signification spiral takes the most extreme point, and once an event crosses a 
“threshold” it can lead to an escalating threat. Once the threshold is defined there 
emerges a “prophesy of more troubling times to come if no action is taken” and a 
“call for firm steps” (Hall, 1978: 224). An example of this can be seen in the events  
surrounding the 2011 London Summer Riots, when MP David Lammy called for the 
Blackberry Messaging (BBM) service to be shut down “in an attempt to prevent 
protesters using it to organise themselves” (Cohen, 2011), as it is mainly teenagers 
who use BBM.  
 
Technology of Dominance  
To examine how radical environmental activists are framed through language that 
shapes a discourse of deviance and terrorism, this section will firstly sketch out 
Foucault’s idea of techniques of dominance in relation to resistance. As already 
discussed, one purpose of governmentality is to “study the autonomous individual’s 
capacity for self-control and how this is linked to forms of political rule and 
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economic exploitation” (Lemke, 2000: 4). Governmentality provides a platform for 
state legislative measures to guide the individual, without directly controlling the 
self, through “techniques of the self are integrated into structures of coercion and 
domination” (Lemke, 2000: 4; Foucault, 1993: 203–4), whereas dominance is a 
technique that relates to power relations between the state and individual. Foucault 
argues that domination is a particular type of power relationship that is stable and 
hierarchical, fixed and difficult to reverse. The effect of domination is that “people 
are subordinated with little room for manoeuvre because their ‘margin of liberty’ is 
extremely limited” (Lemke, 2000: 5–6). Granted, some individuals will reject such 
persuasive tactics as door-to-door recycling or hybrid cars, but there is no penalty or 
criminality attached to such action, because people are persuaded not commanded.  
 
Environmental activists agree that action should be taken to address climate change, 
but they disagree as to whether advanced liberal policies are the solution. The use of 
biopower to produce “a disciplined populace through docile bodies continues to be 
broadly achieved” (Salter, 2011: 214), but the radical activist communities reject 
such advanced liberal policies as the dominant means of governance. Foucault 
defines such resistance as “not wanting to be governed…not wanting to accept these 
laws because they are unjust because by virtue of their antiquity or the more or less 
threatening ascendency given them by today’s sovereign, they hide fundamental 
illegitimacy” (Foucault, 2007: 46). Resistance to solving climate change through 
capital is also a resistance of “not accepting as true…what an authority tells you is 
true, or at least not accepting it because an authority tells you that it is true, but rather 
accepting it only if one considers valid a reason for doing so” (Foucault, 2007: 46). 
Resisting green capitalism is a form of “power relations through the antagonism of 
strategy” (Foucault, 1982: 780) found in the discourse of environmental activism. 
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In the UK, the first specific environmental activism occurred in the 1990s, although 
there had been other actions in the 1970s, with direct action, civil disobedience and 
large-scale protest helping to place environmental activism at the heart of 
environmental discourse. At the same time, environmental governance was still 
developing through institutional policy-making and fledgling moves towards global 
environmental governance. The 1990s began with a renewed cycle of environmental 
protests, with anti-road protests and a DIY
35
 culture (McKay, 1998). Political 
reaction to the Conservative Party’s “Roads for Prosperity” white paper (1989) led to 
a series of high-profile environmental protests.
36
 A brief look at the timeline of 
environmental protest in the 1990s reveals that the decade began with the Twyford 
Down Protest against the M3 extension (1991–92). The following year, activists took 
over Claremont Road, East London, against the M11 link road, and a protest grew up 
around the proposed Bath Easton bypass in 1993. Towards the end of the decade, 
large-scale radical activism emerged at the Newbury bypass (1995), the A30 in 
Devon (1996–97) and against the planned second runway at Manchester airport 
(1997). Protests of the late 1990s and during the 2000s have shifted from debates 
around the proliferation of nuclear weapons to those of the anti-capitalist/global 
justice movements.  
 
The government reaction to the roads protest and the wider socio-cultural 
phenomenon of the free-music/rave scene was to draft the Criminal Justice Bill 
(1994). The Bill was aimed to restrict, criminalise and prevent large gatherings and 
                                                   
35 DIY politics stands for “Do-It-Yourself” – a form of politics that is a “youth centred, and directed cluster of 
interests and practices around green radicalism, direct action politics, new musical sounds and experiences” 
(McKay, 1998: 2). 
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trespass on private or common land. The Criminal Justice and Public Order Bill 
(CJB) (1994) was designed to restrict or prevent unauthorised protests or the 
occupation of land. The Bill contained 171 clauses that “gave police greater stop and 
search powers, and stamp out raves, squatting and mass protest” (Mills and Penman, 
1994: 8). The new powers aimed to “deal with activities which can be a blight for 
individuals and local communities” (Mills and Penman, 1994: 8). The CJB contains 
sections “specifically targeting direct action” (McKay, 1998: 165) and limits the 
number of people able to gather together. It also contains new anti-trespass laws, 
which restrict anti-road protesters. The Bill was designed to give the police increased 
power and the ability to “stop and search”, while abolishing the “right to silence” 
(McKay, 1998: 276). Section 5 of the CJB focuses on laws to prevent “collective 
trespass or nuisance on land”. It identifies that senior police officers who believe that 
two or more people “with the common purpose of residing there for any period can 
be removed from such land” (CJB, 1994: P5, s.61). If there is any refusal to leave the 
land, or an attempt to return to the land within three months, the police have the 
power of arrest.  
 
The CJB took measures against the prominent “new age traveller” 37  movement 
(originating in the mid 1980s) which “offers alternative housing and living options 
from squatting in houses and land to moving around by bus or truck” (McKay, 1998: 
28). The Bill defines such a vehicle as: 
 
whether or not it is in a fit state for use on roads, and includes any 
chassis or body, with or without wheels, appearing to have formed 
part of such a vehicle, and any load carried by, and anything attached 
to, such a vehicle. (CJB, 1994 P5, s.61 1 (a)) 
 
                                                   
37 New age travellers are bohemian travelling communities. Unlike the Romany culture that has a heritage of 
travelling, new age travellers follow a more esoteric travelling community, without paternal or maternal 
lineages.  
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This new law followed on from earlier confrontations between the police and new 
age travellers, epitomised ten years earlier in the “Battle of the Bean Field” on 12 
June 1985, when the police seized numerous vehicles of travellers who were making 
their way to Stonehenge for the summer solstice. The CJB was seen as “a corollary 
of the Thatcherite notion of the privileging of the individual” (McKay, 1998: 19). 
The result was a semi-co-ordinated response from the Freedom Network and 
Criminal Injustice Act campaign with a series of protests, joined by Advanced Part 
Road Alert, Forgive Us Our Trespasses, EarthFirst!, the Hunt Saboteurs Association, 
Liberty, and many others (SchNEWS, 2004: 23). The “Kill the Bill” campaign 
involved many others affected by the Bill, including hunt saboteurs, trade unionists, 
new age travellers, squatters, roads protesters and even football fans. Protesters 
planned to conduct mass protest knowing police resources would be unable to arrest 
all those trespassing. The protests continued into 1995, and “by June there had been 
1000+ arrests” (SchNEWS, 2004: 30) as the environmental protest movement grew 
to incorporate roads protest and anti-CJB action.  
 
The CJB was the first in a series of new laws that aimed to prevent or criminalise the 
activist movement. For example, the 1997 Protection from Harassment Act was a 
“law originally introduced to protect vulnerable women from stalkers” (Lewis and 
Evans, 2009), but through the signification spiral has also been used against animal 
rights protests. The law applies to activists on the grounds that anyone “whose course 
of conduct causes another to fear...that violence will be used against him is guilty of 
an offence...that his course of conduct will cause the other so to fear on each of those 
occasions” (ACT, s4 (1)). The Protection from Harassment Act has been applied to 
gain high court injections against “those fighting to stop climate change, anti-war 
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activists and even wildlife enthusiasts campaigning to save a beauty spot” (Lewis 
and Evans, 2009).  
 
So far this chapter has examined how resistance from activists to advanced liberal 
policies is a rejection of being conducted through a green capitalist lens. In reaction 
to this resistance, the UK government applied the “tactics of law” (such as CJB) to 
curtail and, to some extent, criminalise protest camps. The next section will consider 
a number of examples of how the “tactics of law” as a technology of dominance is 
applied to protest collectives in a way that both criminalises and places activists into 
a discourse of deviance. The first example draws from the UK, the second argues 
that the tactics of law as a technique of dominance is not restricted to the UK, but, 
through the neologism of eco-terrorism, is a global phenomenon. The final example 
will briefly look at “political policing” through surveillance techniques. The first 
example is the Metropolitan Police’s attempts to restrict the monthly pro-
environmental collective Critical Mass.  
 
Example One: Critical Mass 
The conflating of protest with terror is another form of social control. In placing 
activists into a discourse of deviance, it creates a sense of fear, an “us” and “them”, 
and prevents people with a genuine interest from learning about activism (interview 
with two observers (Metcalf and Young) outside the 2007 Heathrow Camp for 
Climate Action). In 2005, the Serious Organized Crime and Police Act (SOCPA) 
passed through Parliament. The Act developed and modernised the Criminal Justice 
and Public Order Act created by the Thatcher government in the early 1990s (later 
becoming the Criminal Justice Bill in 1994), which was a measure aimed at 
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preventing the new age traveller and rave movements. However, the aim of SOCPA 
2005 (under the rubric of anti-terrorism measures) was to prevent protests being held 
in central London. Under section 132 of this Act, it is an offence to organise or take 
part in a demonstration in a public place within the “designated area” (up to 1 km 
around the Parliament buildings) if authorisation has not been given by the 
Metropolitan Police Commissioner. 
 
In 2005, the Metropolitan Police attempted to stop the monthly Critical Mass bicycle 
ride in London, which at times went through the exclusion zone. Critical Mass, like 
other collectives and protest groups, is a non-hierarchical, horizontal collective of 
cyclists. Critical Mass bicycle rides are “no protest movement…instead, riders have 
gathered to celebrate their choice to bicycle, and in doing so have opened up a new 
kind of political space” (Carlsson, 2002: 5). However, like other collectives, there is 
no one definition of the Mass, and each participant is able to “offer a perspective, a 
manifesto, a purpose” (Carlsson, 2002: 7) for the monthly events. Critical Mass 
began in San Francisco, USA, in 1992. Two years later, the first London “Mass” 
took place, and the movement soon spread across the country. There were “Masses”, 
in sixteen other UK cities, including “Oxford, Bath, Cambridge, Liverpool, 
Edinburgh and Glasgow in Scotland” (Anon in Carlsson, 2002: 69). Despite these 
various geographical areas, both nationally and globally, they are united in a 
celebration of cycling. However, in the UK, there is also a strong influence from the 
“long standing roads protest movement…to create a powerful force as they demand 
that the government build less roads, [and] fund better public transport” (Anon in 
Carlsson, 2002: 69). Today there are over 300 Critical Masses that meet on a regular 
basis, with thousands of participants. 
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Although an autonomous collective of individuals, Critical Mass has created some 
codes and rules which have developed since 1992. The Mass is not organised or led 
by one individual. Numbers can range from twenty-five to thousands of cyclists, 
often with pedal-powered sound systems, with a unifying objective to reclaim the 
roads for cyclists. The Mass creates its own discourse through a “system of 
representation” and “affiliation” (as discussed in Chapter Two) that links with the 
wider environmental activist movement – such as “die-in38” and “swarming”39. The 
Mass also has its own rituals and language that give it a form. Techniques of 
corking,
40
 “navigating”, 41  and “breaking the mass” or “splitting the mass” 42  are 
actions the Mass uses to negotiate the ride. This discourse and its systems of 
affiliations were central to Critical Mass’s defence against the Metropolitan Police’s 
case to prevent the rides.  
 
The Metropolitan Police argued that under the Public Order Act (1986), there must 
be advance written notice of a public procession, that demonstrates, “support for or 
opposition to the views or actions of any person or body of persons…to publicise a 
cause or campaign or mark or commemorate an event”43 Moreover, organisers of any 
public procession must deliver notice, “to a police station…in the police area in 
which it is proposed the procession will start”. What is problematic about these 
criteria is that the mass has no organisers, no set route, or leader, and the “the police 
wanted to know where the route was, who the organisers were, neither of which we 
                                                   
38 A die-in is a form of protest when activists pretend to be dead, often symbolising the death of the environment 
ETC. The die-in is a common tactic of the anti-aviation collectives, and occasionally Critical Mass 
39 Swarming, is a protest tactic, where activists split into small groups ahead of a protest, and then come together 
as one, from different directions, to create a mass,  often at a pre-arranged target.  
40 Corking is when one or more cyclists place themselves on their bicycles in front of any waiting traffic at 
junctions and roundabouts. Once the Mass has passed, the cyclists move to allow traffic to continue. 
41 A navigator is one or more bicyclist at the front of the ride who is followed by the rest of the ride. It is an 
important part of the ritual of the ride that the navigator always changes.  
42 Breaking or splitting the mass occurs when at a red light a large group of riders thins out to create a safer 
mass. (http://www.joelpomerantz.com/genlresources/cmglossary.html#splittingthemass) accessed January 2011). 
43
 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200708/ldjudgmt/jd081126/metro-1.htm  
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can give them, there’s no organisers and we don’t have a route. I mean we haven’t a 
clue where we go when we start out” (interview with Des Kay, September, 2010). 
The non-hierarchical semi-structure of the rides means no one person is responsible, 
and no ride has a set route. In essence, the action was based on the grounds that the 
Mass was a procession, and therefore needed a permit, yet there was no one that 
could be identified as an organiser, or leader, and no one person to defend the case in 
court.  
 
In a good example of the blurring between boundaries of environmental discourse, 
the NGO Friends of the Earth provided legal support to anyone within the Mass that 
wanted to challenge the Metropolitan Police’s attempt to curtail the rides. The realos 
of Friends of the Earth were aided, albeit as a silent partner, by the fundis (see 
Chapter Two’s discussions on Dryzek) of Critical Mass, thus demonstrating that 
there is a cross-over between horizontal and vertical environmental activists’ groups. 
Indeed, Friends of the Earth instigated the challenge to the Metropolitan Police by 
contacting regular Critical Mass cyclist, Des Kay, a former member of CND and 
ardent cyclist. Friends of the Earth’s newly formed Rights and Justice Centre, which 
provides legal support for environmental campaigns,
44
 asked Kay if he would: 
 
contest this in court, but we don’t really want any of our 
members…cos it would look like it was prejudiced and they said 
would you like to do it and I was quite happy. (interview with Des 
Kay, September 2010)  
 
 
Yet Friends of the Earth define Kay’s role as “acting for London cyclist, Des Kay, 
who will be represented in court by Michael Fordham of Counsel” (FOE Press 
                                                   
44 For more information see http://www.foe.co.uk/community/campaigns/rights/rights_justice_centre16424.html (accessed 
November 2009). 
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release, 24/5/2006). Fordham “argued in terms of it being a procession, and it’s ok to 
have a procession if it’s customarily held, and it was customarily held because it had 
been running for thirteen years” (interview with Des Kay, September 2010). The 
Law Lords agreed with the Friends of the Earth solicitor, that, like a funeral 
procession, the monthly rides were “not really a procession anyway…so that’s how 
we ended up legitimised” (interview with Des Kay, September 2010). The attempts 
to criminalise some radical environmental activism through legislative measures and 
a discourse of deviance shows an “intent to drive a wedge between more mainstream 
and broadly supported organisations (the good) and radical grassroots activists (the 
bad) seeking to ferment disagreement on one level, and movement splintering on the 
other” (Salter, 2011: 227). Yet, as the earlier discussions on realos and fundis show, 
there is much cross-over between the vertical NGOs and horizontal collectives of the 
environmental activist movements. However, one way that more clearly 
differentiates between realos and fundis is through the neologism of eco-terrorism (as 
discussed in the next section).  
 
The example of Critical Mass shows how state legislation places activism into a 
discourse of deviance, enhanced by making terrorism the threshold on which they 
must act. The criminalisation of environmental activism creates barriers in which to 
contest economics as a central approach in environmental discourse. Hence, as Luke 
predicted in 1999, economic competitiveness has increasingly led to the placing of 
activism into the realm of being a threat to national security.  
 
This chapter has shown so far that much of this placing of activists as deviant or 
terrorism discourse occurred before the attacks on the World Trade Center (referred 
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to as 9/11 from now on). The 9/11 attacks provided a platform from which to 
increase “action at a distance” (Slater, 2011).  
 
Example Two: Eco-Terrorism 
As this chapter has shown, new laws and legislation have been created through the 
wielding of bio-political power to prevent or place the activist movement as 
“terrorist-like”. Yet there was no evidence of activists conducting or being involved 
in acts of terrorism. It might be expected that the conflating of terrorism with 
environmental activism would be a post-9/11 reaction. However, this chapter will 
show that environmental activism occurred before 9/11, around the same time as the 
growth of the animal rights and liberation movements. Repeating the signification 
spiral witnessed through bio-political legislation (e.g. CJB), American neoliberals 
have linked environmental activists to acts of terror. Moreover, in the UK, the 
National Farmers Union has also attempted to conflate environmental activism with 
animal liberation in a discourse of terror, also through the neologism of “eco-
terrorism”.  
 
Prior to the September 11th
  
2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, the 
media and business lobby were already linking environmentalism with terrorism. 
This section will focus specifically on the use of the term “eco-terrorism” to identify 
environmental activism. It will also look briefly at political policing through the 
example of undercover police officer Mark Kennedy. 
 
A year after the formation of the Animal Rights National Index (ARNI), the 
neologism of “eco-terrorist” was introduced into environmental discourse. In 1987, 
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Ron Arnold, a member of the conservation-based Sierra Club, left to form the Wise 
Use movement and coined the term “eco-terrorism”. The Wise Use movement wants 
to industrialise as much American land as possible. Arnold argues that in giving the 
government control of land use, the eco-activist movement can influence political 
discourse, and that “American industry has a moral obligation to protect itself from 
environmental attacks” (Arnold, 1987: 21). He also argues that negotiating with 
environmentalists is futile because:  
The adherents of wildernism are convinced of their moral and ethical 
superiority, are blind to reason on questions of dogma, and feel they 
have an exclusive hold on the truth. It all adds up to religious 
behaviour, and one does not expect objective rationality from religious 
behaviour. (Arnold, 1987: 44)  
 
Arnold believes that environmental activism is threatening the progress of American 
business. Governments are allowing environmental activists and environmental 
organisations to influence political discourse, to the detriment of business. 
“Environmentalism is essentially anti-progressive and ultra reactionary, but 
masquerades in the most popular words it can find” (Arnold, 1987: 84). Arnold adds 
that the environmental movement will destroy American business, as a result of “an 
ignorant public made irate by anti-capitalist assertions that we are evil profit-mad 
monsters” (1987: 51). What Arnold outlines is, for him, epitomised by the neologism 
of environmental activism, or a “new vanguard for a new society in the form of eco-
terrorism will become more widespread” (1987: 25).  
 
The Wise Use movement has been influential in the development of green 
governmentality in the USA. In June 1998, Arnold gave evidence to a Crime 
Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee, Washington. In his evidence, 
Arnold, speaking as the Executive Vice President of the Centre for the Defense of 
Free Enterprise, argues how:  
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Eco-terror is a crime committed to save nature, that generally takes the 
form of equipment vandalism, but which may include package bombs, 
blockades using physical force to obstruct workers from going where 
they have a right to go, and invasions of private or government offices 
to commit the crime of civil disobedience… I'm stating that there is no 
difference between eco-terrorism and animal rights terrorism. And 
there evidently has been some dispute about that difference. The 
perpetrators are, in large part, the same people. (1987: 54) 
 
Here, Arnold makes terrorism what Hall calls the “converge point” (Hall, 1978) by 
linking together animal activism, environmentalism and terrorism. Semiotically, the 
language gives meaning to a discourse of actors as “perpetrators”, using “bombs” for 
their “crimes”, giving a rhetoric of aggressive activists using no form of peaceful 
protest. In the USA, members of the US Congress proposed the Eco-Terrorism 
Prevention Act (2004) and, although the Act failed to become law, a similar bill, the 
Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act passed into law in 2006. Post-9/11 provided an 
ideal platform for the political right in the USA to scoop up all “outsider groups” 
under sweeping legislative measures. Salter notes that:  
 
Post 9/11 is the potential, constructed or otherwise, of perceived 
“threats” to the state-capital order, justify the mobilisation of large 
numbers of police and anti-personal weapons against civilians. (Salter, 
2011: 225) 
 
More recently, climate-denier organisation, the EastWest Institute produced a report 
conflating eco-terrorism with a potential nuclear threat (Berry, 2007). The author of 
the report, Ken Berry, a senior consultant to the global security programme at the 
EastWest Institute, uses as a case study for his argument the poisoning of former 
Russian spy, Alexander Litvinenko in 2006. Berry argues that this case study shows 
how easy it can be to move nuclear material from country to country, and that ease 
could result in the use of nuclear material in terrorist attacks, and that:  
 
regardless of whether the death of Litvinenko was directly linked to 
terrorists, its implications for the prevention of nuclear terrorism are 
much the same. …there may be an even bigger prospect that scientific 
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personnel from the richest countries will aid eco-terrorist use of 
nuclear weapons and materials. (Berry, 2007: 1) 
 
Journalists reacted to the report with headlines “No time for dithering as we wake to 
new eco-terror” (Farrelly, 2007) and “Nuclear terrorism risk seen as growing” 
(Reuters, 2007). Berry contends that: 
 
In the next 10 to 15 years terrorism inspired by Al Qaeda will likely to 
give way to violence inspired by other causes. The emergence of eco-
terrorism, in response to the rising panic of global warming, may be 
one such case. (Berry, 2007: 4) 
 
A more radical argument was proposed connecting the attack on the World Trade 
Center in 2001 and environmental activism as acts of terror, where environmental 
activism contributed to the 9/11 terrorist attacks:  
 
Those who engage in activism or eco-terrorism for the purposes of 
reducing the perceived damage to the environment are indirectly 
facilitating the kind of terrorism that led to the September 11th 
attacks. (Saliba, 2003: 6) 
 
Saliba argues that trying to preserve the environment can give information to 
potential terrorists, citing the Clean Air Bill as an example which implicates 
environmental activists with terrorism. The Bill wants companies to publish any 
chemicals that may go into the atmosphere, and this, Saliba maintains, is inviting 
terrorists to use the information to carry out attacks. British political policy reflects 
US policy, in the form of the UK Terrorism Act (2000), amended in 2006. The Act 
gives the police powers to arrest anyone glorifying terrorism, or selling, loaning or 
spreading terrorist publications. This has strong implications for environmental 
activism – for example, during the Greenpeace blockade of the Faslane Naval Base 
entrance (in February 2007), when several MPs were due to visit the base, the MOD 
cancelled the visit. 
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Eco-Terrorism in the UK 
The notion of eco-terrorism first appeared in the British mainstream media when the 
leader of the National Farmers Union (NFU), Ben Gill, equated eco-terrorism with 
the outbreak of foot and mouth disease. To a meeting of Australian farmers, Gill 
claimed that “Eco-terrorists may have deliberately triggered the foot and mouth 
epidemic in Britain and other outbreaks around the world” (Gill, 2001). Saliba 
reinforces this idea: 
 
There is a growing likelihood incidents like England’s sudden 
outburst of foot and mouth disease may herald a new form of animal 
rights terrorism, in which diseases are deliberately spread. (Saliba, 
2003: 3) 
 
Gill’s comments appeared in both national and regional newspapers (Brown, 2001). 
The Scotsman reported the story on page seven of their farming section. Framing the 
article under the headline “Eco-terrorists could have spread FMD, says chief” 
indicates who is responsible for the UK foot and mouth outbreak (Maxwell, 2001: 7). 
The opening paragraph places the crisis in a local, Scottish context, outlining the 
latest case (ninth) of foot and mouth to be confirmed in Scotland. The connection 
between environmentalists and the outbreak arrives in the third paragraph, when: 
 
…confirmation the epidemic is not over came as Ben Gill, president 
of the English NFU, made a speech in Australia claiming that it may 
have been deliberately triggered by eco-terrorists.  (Maxwell, 2001: 7)  
 
The Newcastle Journal conflates the lexicon of eco with terror, stating “NFU chief in 
eco-terror controversy” with a subheading of “Campaigners slate mad-hatter theory” 
(Lognoone, 2001: 17). There are comments from regional members of the NFU 
alongside Friends of the Earth and Charles Secrett (a leading British 
environmentalist). The only government comment, from a spokesperson at the then 
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF), said it had “no reason to 
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believe eco-terrorists were behind the outbreak” (MAFF, 2001: 1). The 
Northumberland Regional Spokesperson, Malcolm Corbet, reinforced Gill’s 
preferred reading, stating that “his comments weren’t based on idle speculation. He 
is a well respected man who chooses his words carefully” (Corbett, 2001), yet neither 
Gill nor Corbet voiced any evidence in the Newcastle Journal article. The only clear 
suggestion of the source of foot and mouth comes from the MAFF: 
 
The theory [eco-terrorism] was put to us …in the absence of any 
evidence we were unable to investigate it further. All the evidence that 
we have strongly points to the source of the outbreak being the pig 
unit at Heddon-on-the-Wall. (MAFF, 2001: 1) 
 
Responding, the NFU Press Officer stated that there had been a misunderstanding of 
Gill’s comments, adding “Who was responsible for the source of the outbreak? We 
just don’t know” (Simpson, 2001). Such support for environmentalists over the NFU 
by regional newspapers signals sympathy in the regional representation of eco-
activism. Paradoxically, the national newspaper reporting, which focused attention 
on Gill and reiterated environmental activists as eco-terrorists, was different.  
 
The Daily Telegraph and Guardian newspapers reinforced the dominant codes or 
preferred meaning of the NFU. They also covered the story in their main sections. 
“Eco-terrorists may be to blame, says NFU head” (Brown and Saville, 2001: 12). 
This introduced a more hostile rhetoric to the story, linking animal activists and 
militants to the outbreak of foot and mouth. The article talks of “increasingly militant 
green splinter groups that would stop at nothing to undermine existing agricultural 
practice”. The rhetoric of militant environmentalists who stop at nothing, alongside 
the comments by Gill, forms a “determinate moment”. Hall’s encoding/decoding 
model defines the determinate moment as being when the author “employs a code 
and yields a ‘message’: at another determinate moment, the ‘message’, via its 
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decoding, issues into a structure” (Hall, 1973: 3). The national newspapers, in 
contrast to regional newspapers, preferred a reading of eco-activist as militant, 
antagonistic and linked with animal activism.  
 
This example of “eco-terrorism”, used within an agricultural context, highlights how 
the term gives a preferred reading to a message. The attack of 9/11 signalled the 
beginning of a change in legislative measures towards environmental activism. Soon 
after, the proposed Eco-terrorism Prevention Act in the USA, and UK law in the 
form of SOCPA (2005) began framing environmental activism as a political threat. 
Charting the idioms of eco-terrorism allows us to locate it within the broader political 
context of a post-9/11 association of the sensed subversive political moves being 
terrorism. Such moves placed the discursive identification of the environmental 
activist as a terrorist, and the conservative regulatory changes outlawed collective 
political dissent in both the USA and (later) the UK. In linking these discursive 
moments, this work is mapping a cultural moment in which a network of political 
and media discourses chime and resonate to produce a heightened sense of eco-
terrorism as an existent threat. 
 
Evidence for Eco-terrorism 
The purpose of linking environmental activism with terrorism is to act as a 
signification spiral for a language that justifies the labelling of activists as deviant. 
As earlier discussions show, once a label is applied it becomes a “truth”. The attempt 
by the neoliberal American right, and the NFU leader to place activists into a 
discourse of deviance is based on opinion with little evidence. Rootes found no clear 
correlation between animal rights and environmental activism, but he notes:  
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[Any association, proven or not, of] animal rights protests and anti-
hunting protests with the environmental movement…it is likely the 
image such people hold will be of an environmental movement that is 
not only more confrontational than it was a decade age, but one that is 
more violent than is warranted. (Rootes, 2003: 46–47) 
 
Rootes (2003) considers that there is no evidence for eco-terrorism or the threat of 
eco-terrorism, stating that during his nine years of study, only three cases of activism 
could truly be identified as acts of eco-terrorism. These three cases were: (1) the 
bombing, in 1989, of a McDonald’s restaurant in the town of Chico, California, in 
protest at the destruction of the rainforest; (2) the 1996 anti-road protest at Newbury, 
where catapults were used against construction equipment, causing injury to a 
security guard; and (3) a year later in 1997, when Newbury protesters set fire to 
construction equipment. Rootes considers that these case studies show that violent 
acts are “noticeable by their absence” (2003: 38), yet they could still influence the 
public’s understanding of environmental discourse.  
 
Salter also found that there is little evidence for eco-terrorism in the literature of 
either the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) or the Earth Liberation Front (ELF), as  
“There’s no mention that a single person has been injured in an action attributed to 
an ALF or ELF underground cell” (Salter, 2011: 228). Any violence in the 
environmental movement (as discussed in the next chapter) has been against non-
human machines. Governments and businesses view direct action against material or 
organic objects as a “direct threat to corporate agribusiness, pharmaceutical and 
related industries” (Salter, 2011: 228). 
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In 2008, an article in the Observer newspaper ran with a headline “Police warn of 
growing threat from eco-terrorist” (Townsend and Denning, 2008). In the article, 
environmental activists were “researching a list of target companies which they 
believe are major polluters”, and “officers are concerned a ‘lone maverick’ eco-
extremist may attempt a terrorist attack aimed at killing large numbers of Britons” 
(Townsend and Denning, 2008: 8). The article offered no new evidence that proved 
that environmental activists are either eco-extremists or eco-terrorists. The article 
was challenged by academics from Keele University (Doherty, Dobson, and Rootes 
et al), and by Kevin Smith, a member of the Climate Camp media team, who pointed 
out there was no evidence for the story. “Neither in Britain nor in the US have even 
the most radical environmental activists attacked people rather than property” 
(Doherty, Doyle, Hayes, Rootes and Saunders, 2008: 32). Smith noted 
“environmental activists engaging in legitimate civil disobedience are presented as 
planning to resort to terrorist acts, without any evidence” (Smith in Doherty, Doyle, 
Hayes, Rootes and Saunders, 2008: 32). On the basis of the comments, the Observer 
pulled the story, claiming, “it is perfectly legitimate to report police security 
concerns, but none of the statements were substantiated…the paper had no intention 
of suggesting that every activist was a potential terrorist…the claim itself was the 
story” (Pritchard in Doherty, Doyle, Hayes, Rootes and Saunders, 2008: 34). 
 
Yet, the repeated use of the term “eco-terrorism” means that it becomes a “truth”, a 
foundation of knowledge about environmental activists. Moreover, the term became 
a labelling for imagined threats towards anyone who fails to lead an ecologically 
sound lifestyle. For example, in 1994, Special Branch announced that “it was 
changing its priorities to concentrate on environmental activism” (Monbiot, 1996: 
19) because “environmental activists might be preparing for ‘suicide attacks’ on road 
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builders” (Monbiot, 1996: 19). This statement was made despite the Association of 
Chief Police Officers (ACPO) admitting that “no terrorist offences by greens have 
taken place and failing to furnish any evidence to suggest that they were likely to 
occur, decided to start using the antiterrorism squad to gather intelligence” (Monbiot, 
1996: 19). This “amplification” of deviance equates environmental activists with 
potential acts of terrorism. Seeing the media as part of the state is a clear “tactic of 
law” that places activsits into a discourse of deviance and terrorism. These examples 
show how the media repeatedly place activists into a discourse of deviance and 
terrorism. The final example briefly shows how biopower operates through what 
activists term political policing, a term activists use for surveillance by the state 
through undercover officers.  
 
Example Three: Political Policing
45
  
In October 2010, the website Indymedia Nottingham posted a short message that 
read:  
Mark “Stone” has been an undercover police officer from 2000 
to at least the end of 2009. We are unsure whether he is still a 
serving police officer or not. His real name is Mark Kennedy. 
Investigations into this identity revealed evidence that he has 
been a police officer, and a face-to-face confession has 
confirmed this. Mark claims that he left the police force in late 
2009, and that before becoming an undercover officer he was a 
Metropolitan police constable. (Indymedia, 21 October 2010) 
 
Mark Stone was a pseudonym used by Police Constable (PC) Mark Kennedy, an 
officer in the National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU). NPOIU was one of 
many “secret police” units that observed and infiltrated the environmental activism 
                                                   
45 Political policing and protest began with the formation of the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS, 1968), a 
Special Branch unit also known as “hairies’ (Taylor, 2002). SDS was formed as a reaction to the Anti-Vietnam 
protests, the growth in membership of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND). The Cold War and the 
burgeoning civil rights movement all meant an increasing recognition by police of the need for better 
intelligence, equipment and training for public order work. 
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movement from the 1990s to 2010. Between 1994 and 2000, a number of 
parliamentary measures gave greater powers to the police to conduct surveillance 
exercises on the activist movement. The National Extremism Tactical Co-ordinator 
Unit (NECTU
46
) (2004), the National Domestic Extremism Team (2005) and the 
Counter Terrorism Command
47
 (2006) had powers to monitor and prevent any 
protest in order to “gather intelligence so appropriate policing could take place” 
(Hattenstone, 2011). Kennedy was directly involved, with other activists, in the 
planning of direct action on the Ratcliffe-on-Soar coal-fired power station. Activists 
were not surprised that an undercover police officer had been amongst the collective 
for a nine-year period: “we assume at every meeting there are at least one journalist 
and one special branch officer” (Anon, 12:42). Paradoxically, the surveillance by the 
state failed to have a panoptic effect; instead it reaffirmed to activists that the state 
was determined to use tactics of law to curtail or prevent environmental activism.  
 
Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to identify how discursive challenges by mainstream 
party politics shifted the meaning of environmental discourse. The contestation 
between economic environmentalism and social justice environmentalism began to 
change from environmental activism being the dominant position to a situation where 
green capitalism had the dominant position in environmental discourse. Through 
                                                   
46 NETCU is a national policing unit set up by ACPO to respond to the threat of domestic extremism in England 
and Wales. NETCU’s objective is to aid peaceful protest, and rout out “a few individuals [who] resort to 
criminal activity to further their cause. These individuals sometimes try to hide their illegal activities by 
associating themselves with otherwise peaceful campaigners.” They are overseen by the Counter Terrorism 
Command. For more information, see http://www.netcu.org.uk/about/about.jsp (accessed 17 October 2011). 
 
47 The Counter Terrorism Command took over terrorism-related issues from the Anti-Terrorism Squad and 
Special Branch. Their remit is to provide a response to “terrorist, domestic extremist and related offences, 
including the prevention and disruption of terrorist activity”; gather intelligence on terrorism and extremism in 
London, bomb disposal, work with the “British Security Service and Secret Intelligence Service” and to offer 
“protection of British interests overseas and the investigation of attacks against those interests”. For more 
information, see http://www.met.police.uk/so/counter_terrorism.htm (accessed October 2011).  
 
183 
 
green governmentality, individuals are coerced to take responsibility for climate 
change. Through techniques of the self in the name of advanced liberal policies, 
individuals are persuaded to go green, whereas those who reject being conducted 
through such policies are increasingly labelled as deviant, to the extent of placing 
environmental activists in a discourse of terrorism.  
 
Through the practice of green governmentality governments are able to create new 
markets, politically position themselves on the global stage with global 
environmental governance, and maintain their hegemonic position in environmental 
discourse.  
 
Using Hall’s “signification spiral” (Hall, 1978) concept to analyse the use of “tactics 
of law” shows that the rapid increase in global and national environmental 
governance has created a division between environmentalism as an act of radicalism, 
and environmentalism as an economic discourse. Environmental reflexivity (to 
borrow Dean’s term), through economic practice, means the onus falls on individuals 
to change their behaviour in favour of a green capitalism.  
 
Green governmentality provided a platform that was not simply a post-9/11 effect. 
The terror attacks on 9/11 created a politics of fear, which some organisations could 
use to instil greater fear and retain the other in discourses of deviancy or terrorism. 
Yet the earlier techniques of dominance through covert police operations, the 
Criminal Justice Bill and subsequent Serious Organized Crime and Police Act, The 
CBJ, SOCPA and Terrorism Acts were all justified through the threshold of a 
signification spiral. Because earlier governments had put in place measures to 
criminalise environmental activism there was no strong need for more legalisation or 
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to iterate the discourse of deviance. Instead, the government was able to take control 
of environmental discourse by pushing forward new green capitalism plans and 
legalisation.  
 
Thus the relationship between mainstream politics and the environmental activists’ 
movement is one of a discursive challenge over the hegemonic position of 
environmental discourse. This relationship has reversed over time, and the use of 
legislation and the signification spiral has led to mainstream politics holding the 
hegemonic position. The next chapter will draw on Fairclough’s critical discourse 
analysis (1995) to examine how this relationship is represented in the mainstream 
media.  
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Chapter Five: Critical Discourse Analysis: Journalistic Narratives of 
the Environmental Activist Movement  
 
Introduction 
This chapter will apply a critical discourse analysis (CDA) to newspaper reports of 
environmental activism, to examine how the media report environmental activism in 
relation to environmental discourse. The CDA will identify critical discursive 
moments. Critical discursive moments are a way of identifying key events that 
impact on a discourse. In Carvalho’s study (2000), data was drawn from a series of 
“critical discursive moments” – periods “that involve specific happenings which may 
lead to challenges to the ‘established’ discursive position” (Carvalho, 2000: 5).48 An 
analysis of “moments” helps identify any continuation of arguments over a period, 
and any challenges or changes to discourse “at particularly important times in the 
social construction of an issue” (2005: 37). For Carvalho, the identification of critical 
discourse moments is “essentially interpretive work, which is probably not replicable 
in the same exact terms by other individuals” (2005: 34). However, as Carvalho 
observes, “if the goal is to understand how meanings assigned through language to 
reality are a crucial basis for social and political (inter)action, and to look at the 
subtle ways in which those meanings are achieved, discourse analysis offers an 
important potential” (2005: 38). An example of critical discursive moments is found 
in Gamson and Stuart’s (1992) study Media Discourse as a Symbolic Contest: the 
                                                   
48 Similar to Carvalho’s findings, to collate all articles that focus on different protests with a connection to 
environmentalism would have to include a wide range of other disciplines and subjects. It would be a huge 
undertaking to comprehensively analyse every single environmentally focused protest since the 1970s. There 
are a large variety of articles, from news, to editorials, letters pages, comment, and even a short-run weekly 
column by roads protester, Daniel Hopper (Daily Mirror, 1997). The reporting covers a wide dimension of 
environmental activism, appearing in the entire spectrum of UK national newspapers. Therefore, it would be 
absolutely impossible even for a Ph.D. to give a detailed analysis of all the articles. 
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Bomb in Political Cartoons. The research focused on “framing the prevention of 
nuclear war”, and as such the “critical discourse moments were chosen accordingly” 
(58). The result is an ability to unpack a “particular type of package at different 
critical discourse moments” (1992: 58). 
 
This chapter also explores whether there are historical patterns that shape journalistic 
traits. Do journalists repeat the same narrative when reporting environmental protest? 
This chapter will draw on four samples, charting key protests to identify any 
reiteration of journalistic language patterns when representing environmental 
activism.  
 
The aim of this chapter is to apply critical discourse analysis to a series of historical 
samples. The objective in drawing on historical practice is to identify if there are any 
journalistic practices that reaffirm a will to truth (as discussed in Chapter Two) that 
environmental activism exists within a discourse of deviance. The critical discourse 
analysis will look to identify whether the practices of green governmentality 
(discussed in Chapter Three) reaffirm a particular journalistic stance, by examining if 
an order of discourse (see Chapter Two) exists that “excludes” environmental 
activists as actors from their own representation. Moreover, the analysis of four 
samples (Greenham Common Peace Camps, Swampy, the May Day and the Global 
Justice Movement) reflects the political application of the “tactic of law” (see 
Chapter Four) to increasingly criminalise environmental activism.  
 
This chapter will firstly look at earlier studies that represent protest in newspapers to 
establish how journalists frame protests. By drawing on the studies of Halloran et al. 
(1971) this chapter will aim to identify any linguistic patterns that shape the reporting 
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of protest. The next section will outline the methodological innovation, before 
turning to the patterns and analysis of critical discourse analysis.   
 
Earlier Research on UK Media Representations of Protest  
A study by Halloran et al. (1971) on newspaper reports of protest draws on Lang and 
Lang’s (1955) notion of an “inferential structure” to test if there is a bias in news 
reporting techniques. Lang and Lang’s study focuses on the reporting of local 
elections in the USA. Lang and Lang analysed the coverage of four different news 
outlets. Their study of a local election reveals that television producers appeared to 
be following a pattern or structure that conferred a specific meaning and bias around 
each candidate. Lang and Lang found that both intentional and unintentional bias 
“can influence public definitions” (1955: 177) and that such preconceived bias, in the 
form of an “inferential structure” significantly directs the “public definitions in a 
particular direction” (1955: 171). Based on Lang and Lang’s inferential structure, 
Halloran et al. found that newspapers framed protesters in an unfavourable light. In 
order to establish how linguistic styles shape the public perception, they categorised 
journalistic language into nouns and adjectives. These categories were then slimmed 
down into sub-categories of nouns which were either “neutral”, “specific 
descriptions” or “unfavourable”. Adjectives were sub-categorised as “favourable”, 
“neutral” and “unfavourable”. Specific descriptions included the terms “militant”, 
“activist”, “student” and “left-wing”. Unfavourable terms included “confrontation”, 
“attack”, “riot”, “mob” and “extremist” (1971, 107–12). In fairness, Halloran et al. 
also found the use of less aggressive adjectives, such as “peaceful”, “sincere” and 
“good humoured”. In general, however, Halloran et al.’s findings reveal that news 
reports focused on either violence or the potential for violence.  
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The representation of marchers as young hooligans empties the event of any political 
context, shaping the identity of the protesters as violent, giving “an indication of the 
way in which ideas about current events are structured, simplified and fed into the 
general social consciousness” (Halloran et al., 1971: 216). This deliberate ploy of 
structuring the order of discourse to undermine political validity continues 
throughout the history of radical protest. In looking at today’s reporting of protest, 
one can see the continued use of such an inferential structure.  
 
Moreover, there are similarities between Halloran et al.’s findings and the reporting 
of the Greenham Common Women’s Peace Camp (1980s) that show how the 
inferential structure is not limited to the 1960s protest movements.
49
 Eldridge (1995) 
found that when coverage did occur, reporters would couch the women’s actions as 
violent and aggressive. News reports on confrontations applied a language of 
“force”, “blockade”, “tear down” and “bare hands” (Eldridge, 1995: 327). In 
contrast, much of the “violence against the women” (Eldridge, 1995: 329) went 
unreported, and accusations of police violence did “not make the news” (Eldridge, 
1995: 329.). In one example, when women tried to prevent a delivery lorry from 
entering the base, reporters focused on “the police view: the men and supplies” 
(Eldridge, 1995: 328). A language that referred to the Cold War and metaphorical 
use of masculine rhetoric shaped the identity of the women.  
 
                                                   
49 Anecdotally, Hamish Campbell encourages citizen journalism at the Camp for Climate Action and runs the 
website VisionON.TV (the main news platform from the camp). His family was involved with the Greenham 
Common peace camps – evidence, I would suggest, that each protest cycle takes and reinvents elements of 
previous protests and builds a historical discourse around the UK protest movement. 
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Outline of Samples for CDA 
The criteria for choosing the critical discourse moments are based on (a) their 
historical significance, and (b) their impact in changing the environmental activist 
discourse. The articles are newspaper reports of the following moments.  
 
1) Two protest at the Greenham Common Peace Camps, Embrace the Base (13 
December 1982) and Dancing on the Silos (2 January 1983);  
2)  “Swampy” and the roads protesters; 
3) May Day protests (2000–2004); and 
4) Global Justice Movement G20 protest. 
 
The Global Justice Movement’s protest generated the highest volume (32 in total) of 
reports as it covers four years (2000–2003).  
 
Overall, the sixty-one articles were narrowed down to seven stories: (1) Palmer 
(1982) “Peace: the plea by 30,000 women”, Daily Mirror; (2) Smith (1983) “Peace 
women go over the top”, The Sunday Times; (3) Jury (1997) “One week on, Swampy 
comes out blinking”, The Independent; (4) Lee and Peachy (2000) “100 held as thugs 
riot in London anarchy”, The Times; (5) Boggan, Bennetto, Milmo, and Beard (2001) 
“Veggie burgers, militant cyclists and rain”, The Independent; (6) Cobain (2001) 
“Rain rescues capitalism from spiked hair horde”, The Times; and (7) Allen, Craven 
and Taylor (2002) “4000 police tame May Day militants”, Daily Mail (May 2:  8). 
Where possible the sample was taken from front page and news sections in the first 
few pages of a newspaper has a greater chance of capturing material that was likely 
“to mobilise public opinion through unorthodox forms of action and so put pressure 
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on decision-makers” (Della Porta and Diani, 2006, 167). The final samples50 are the 
Embrace the Base (December 1982) and Dancing on the Silos protest (January 1983) 
at the Greenham Common Women’s Peace Camp;51 Swampy and the roads protest; 
and two samples each from the Global Justice/Anti-capitalist protests. This CDA is 
focusing on national newspaper coverage. These examples have been chosen because 
(1) they received the highest number of returns on a Nexis database search; (2) they 
have been addressed by other academic work in the field, and (3) they are often 
referred to by activists in the movement as seminal or watershed moments (see 
Chapter Six for empirical data). 
 
Sample One: Greenham Common Peace Camps (1982–1995) 
The first CDA is the Greenham Common Peace Camp. The peace camp has been 
chosen for two reasons: firstly because it was the first “camp” to emerge on the 
political arena, and secondly because “the peace movement was just as significant 
with overlapping membership in environmental and peace organisations being the 
rule rather than the exception” (Hunold and Dryzek, 2005: 87). This is identified as a 
critical discursive moment because Greenham was the first large-scale, long-term 
protest in the UK. Its links to anti-nuclear protests mirror those of the first 
environmental activism. Greenham Common was also significant for its role in 
building the foundations of contemporary environmental activism. The first example 
is the Embrace the Base protest. Embrace the Base gained front-page media 
                                                   
50 Although this work frequently refers to the Heathrow climate camp (2007), this will not be included in the 
CDA, as the majority of coverage came from the London Evening Standard, a regional newspaper. Moreover, 
the Heathrow camp is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Six.  
51 This study has chosen to focus on UK representations of environmental activism, although it acknowledges the 
influence of American environmental activism in shaping UK activist discourses. Indeed, the first 
environmental protest, which later formed Greenpeace, was made up of political activists and journalists (see 
Chapter Seven for more details). The event made the front page and caused a political incident between the 
Canadian and American governments. However, American journalism is different from British journalism, 
and for that reason, and because it was about American politics, it will not be part of this critical discourse 
analysis. 
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coverage. All earlier efforts by the women were ignored or given little news value by 
editors and journalists. Eldridge (1995) notes how, in December 1982, the Greenham 
Common Women’s Peace Camp had been established for just over a year and the 
women organised their first large-scale protest. Embrace the Base was a campaign to 
circle the airbase with a human chain of women and children. Thirty thousand 
women “were seen on television embracing the base” (Eldridge, 1995: 318).  
 
All together, there were eight articles from this action. The Daily Express and Daily 
Mirror newspapers ran with the protest as front-page news. The Daily Express led 
with a headline of “The peace war” (Express Staff Reporter, 1982a), whereas the 
Daily Mirror simply stated “Peace: the plea from 30,000 women who joined hands in 
the world’s most powerful protest against nuclear war” (Palmer, 1982: 1). The Daily 
Express focused on the role of the Russian media in the event, arguing that the 
protesters gave Russian reporters access to the base, putting the UK at risk. In 
contrast, the Daily Mirror very much focused on the carnivalesque nature of the 
event and the role of families. The Daily Mirror’s coverage was surrounded by 
visual imagery of women with the peace sign painted on their faces, the women 
embracing the base and children, sub-headlined as “Keeping warm” (Palmer, 1982: 
2). Other press coverage carried headlines “30,000 women at Greenham” (Brown, 
1982), “Peace: the plea by 30,000 women” (Palmer, 1982); “Peace war that won’t go 
away” (Pratt, 1982); and “Scuffles as women seal off airbase” (Brown, 1982). Each 
of these headlines had similar articles, and were fairly factual. With the exception of 
the Guardian piece (Brown, 1982) there was little use of adjectives that indicated 
either a positive or negative representation.
52
  
                                                   
52 Of the thirteen articles on Greenham Common for this study, those by Brown, Express Staff Reporter, Pratt 
(1982), Steven and the anonymous piece in the News of the World newspaper (1983) were rejected, because 
they were either shorter than 200 words or appeared buried in the newspaper. There were two articles retained, 
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Palmer’s article (1982: 1–3) covers the front and two inner pages of the Daily 
Mirror. The event is given prominence with the banner headline “Peace”, and an 
image of the women linking arms around the base. The language is stoic and the 
discourse is of patriotism and national pride – typical British adversity. The top line 
proclaims “amid the sleet and rain of a bitter winter afternoon,5330,000 staged a 
remarkable protest…[and] they linked hands in heart of the English countryside” 
(Palmer, 1982: 1). The language of Britishness is juxtaposed against the “90 
American cruise nuclear missiles” (Palmer, 1982:1). The order of discourse 
continues to place the women in a patriotic role with “a mass shout of freedom went 
out to signal the world’s most powerful demonstration of peace” (Palmer, 1982: 1). 
In Fairclough’s interpretation, the language is fairly emotive and informal 
(heterogeneity in Fairclough’s terms), favouring the women’s actions. The next 
paragraph become more informal as the “demonstration of peace” becomes “the 
demo was good-humoured throughout” (Palmer, 1982: 1). Indeed, the order of 
discourse favours the women. There’s no mention of state representation, and the 
first direct quote comes from “mother of two Geraldine Adams from north London 
hung up nappies said they symbolise women in home” (Palmer, 1982: 1). The 
absence of comment from an official spokesperson or representative of the state 
continues on pages two and three. There are several direct quotes from “Rebecca 
Johnson, 28, who has camped outside the base for five months”, to “seven year old 
Georgia Brown who was there from Oxford with her dad and two sisters”, and 
“Pensioners Pat and Fred Sweeny who had travelled from Bognor Regis”; Pat and 
Fred were joined by “social worker, Jean Wilson” and “Mary a militant multiple 
                                                                                                                                                
were The Daily Mirror newspaper’s “Peace: the plea by 30,000 women” (Palmer, 1982) and the Observer’s 
“Peace women’s raid: 44 charged” (Bishop, 1983). These two articles were kept for analysis as they were on 
the front page and each covers the two actions.  
53 The Embrace the Base action occurred on 13 December 1982. 
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sclerosis suffered” (Palmer, 1982: 3). Each of these people works as a bridge 
between the text and a discourse of unity (intertextuality in Fairclough’s terms). The 
text signals a media discourse that supports the peace camp by providing a narrative 
through the different female voices.  
 
The second sample is the Dancing on the Silos action. Smith’s reporting of the 
Dancing on the Silos begins with a sense of subterfuge and underground activity as 
“dark figures of women in anoraks, trousers and scarfs emerged from the Berkshire 
woods where they were sleeping” (Smith, 1983: 4). Initially, the journalistic 
language creates two meanings, either dark and dangerous as the “dark figures” are 
emerging, but equally there’s an interpretation of fairies and goblins sleeping in the 
woods. Initially, Smith’s language makes it sound a little sinister, but then noticing 
they are wearing “anoraks” is hardly the balaclavas of block bloc54. The language 
reinforces the warlike action as “Silently, they pulled hidden metal ladders from 
under the gorse bushes and advanced against the target” (Smith, 1983) 
The order of discourse begins with the women, as “Nell Logan, a 73 year old 
grandmother, whispered to me that she was a little nervous, but determined to go 
over the top” (Smith, 1983: 4). After this quote, the language shapes the women’s 
actions as underhanded – the warlike stealth of the activists is reinforced with the 
mention of the “headlights of the military police patrol car”, who, later in the piece 
are, “joined by officers from Thames Valley force, begin to climb the mound in pairs 
to bring down the protesting women” (Smith, 1983: 4). Although in Fairclough’s 
terms there is normative identifying of the protesters as “women”, with the exception 
of “Nell” no other activists are named. The order of discourse gives the first voice to 
                                                   
54 Black Bloc is not a prescribed collective, but more a group of individuals who believe that “violence against 
the police” is a legitimate political tool, a form of self-defence against the state (Viejo, 2003:371), although some 
activists see the Black Bloc as “a tactic… a dress code. Nothing more” (K, 2001:31) 
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the protesters, but is soon replaced by official language of the state and a war 
discourse. The discourse shapes the protest as a clash with the police through words 
of “targets”, “over the top” and “bring down”, but this is all relatively localised in the 
“Berkshire woods” (Smith, 1983: 4).  
 
Glocalisation 
55
 (Fairclough’s term for local and global discourse) is very prominent 
in Bishop’s reporting of the same event. The piece opens with the normalising term 
of “Forty-four women peace protesters”. The reader is soon introduced to the global 
context of the base designated as “the American future missile base at Greenham 
Common” (Bishop, 1983: 2). Almost immediately, the order of discourse favours the 
state and military, as the women “were charged with common law breach of the 
peace”, they were detained by the police and “held in custody at police stations in 
Newbury, Reading, Slough and Oxford, over the weekend” (Bishop, 1983: 2). The 
listing of various geographical locations infers a widespread involvement of many 
police officers. Techniques of dominance are reinforced as the “women will appear 
before Newbury magistrates tomorrow” (Bishop, 1983: 2). These techniques of 
dominance are all in the first two paragraphs of the piece, which then returns to 
issues of the local and the global. The global context is reiterated slightly later in the 
piece as the United States is positioned against the local area: “step ladders were 
placed against the perimeter fence of the United States airforce base – where it runs 
along the well used road close to Newbury Race course” (Bishop, 1983: 2). 
 
Yet a quote later on in the story contradicts the earlier discussions of America storing 
missiles at RAF Greenham, to imply that America’s use of the base had yet to be 
decided. At paragraph ten (of 14) there is a direct quote from the protesters “they 
                                                   
55 This term stands for putting the local into a global context.  
195 
 
want to get them [the silos] finished before there is an election where there is a 
prospect of the missiles being rejected, said Deborah Law” (Bishop, 1983: 2). This 
contradicts the early comment that the base belongs to the USA, and also places the 
activists much lower down in the order of discourse than Smith’s story.  
 
There is also a clear sense of journalists using language about media discourse; that 
is, journalists talking about journalism. Bishop is a good example, as illustrated in 
“the women climbed into the camp with embarrassing ease, watched by 
photographers, reporters and TV cameras” (Bishop, 1983: 2). Furthermore, Bishop 
rounds off his story with a reference to the media discourse increasing the number of 
activists “many of the demonstrators yesterday were said to be recent converts to the 
cause…after the mass demonstration last month” (Bishop, 1983: 2). 
 
The three different news reports indicate a media discourse that initially supports the 
women. Following the first action, Embrace the Base, the tone changes to one that 
makes greater use of metaphors of war and a narrative that includes political and 
state discourses. The first protest is indicative of stable relations between the 
journalists and activists, but over time the order of discourse moves from the women 
only, to include observations on media discourse and law courts. The result is that 
media discourse places the protesters at the top of the order of discourse, but they are 
displaced by techniques of dominance. The reporting begins with a heavy 
concentration on quotes from the protesters, but as the article progresses, the voice of 
the women is replaced by direct quotes from representatives of the state (that is 
police officers and MPs) This increase in formal heterogeneity in the language also 
begins to criminalise the women. A similar pattern is found in the reporting of the 
roads protesters (1990s). 
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The second action, a month later (Jan 1983), saw the women enter the base and climb 
onto the top of the missile silos that held nuclear warheads. The headlines about this 
action applied more adjectives about the women’s actions, carrying more images of 
the women and police lines. The Dancing on the Silos event took place on New 
Year’s Day (1 Jan 1983). As a consequence, only a limited number of journalists 
were working the beat, and the newspapers first published the event on 2 January, 
which was a Sunday. There are fewer Sunday newspapers than weekday publications 
(seven on Sunday, eleven weekday national newspapers), which may account for the 
low number of articles. The action gained some reports (five in total) but no front-
page coverage, which tended to be focused on New Year’s Day celebrations. The 
Sunday Telegraph ran with a headline, “44 women invade air base” (Steven, 1983), 
the Sunday Times reported the event as “Peace women go over the top” (Smith, 
1983), and the Observer newspaper followed up the event with a count of women 
arrested: “Peace women’s raid: 44 charged” (Bishop, 1983). The News of the World 
focused on the number of women, “44 peace women held over roof demo” (Anon, 
1983).  
 
Sample Two: Swamp(ing) the Media 
The second sample is the case of activist Daniel Hooper, aka Swampy. As Paterson 
notes (2000) in his essay Swampy Fever: Media Construction and Direct Action 
Politics, in relation to environmental activism, “if you mention Swampy, people will 
know what you are talking about”. Swampy became “one of the most talked about 
figures in British political debate, and his popularity endured throughout 1997” 
(Paterson in Seel, Paterson and Doherty, 2000: 151). Moreover, film Director Emily 
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James in her film Just Do It: A Tale of Modern Day Outlaws
56
 (2011), predominantly 
about the climate camps, refers to Swampy as an iconic image of the movement. 
Swampy became a “folk-hero” (Paterson in Doherty, 2000) of the anti-roads 
movement. There were numerous other anti-roads protest from 1992 to 1997, 
including Twyford (1992), M11 Wanstead (1993), Bath Easton (1994), Newbury 
(1995), and later in the 1990s, the roads protest moved to support residents against 
the expansion of Manchester Airport (1997) (Howarth and Griggs, 2000). Despite 
Swampy emerging later in the decade, the entire movement was epitomised by his 
relationship with journalists. Two key protests were at Newbury and Manchester 
Airport. Newbury was the largest single road building plan, a critical part of the 
Conservative Government’s (that is, the 1979–1997 administration) £23 billion roads 
programme. The Newbury bypass was a large part of the “strategic transport 
connection between the industrial West Midlands and the port of Southampton” 
(Barry, 2001: 180). Linking the Midlands and south coast ports was outlined in the 
trans-European Networks plan.
57
 Thatcher’s “opening up” of Britain to European 
trade was a clear signal by the Conservative government to increase economic and 
industrial growth, at the expense of the environment.
58
 At the same time, government 
legalisation made protesting in large numbers a criminal act. The roads protest 
garnered much support from an interconnectivity between the roads protest/runways 
                                                   
56 This film caused friction in the movement, as the director initially filmed it through covert action. The title also 
attempts to hook into the folk hero discourse of Swampy, but created divisions within the movement. Many 
activists refused to watch the film (data from focus group, 9 August 2011). 
57 The Treaty on European Union first provided a legal basis for the trans-European networks. Under the terms of 
Chapter XV of the Treaty (Articles 154, 155 and 156), the European Union must aim to promote the 
development of trans-European networks as a key element for the creation of the internal market and the 
reinforcement of economic and social cohesion. This development included the interconnection and 
interoperability of national networks, as well as access to such networks. 
58 The trans-Europe network meant the carving-up of swathes of green-belt countryside. The M3 extension meant 
cutting through Twyford Down, in the heart of the Hampshire countryside, and not too far from Newbury. 
Other similar sites were the Bath Easton Protest (a new bypass around the city of Bath) and the A30 Fairmile 
bypass in Devon. However, not all protest sites were in rural areas. Whereas Twyford, Manchester, Newbury 
and Bath Easton all involved the coalescing of local residents and protesters in trees and tunnels, the M11 
urban protest took place in derelict houses, across streets and in makeshift squats. 
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movements and protests against the Criminal Justice Act (1994), the free music/rave 
scene and the new age traveller collectives. 
 
There were numerous headlines that focused on the “novelty” around the activists’ 
repertoires of tactics, and the tactics to “bear witness” (Della Porta and Diani, 2006) 
to the tunnelling were the focus of some news stories. Tunnelling is the building of 
tunnels under the proposed route, a tactic borrowed from Earthfirst!, that makes the 
ground unsafe to drive diggers and road building equipment over. Tunnelling was 
first used at Claremont Road, and reached “a whole new level of ingenuity and 
dedication at the A30 protest” (Aufheben in McKay, 1998: 125). Swampy was a 
well-known figure because he was in the deepest tunnel, for the longest period, and 
hence the most dangerous position. Couldry (2000) identifies “novelty” and location 
as one way of increasing the news value of events “not usually open to media 
coverage” (Couldry, 2000: 156). The tunnels, trees and protest site all make use of 
location to turn the event into a novelty news item.  
 
A search on the Nexis newspaper database with the key words “Swampy”, “A30”, 
“Manchester”, “Protest” and “eco-activism”, between the dates of 1 January 1990 
and 1 June 1998 returns sixteen results from national newspapers. The Independent 
and Guardian newspapers had the highest percentage of coverage (six and five, 
respectively), although only one story from each made the front page. The Daily 
Mail and Mirror newspaper groups (two each) were the next highest groups and 
there was one article each in The Times and Observer newspapers. However, much 
of the coverage outside of the Independent and Guardian was less than 300 words. 
The Independent led with headlines from “First it was tunnels, now it’s runways” 
(Aitkenhead, 1997); to “Going underground” (Gibbs, 1996) and “Risk grows as 
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Swampy digs deeper” (Jury and Schoon, 1997). As Paterson notes “Swampy became 
a byword for environmental direct action and youth disaffection from formal politics, 
often being used in headlines where he, as a person, never appears in articles” 
(Paterson in Seel, Paterson and Doherty 2000: 151). Swampy became synonymous 
with the roads protests of the 1990s.  
 
Here critical discourse analysis is applied to an article in the Independent newspaper 
“One week on, Swampy comes out blinking” (Jury 1997) and the Times newspaper’s 
piece “Last A30 tunneller emerges defiant” Fresco, A. (1997). The only tabloid 
coverage came from the Sunday Mirror newspaper, which commissioned Hooper to 
write a weekly column under the tagline “Britain’s best-known eco-warrior writes for 
the Sunday Mirror: You really dig our boy!” (Sunday Mirror, 1997). Swampy’s 
column had three narratives: (1) a self-mocking of his “celebrity status”; (2) a 
symbiotic relationship with local residents (this narrative reoccurs at the Heathrow 
Climate Camp and is discussed in the next chapter); (3) a justification for the protest. 
Swampy notes “we [protesters] met lots of people who would be badly 
affected…many were very middle class but have realised the democratic system has 
failed” (Hooper, 1997). This language reinforces the folk hero discourse. The Sunday 
Mirror shifts the focus away from the camp onto personality-led narrative, as in 
“Swampy’s camp is buzzing with rumours he’s about to be signed up by Hollywood 
to work on a film of his life story” (Sunday Mirror, 1997d). Note that it has become 
“Swampy’s camp” and not the camp or site of protest. The move away from 
autonomous collectives to a personality-led focus made “Swampy a household name, 
as well as altering public perceptions of new environmental movements and their 
objectives” (Griggs and Howarth, 2000: 62). The glut of excess publicity removed 
any discursive space of political debate (Jordan, 2002). The impact of focusing on 
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one protester devalues the efforts of the camp. As Swampy emerged from the tunnel, 
his first direct quote was “I’m alright – I had plenty to eat” (Jury, 1997), and Ian, a 
fellow tunneller at the A30 site, “agreed to come out if he was given a cigarette, cup 
of coffee and a chance to speak to the press” (Jury, 1997).  
  
Ball’s report “Swampy: a tunnel star undermined” (1997: 3) for the Independent 
newspaper highlights how media discourse had become central to the narrative 
around the roads protest. The second sample “Risk grows as Swampy digs deeper” 
(Jury and Schoon, 1997: 1) has a similar theme. Ball’s piece begins in a similar 
manner to Palmer’s reporting on the Greenham Common Peace camp, “three 
protesters against the A30 road development… Swampy, 23 was at least 30 feet 
down…[a]16 year old girl known as animal and a colleague John Woodhams, 24” 
(Jury and Schoon, 1997: 1). 
 
In both samples, the boundaries of representation move away from the activists to 
either a third person, or the journalists speaking on behalf of the activists. In Jury and 
Schoon’s piece, the first direct quote from an activist comes two-thirds through the 
article. The activists comment comes after the sheriff discussing the possible collapse 
of the tunnel – “undersheriff Trevor Coleman said yesterday ‘this is obviously a 
matter of great concern” (Jury and Schoon, 1997: 1). The boundaries are clearer in 
Ball’s piece in which the first instance of official language is from an author “Writer 
Michael Fordham attacks the Newbury bypass tunnellers and folk hero” (Ball, 1997: 
3). This war metaphor is maintained when “fellow protester, Alan, an ex-Para, who 
fought with Swampy to prevent the new runway” (Ball, 1997: 3) is discussed but not 
quoted directly in the story. The piece then returns to Fordham for a final quote that 
describes environmental activists as “people who have led troubled lives and for the 
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most part the sub-culture of the camp is their only family” (Fordham in Ball, 1997: 
3). Ball’s piece links the new age traveller movement with the environmental roads 
protest and the metaphor of war – “new age eco-warrior” (Ball, 1997: 3). 
 
However, what is clear in both pieces is this notion of journalists talking about 
journalism as a theme of the reporting. Similar to Bishop’s observation, Ball’s piece 
opens with a clear indication that media discourse is part of the narrative “the surge 
of publicity that turned Swampy the environmental protester into a media celebrity is 
now creating waves of unrest among underground supporters” (Ball, 1997: 3). Jury 
and Schoon also focus on media discourse “if media cameramen were allowed to 
film the men emerging from the tunnels – at the end of what is now the longest road 
protest in Britain – the demonstrators would be satisfied their point had been made” 
(Jury and Schoon, 1997: 1). The implication of journalists talking about journalism 
places media discourse within environmental discourse, as an additional discourse 
that influences meaning and the will to truth.  
 
Journalists use the term “Swampy” as a node to give meaning to environmental 
activism, through their use of language as an interdiscursive practice. For example, 
Richard Littlejohn’s recent article on the Occupy protest movement carries the 
headline “Move over Swampy, it’s us who should be protesting” (Littlejohn, 2011). 
There’s also “intertextuality” (to borrow from Fairclough’s interpretation, although 
not his neologism) in an article on the No Third Runway campaign, which declares: 
“New wave protesters target airport expansion: University educated campaigners are 
learning lessons from Swampy and the 1990s road protests” (Milmo and Bowcott, 
2008). Indeed, Hooper also took part in the Heathrow climate camp. The Sunday 
Mirror, once an advocate, was quick to dismiss his effort: “Swampy joins airport 
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camp: (but goes to sleep at his mum’s)” (Hodgson, 2007). Another Swampy 
supporter, The Independent, reiterated the folk hero discourse as “The return of 
Swampy underground eco-hero joins the Heathrow protest” (Owen, 2007). Hooper’s 
presence caused friction in the camp, much to the annoyance of other protesters – 
“The Standard [London Evening Standard newspaper] actually interviewed Swampy 
about Heathrow” (activist Steve  in an interview, 2011), “…he was on television. 
That was embarrassing” (activist Michael, 2011). Indeed, post-2005 collectives 
learnt from the journalists’ treatment of Hooper by developing media tactics that 
ensure that the focus moves from one protester (as will be discussed in Chapter 
Seven).  
 
The two examples set out so far, Greenham Common Peace Camps and Swampy, 
were both articulated around one-off big events. The next two examples are annual 
events and they shift the temporal and historical discourse of the movements. Up 
until now, these actions have taken place before the incorporation of global justice / 
anti-capitalist discourse into environmentalism.  
 
What can be concluded from the Swampy instance is the focus on an individual as 
both a trope for a movement, and as environmental discourse focused around 
individual action, a parody of green governmentality. Swampy’s longevity in the 
tunnel generated a large volume of media coverage for its novelty on the news 
agenda. Comparing this sample with the reporting of Greenham Common Peace 
Camps, there are clear divisions between the two camps. Greenham Common Peace 
Camp was very much about one voice of the camp, the collective voice.
59
 From the 
                                                   
59 Anecdotally, informal discussion with Sasha Roseneil (26 June 2012) on the Greenham Common Peace Camp 
revealed that some journalists had abandoned their media work to join the camp. However, the journalists 
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early days, the mantra of the peace camp was “we have no leaders here, all the stars 
are in the sky” (Abraham, 1988), whereas the Swampy sample shows how much 
focus was placed on the individual. In Foucauldian terms, these two forms of conduct 
can be understood in terms of the peace camp being a “conduct of conduct” under the 
collective action, whereas Swampy was conducting himself for the benefit of the 
movement. Swampy was the only time one individual spoke for the entire 
movement, subsequent action, up until the climate camps (see Chapter Six), meant 
many activists spoke as collectives with one voice.  
 
Sample Three: The Global Justice Movement and Violence  
The third “moment” looks at the May Day protests (2000–2004) centring on protest 
from 2000 to 2002. The May Day protests began as a combination of anti-capitalist 
and environmental discourse. The first May Day event, Guerrilla Gardening (2000), 
aimed to highlight issues around environmental discourse. The action followed large-
scale demonstrations which coincided with meetings of the G8, World Bank and 
World Trade Organization (WTO) across the globe, as “Eco-warriors and Swampy’s 
friends” became “anarchist anti-capitalist” (Plows, 2002). Unlike the Greenham 
Common Peace Camps and the anti-road campaigns that centred on “big events”, the 
May Day protests and later the Camps for Climate Action occurred roughly the same 
time over consecutive years. There were five May Day protest events, each taking 
place on 1 May in London. Similar protests took place across the world aided by the 
growth of the internet as a communication tool. Prior to the first May Day protest, 
there had been two other global justice/anti-capitalist protests in London (J18, 
                                                                                                                                                
found it difficult not to be a “star in the sky” and to speak as a collective voice. It was a skill some journalists 
learnt, whilst others left the camp.  
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N30).
60
 The movement gained global attention in Seattle, USA (1999). The protest 
against the World Trade Organization, World Bank and the failure to ratify the 
Kyoto Protocol in Seattle introduced the global justice movement to the world’s 
media.  
 
Given the vast range of articles, this section will highlight a mere few, and as with 
the earlier examples, attention will focus on two stories as representative samples of 
the reporting as a whole. From the sample there were thirty-two articles across four 
years that focus on the anti-capitalist / global justice protest (2000–2004). Due to the 
volume of articles and length of time, the years 2000, 2001 and 2002 will be given 
priority. There were twenty-nine articles, with the highest percentage from years 
2000, 2001 and 2002. As with the overall criteria, there was a second round rejecting 
any articles that did not appear on the front page or initial news section, were 
comments or editorials, or were predominantly images and lacked text. For example, 
the Daily Mirror (Harris, 2001) and Daily Mail (Nawar, 2002) newspapers carried 
full-page spread images of protesters clashing with police but limited text. The 
articles chosen were taken from the Times, Independent and Daily Mail newspapers 
as these (a) were front-page coverage, and b) carried the greatest number of words. 
The articles are “100 held as thugs riot in London anarchy” (Lee, Peachy, Urquhart, 
and Tendler, 2000: 1); “Veggie burgers, militant cyclists and rain” (Boggan et al., 
2001: 1); “Rain rescues capitalism from spiked hair horde” (Cobain, 2001); and 
“4000 police tame May Day militants” (Allen, Craven and Taylor, 2002).  
 
The protests of 2001 and 2002 are worth examining to see if recurrent events are 
reported differently to one-offs; and secondly to see if the terrorist attacks of 9/11 
                                                   
60 J18 and N30 signal two dates of other global justice movement activism in the City of London. J18 stands for 
18 June, the protest before Seattle. N30 stands for 30 November, another protest day. 
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had any impact on representation of environmental activism. The activists behind the 
Guerrilla Gardening took their lead from the earlier Reclaim the Street movement, 
turning public urban spaces into green havens. The protest began with a Critical 
Mass cycle ride meeting with fellow activists in Parliament Square. A camp was 
established on Parliament Green, and activists began planting flowers and other 
greenery (including marijuana plants). A slice of turf was placed in a Mohican style 
across the head of a Winston Churchill statue. This is a form of culture jamming,
61
 “a 
generic name given to a range of activities which seek to re-work and 
reconceptualise elements from mainstream culture in order to make some kind of 
satirical comment” (Gilbert, 2008: 96). The Churchill incident drew cries of outrage 
from the tabloid newspapers as “Riot yobs desecrate Churchill monument” (Sullivan, 
2000: 1) and “Rioters shame legacy of Churchill” (Black, Dixon, Mitchell, and 
Swift, 2000: 1–3). A discourse of moral panic dominates the Sun newspaper, with a 
call to “Find these animals”, as a “Riot rocks London” (Parker, Sullivan, and 
Whitaker, 2000: 4–5). Activists become “mobs” who “picked establishment symbols 
and McDonald’s for its rampage” (Parker, Sullivan, and Whitaker, 2000: 4–5) or 
were a “reasonably behaved mob looking for a catalyst” (Vidal, 2000: 3).  
 
A year later (2001) and the protest, titled “Mayday Monopoly”, had a greater 
emphasis on capitalism and consumption. Protesters attempted to echo the route of 
the Monopoly Game around the streets of London. The day of action saw “activists 
plan and carry out as many ‘autonomous actions’ throughout London” (urban75, 
undated). Many newspaper “articles ultimately bolstered the dominant frame of anti-
globalisation as a security problem, suggesting that without a heavy police presence, 
                                                   
61 The term originated from the Adbuster magazine (1999), which “elevated the term culture jamming into an 
entire political philosophy, albeit a decidedly incoherent one. Highly critical of all mainstream politics and 
commercial culture” (Gilbert, 2008: 97). 
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such events would not be peaceful” (Meade, 2008: 343). In her article “Mayday 
Mayday”, Meade (2008) notes the Irish Independent newspaper provided a highly 
charged inferential structure that anticipated violence. Readers were invited to adopt 
the subject positions of the security forces, or at least the security conscious, repeated 
discussions of the scale of the policing operation emphasised the gravity of the 
impending crisis (Meade, 2008: 341). This is very common, and there is a similarity 
in Meade’s findings with UK newspaper reports from the 2002 May Day protest. 
Moreover, this protest is part of a moment, because (a) it was the first protest after 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks and (b) it was the third established May Day protest.  
 
May Day 2002 was a more subdued affair. Termed “Mayfayre”, it centred on the 
large multinational companies and high-end consumer brands of the London area of 
Mayfair. Headlines ran with “4,000 police tame anarchists”. The protest never 
achieved its goal when protesters were penned in, or “kettled” by the police at 
Oxford Circus. This reflexivity measure by the state (technique of dominance in 
Foucault’s terms), is an example of the state controlling activists and limiting any 
protest. Metropolitan Police Assistant Commissioner David Vaness defended the use 
of such reflexive mechanisms as he claims, “we have high visibility policing and it 
will in effect be ‘in yer face’ policing with strong evidence gathering” (Nawar, 2002: 
7). Newspaper headlines iterated these reflexivity measures by defending the role of 
the police: “relieved police left to talk of love and peace” (Harding, 2002: 2–3), and 
Vaness’s comments are reiterated with the headline “In yer face” (Nawar, 2002: 7) 
and in the Daily Telegraph’s headline – “Police win May Day face off” (Steele and 
Pook, 2002: 1).  
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The two samples for the global justice movement are taken from the May Day 2000, 
and May Day 2002. These representative samples are intentionally pre- and post the 
terror attacks to establish whether the event in New York had an impact on UK 
media discourse. The two pieces are Lee, Peachey, Urquart, and Tendler’s front-page 
splash “100 held as thugs riot in London anarchy” in the Times newspaper (2000: 1). 
The story is accompanied by the Winston Churchill culture jam image. The second 
sample is from the Daily Mirror with the headline “In yer face” (Nuwar, 2002: 7). 
The discourse of journalists discussing journalism re-emerges as “members of the 
Sky news crew were caught up in the McDonald’s violence” (Lee et al., 2000: 1). 
However, what is clear from both is that boundaries are now set by the police, 
politicians and social commentators. The voice of the activists is almost completely 
removed, replaced by comments from “official” spokespersons. Lee et al. note that 
“Tony Blair condemned the mindless thuggery of the eco-activists” and that 
“vandalism was beyond contempt” (2000: 1). Blair’s comments continue, with the 
metaphor of war a re-emerging and repetitive theme, “in an angry statement the 
Prime Minister said ‘it is only because of the bravery and courage of our war dead 
that these idiots can live in a free country at all. The police must have full support of 
everybody in dealing effectively with them’” (Lee et al., 2000: 1). The Blair quote 
also reintroduces into the narrative the role of power. The call to support the police 
by “everybody” is, this work would argue, a technique of the self, whilst the activists 
become the abnormal – defined as “them”. There are numerous quotes and comments 
on the role of the police – with “nine officers injured”, whilst the police had spent 
“nearly six months planning Scotland Yard and the City of London Force” (Lee et 
al., 2000: 1). There is a similar theme in the 2002 reports, as “five police officers 
were injured” despite “officers dressed in riot gear” as “police charged 
demonstrators” (Nuwar, 2002: 7). Nuwar’s piece does contain one quote from an 
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unnamed protester to finish the article: “one demonstrator said “we’ve been walking 
around in circles for hours. The day doesn’t seem to have any focus” (2002: 7). 
 
After the May Day protest, the next major global justice / anti-capitalist protest was 
the “G20 Meltdown in the City”, 62  which saw a shift in the style of reporting. 
Journalists continued to use the same linguistic patterns, but also applied 
“convergence” (Hall, 1978) between protest groups. Reporters began linking radical 
protest movements to wider social issues. The linguistic style connects together (or 
labels) all the collectives (i.e. climate camps, environmentalists, anti-capitalists) with 
other (often more violent) collectives, which heighten or “escalate” (Hall, 1978: 223) 
a sense or threat of violence spreading across other parts of society. Journalists 
identify a specific issue or concern, and then link it with a “subversive minority” 
(Hall, 1978: 223). Reporting of the London G20 event made a convergence between 
collective environmentalists, Whitechapel Anarchists, and a university lecturer as 
one violent group against city workers. Newspaper reports in The Times (O’Neill, 
2009a, 2009b) advised bankers to “dress down” or “work from home” on “police 
advice” – for fear of violent attacks. The Times pre-empted the protest with threats of 
terrorism as “Hospitals all set for victims of G20 violence; London is braced for riots 
in City streets as protesters vent anger” (O’Neill, 2009b). Adjectives used to define 
the march included “alert” and “injured”, with protesters expected to “storm 
buildings”. Similarly, the Guardian’s phrases defining the day included 
“pandemonium”, “anarchist cells” and “resurgent anarchists” (Guardian, 2009: 4). 
This form of “converging” reaffirms the protesters as being outside of society, 
deviant and terroristic.  
 
                                                   
62 For further details, see also http://www.g-20meltdown.org/. 
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These different examples of critical discourse moments show that there was a shift 
from the relatively objective, folk hero discourse of the pre-1997 communicative 
events, to a stronger sense of an antagonistic relationship between the environmental 
activist movement and the state. The reflexivity mechanisms with the CJB and 
kettling are reflected in the traditional media’s support of techniques of dominance. 
This is backed up by the findings from the CDA of the different newspaper samples. 
The next section reveals the findings, and shows that as the state increases its 
techniques of dominance, environmental activists are placed into a discourse of 
deviance.  
 
Findings: Critical Discourse Analysis of Critical Discourse Moments  
The findings show a clear shift in the order of discourse post-1997. Prior to 1997, the 
order of discourse runs in chronological order from media discourse, activists’ 
discourse, and third, environmental governance as a discourse. Post-1997 there is a 
clear shift that places environmental governance as the dominant discourse, followed 
by media discourse and then activism as a discourse. These findings begin to show 
evidence of the earlier arguments in this work. Prior to 1997, there are thirteen 
articles that cover two protests (1982 and 1983) from the Greenham Common Peace 
Camps (1981–87). There were four articles rejected in the coverage of Greenham. 
The first two to be excluded were the Guardian’s “30,000 women at Greenham” 
(Brown, 1982), and Daily Express’s “The peace war” (Express Staff Reporter, 1982). 
The latter was rejected because it linked the Greenham Common protest with a 
Russian journalist to place it in a global context of the Cold War. Although the Cold 
War is used as a metaphor in the article, the fact that American missiles were stored 
at RAF Greenham means that the global framing in the article moves the story away 
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from specific British protests to a wider discussion of international relations. The two 
other rejected articles on Greenham were the Daily Express’s “Peace war that won’t 
go away” (Pratt, 1982) and the Observer newspaper’s “Peace women’s raid: 44 
charged” (Bishop, 1983). Articles retained for analysis focused on two events, the 
Embrace the Base protest (December 1982) and Dancing on the Silos (January 
1983). 
 
What emerges from a CDA of these moments are four themes: (1) motherhood, 
(2) journalism, (3) violence or the pre-empting of violence, and (4) terrorism. 
Overall, the order of discourse also shifts as the themes emerge. Early reports of 
environmental activism has journalists applying a neutral, objective language. The 
hierarchical order of discourse runs from activists and media to the state. In the 
Greenham Common reports the activists are defined as “women” and “protesters”, 
and a quote from “spokeswomen for the group said the action was designed to draw 
attention…construction of the silos had been speeded up” (Bishop, 1983). There are 
generic references to the state as the “judicial system”, “police” and “legal system” 
(Bishop, 1983; Palmer, 1982) and these follow the women and protesters. There’s a 
similar prioritising of activists in the Swampy reports. Jury’s (1997) piece starts with 
Swampy and protesters. The first quote in the piece comes from Swampy, followed 
by media discourse, then state – “police”, “PPP consortium – connect a privately 
funding and building the £75m road and the government repays the cost over the 
next ten years” (Jury, 1997). Post 1997 the order of discourse reaffirms the state as 
the dominant discourse, with a large concentration of “Scotland Yard 6,000 officers”, 
and “3,000 in reserve” (Cobain, 2001). There are “mounted police”, “police” and 
“violence” (Boggan et al., 2001: 1), but no mention of activists. Only the following 
year do activists clearly re-emerge in the order of discourse. Allen, Craven and 
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Taylor (2002) define activists as “hard core protesters”, “anarchists” and repeat 
Boggan et al.’s (2001) use of the term “militant” in the headline. Thus the order of 
discourse moves from activists being directly quoted to negating the activists’ 
position, and when they are defined, it is in terms of deviancy. The role of the state 
increases post-1997 and around 2000–01 there is little mention of activists in the 
order of discourse.  
 
This is reiterated through the “grammar” of journalists. Fairclough notes the use of 
sentence connectors “however”, “but”, “nevertheless” or “meanwhile” as “markers 
of the ordering of voices”, and in a sentence it “implicitly contrasts positive and 
negative sides” (1995: 82). In the earlier reports, journalists apply “but” to create a 
contrast between activists and local residents. It’s a technique used to divide and rule 
the activists. For example, Palmer (1982) applies “but” to juxtapose the women at 
Greenham Common Peace Camp with local residents, noting “but, not everybody at 
Greenham yesterday was happy” (1982: 1), whereas in the 2001 reporting “but” was 
used to mark out the dominant police position against activists: “smoke bombs and 
sticks were thrown but police in riot gear refused to allow protesters in or out” 
(Boggan et al., 2001: 1). “Nevertheless” is often applied to give authority to the state 
by these Independent newspaper journalists. Their use of the term, for example, in 
“Nevertheless, the wanton rampage anticipated – and criticised in advance by the 
Prime Minister, Tony Blair and the Mayor of London, Ken Livingston, were kept in 
check”. This flags up the pre-empting of violence, a theme that repeatedly emerges, 
from the Greenham Common protest reports to G20.  
 
Lee et al. (2000) note the organisational element of the state, when “After nearly six 
months of planning Scotland Yard and the City of London force had 5,500 officers 
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ready on the streets for trouble...and another 9,000 in reserve across London”. 
Meaning is shaped from official sources, as “the Yard had intelligence that a hard 
core of several hundred protesters was bent on using the demonstration as a cover for 
hit and run attacks”63 (Lee et al., 2000). As Boggan et al. (2001) say, “London was 
braced for riots and looting”, without any concrete evidence to substantiate the 
claims. Boggan et al.’s (2001) concentration on violence comes later in the piece. 
The first half of the article challenges the pre-emptive assumption of violence, yet 
the second half focuses on violence when:  
At Oxford Circus shortly before 3pm, it was here, if anywhere, that 
trouble was expected…a dark green R registered Jaguar car was 
damaged as protesters climbed on the roof and kicked the front 
bumper off the vehicle. BUT, there was no obvious damage to shops, 
many of which had been boarded up ahead of the demonstrations. 
(Boggan et al., 2001: 4) 
 
There is also a quote from an activist as “one protester, who gave her name as Spirit, 
said ‘this was always intended to be a peaceful day. The police provoked what little 
violence there was by their very presence’” (Boggan et al. (2001). The theme of 
violence echoes Halloran, Elliott, and Murdock’s study (1971) Demonstrations: A 
Case Study.  
 
When an environmental activist’s voice is heard the language is informal, colloquial 
and can be interpreted as depoliticising the event. Journalists’ focus on colloquial 
language detracts from the reason for the camp, by presenting a notion of casualness 
and disorganisation, in contrast to the organisational language of the state. A shift 
post-1997 also places the activists away from a discourse of motherhood and caring 
and into one of conflict. For example, up to 1997 the term “militant” is used 
                                                   
63 Intelligence here refers to the Special Branch Squad and the newly formed NPIOU (1999). This intelligence 
would have come from the undercover police officers, as discussed in Chapter Four.  
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sparingly, yet between 2000 and 2009 it occurs more regularly. In the coverage of 
Greenham Common and the roads protest there is a strong use of metaphors that 
indicate caring, mother earth, and eco-feminism. Journalists use metaphors of 
motherhood, the Women’s Institute (Greenham reports) and even Swampy’s “mum 
still loves him” (Jury, 1997). Protesters at Greenham and later the anti-roads 
movement are defined as “a mother of two” (Palmer, 1982). Two women of 73 and 
63 were allowed bail “because of their age” (Bishop, 1983), all of the participants at 
Greenham are referred to as “30,000 women” and, after their arrest, “44 women” 
(Palmer, 1982), and “peace women” (Bishop, 1983). This neutral definition 
continues, with the roads protesters referred to as “demonstrators”, “protesters” and 
“people in groups” or “groups of people” (Jury, 1997).  
 
From 2000 onwards, a metaphor around ritualism, male rituals, war, and conflict is 
common in the journalistic language. There is an increasing use of the term 
“militant” as in “militant cyclists and eco-warriors” (Cobain, 2001), and the 
Independent newspaper ran with a page-two headline “Veggie burgers, militant 
cyclists and rain” (Boggan et al., 2001). It seems also that vegetarianism is being 
linked to militancy, a less than subtle indicator of other links between animal 
activism and environmental activism. The Daily Mail declares that “May Day 
militants”, “Soho sex workers” and a “hard core” all took part in the 2002 May Day. 
This “amplification”, to borrow Hall’s term (1978), places the environmental 
activists into a framework that links numerous different movements, all appropriated 
through a discourse of deviance. This use of “noun-like” terms to define activists is 
what Fairclough terms “nominalisation”. This nominalisation indicates the wider 
move towards deviancy, and mirrors the political shift from the Conservative party 
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(under John Major’s (1992–97) and Margaret Thatcher’s (1979–92 premierships) to 
the centralised premiership of Tony Blair.  
 
Despite the order of discourse altering from the late 1990s onwards, journalists’ 
discussion of media discourse remains a constant in the order of discourse. In 
establishing the media order of discourse, it gives an indication of fixed or shifting 
boundaries, discursive practice within the media order of discourse, and relations 
between media order of discourse and “socially adjacent orders of discourse” 
(Fairclough, 1995: 205).  
 
Conclusion  
The critical discourse analysis has shown that the order of discourse affects the 
relationship between environmental activists and the state. A change in language 
from relative neutrality to a discourse of terrorism, places environmental activism 
into a discourse of deviance. The critical discourse moments act as nodal 
communicative events that create knowledge and meaning of environmental 
discourse. Over time, the production and consumption of knowledge around 
environmental activists is bridged through historical events to provide journalistic 
traits that rely on intertextual analysis. The production (and consumption) of text, 
contextualised within a critical theory of green governmentality enables us to identify 
a discourse practice that supports political discourse and creates socio-cultural 
practice that favours green governmentality. The media discourse supports the 
reflexivity measures that criminalise elements of environmental activism to reinforce 
knowledge that activists exist outside of society. However, the middle ground taken 
up by the media in the order of discourse provides ample opportunities for both the 
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state and the activist to contest the discourse of deviance, by actually utilising the 
media in a particular way. The next chapter will look at how the “novelty” of 
environmental activism enables the movements to create a heterotopic space 
(Foucault, 1995) that challenges both green governmentality and the order of media 
discourse. 
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Chapter Six: Fighting Back: The Internet and Heterotopia 
 
Communication isn’t about having words on paper, it’s about having words on paper 
you would like actually to read.  There’s no point having information because that’s 
not communication, communication is catching someone’s eye and having a 
conversation with them, you’ve got to add some journalism, make it shorter 
 (interview with visionOntv activist Hamish Campbell). 
Introduction 
This thesis has argued that as neoliberal policies increasingly linked environmental 
discourse to party politics, so environmental activists were placed into a discourse of 
deviance through legislation and media discourse. Journalists have consistently 
reverted to a pattern of framing environmental activists as deviant, and this pattern 
has increased as political discourse increasingly criminalises environmental activism 
through legislative measures. In Chapter Five, the critical discourse analysis showed 
how, despite a rather sympathetic leftist reporting of the Greenham Common Peace 
camp, there were undertones of activists as terrorists or deviant. This increased 
through the reporting of Swampy and became overt in the reporting of the May Day 
and G20 protests, juxtaposed with the increasing use of “eco-terrorism” as a label for 
environmental activism.  
 
Why, then, has the environmental activism movement survived in spite of the 
technique used to quash or curtail grass-roots direct action and radical politics? 
Despite the legislative measures that criminalise elements of radical protest, the 
environmental activism movement has survived in a variety of forms since the first 
environmental activists protests. From the vertical organisational realos (see 
discussions on environmental discourse in Chapter Two) of Greenpeace, Friends of 
the Earth and other NGOs, while the horizontal radical environmental activists have 
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continually reinvented themselves, with the most recent incarnation being the Camps 
for Climate Action.  
 
This chapter argues that the radical environmental activists’ movement has survived 
and grown for three keys reasons: (1) linking environmental discourse with green 
governmentality shifts environmentalism onto a greater global scale; (2) the 
emergence of the internet provides a global platform for protest and enables activists 
to bypass traditional media practices; and (3) the retention and development of 
protest camps creates a space (heterotopia) to challenge neoliberal co-opting of 
environmental discourse. The term “heterotopia” originates as an anatomical 
reference to parts of the body that are either “out of place, missing, extra, or, like 
tumours, alien” (Hetherington 1996: 35). Cultural theorists have translated the 
biological concept of “out of place, missing, extra”, to examine how “otherness” 
exists in society (Hetherington, 1996; Foucault, 1986; Saunders and Price, 2009). 
 
The co-opting of environmental discourse through a green governmentality lens into 
global economic and political policies such as the Kyoto Protocol (see Chapter 
Three) also placed the environmental activists’ movement onto the global stage. 
What is problematic about a green governmentality approach is that it cannot be a 
universal rule applied to all. Governmentality and green governmentality can only 
work in relationships between the individual and the individual state. Moreover, with 
the emergence of the WTO and IMF, and the internet, many state-led policies 
became meshed into global policies (as discussed in Chapter Three). Secondly, the 
World Wide Web enables local protest to become globally recognised. The Internet 
provides a new platform for various activists’ movements to engage with protest 
outside their own countries (such as the Zapatista movement, Mexico, or 
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Oberservatree in Australia), taking them from the local to the global. Yet, despite 
Castell and Klein’s (see Chapter One) enthusiasm for appropriating the success of 
the Zapatista movement to the Internet, there were other factors to consider. There 
were other factors outside of technology , media practice and activism that brought 
the Zapatista to the world’s attention.  Collier and Collier, (2005) note how the 
“Chiapas had become host to independent and non-governmental organisations 
sympathetic to the plight of the peasant and indigenous poor” (Collier and Collier, 
2005: 454). Moreover a lack of desire to seek state power  was as Berger (2001) 
notes, “ another crucial difference between the Zapatista and earlier guerrilla 
movement is that the former do not seek to capture state power” (156). Berger goes 
on to say “Zapatistas can be defined as a postmodern political movement in that they 
are seeking to move beyond both the politics of modernity associated with the 
economic liberalism of the Mexican government and the Marxism of the cold war 
guerrilla tradition” (Berger, 2001: 155). The Zapatisata engagement with NGOs, 
indigenous groups and women’s rights, aligned them with wider social movements, 
and aided their support from the local to the global.. The camps become what 
Foucault called heterotopias, that offer an alternative solution to green 
governmentality. This chapter will draw together the themes of this thesis so far 
(discourse, governmentality, green governmentality and media discourse) to examine 
how environmental activism has retained a place within environmental discourse. It 
will do so through empirical research with interviews
64
 and a focus group, as set out 
in Chapter Two.  
 
                                                   
64 The interviews are with White Chapel Anarchist Martin; cyclist and Critical Mass regular attendee, Des Kay; 
Clown Liberation Army and author John Jordan and Greenham Common activist, Barbara Tizzard. These 
individuals were important for their personal contribution to the moments. 
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The rationale for a focus group is twofold. Firstly, Stubbs in Poole (1997) and 
O’Halloran (2003)65 argue that CDA lacks any ability to show “causal links between 
particular textual features”, and that without any direct research “data is needed on 
readers’ thought processes” (Stubbs in Poole, 2010:148). Secondly, the use of a focus 
group aims to address the concerns raised that a critical discourse analysis begins at a 
pre-emptive stance, and that, as the findings of Chapter Five show, the voice of the 
activists has been lost within media discourse.  This chapter will therefore draw on 
focus group data with different activists from various collectives, each of whom had 
an integral role at the Camps for Climate Action. 
 
The first section of this chapter will draw on Foucault (2007) and Death (2010a and 
b) to examine why resistance exists within power relations. This will then illustrate 
how resistance emerges from radical activists through the concept of heterotopia, 
followed by a discussion on how the internet has provide a virtual heterotopia that 
enables activists to move from the local to the global and bypass traditional media 
reporting. The final section will look at what happens when a protest camp moves 
away from a heterotopia. 
 
Resistance and Power Relations 
In Security, Territory and Population, Foucault discusses how “we might describe 
resistance to processes of governmentality as distinct from revolts against political 
sovereignty or economic exploitation” (Foucault, 2007: 196). He argues that political 
uprisings against economic disparities, protest against living standards, human rights, 
divisions in wealth (such as the 99% Occupy protest) are common, but protest and 
                                                   
65 See discussion in Chapter Five about what is problematic with CDA. 
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revolts against forms of political governance rarely register. Resistance to 
governmentality is a different form of resistance from economic exploitation or 
political sovereignty, as it is often about wanting to be governed in a different way. 
Resistance occurs, for Foucault, when power and politics are interlinked through the 
practice of governmentality, and, as earlier discussion shows, there is a power 
struggle between activists and party politics over environmental discourse. Politics 
and power are central to resistance because “everything is political by the nature of 
things; everything is political by the existence of adversaries. It is a question of 
saying rather: nothing is political, everything can be politicised, and everything may 
become political. Politics is more or less than that which is born with resistance to 
governmentality, the first uprising, the first confrontation” (Foucault, 2007: 390). As 
Death notes, “resistance against a pre-determined politics or system” (2010b: 235) 
often occurs at times of “heightened conflict across the social system”, which 
produces “intensified interactions between challengers and authorities which can end 
in reform, repression and sometimes revolution” (Tarrow, 2005, 153). 
 
Foucault defines these “points of resistance” (Foucault, 2007: 194) as “movements 
whose objective is a different form of conduct, that is to say, wanting to be 
conducted differently, by other leaders and other shepherds, towards other objectives 
and forms of salvation, and through other procedures and methods” (Foucault, 2007: 
194). Resistance to governmentality seeks a different way of being ruled that remains 
within the boundaries of governance – what Foucault calls “counter-attacks, or kinds 
of reaction…are we not dealing with the same phenomena in reverse” (Foucault, 
2007: 195). There is always “resistance to political discourse and power, and in every 
epoch, or a crisis of governmentality it is important to ask what forms these counter-
conducts take in the current crisis in order to define new modalities of struggle or 
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resistance” (Foucault, 2007: 389–90). By counter-conduct Foucault refers, not to 
dissent, resistance or revolt – all terms he rejects in preference for a term that “in the 
sense of struggle against the processes implemented for conducting others; which is 
why I prefer it to mis-conduct – which only refers to the passive sense of the word, 
of behavior, not conducting oneself properly…the word ‘counter-conduct’ enables us 
to avoid a certain substantification allowed by the word ‘dissidence’” (Foucault, 
2007: 201–2). In other words, Foucault’s preference for counter-conduct as a term of 
resistance is akin to acts of dissent, such as civil disobedience, over overt anarchic 
action. Thus counter-conducts often have the same objective as governmentality, but 
seek answers and solutions in alternative ways. That is, the climate camps seek a 
solution to climate change that negates green capitalism, as a counterpoint to the 
state’s solution through green governmentality found in ‘revolts of conduct’ 
(Foucault’s term). Resistance comes when those who resist unite with similar 
collectives and movements to form what Foucault terms a “revolts of conduct” 
(2007: 194). 
 
Revolts of conduct often occur at large gatherings around environmental governance. 
These “mega-protests” (Death, 2010b) provide platforms for understanding how 
“Political clashes and counter-conducts are not simply a battle of ideologies or 
worldviews, but involve wars of position and movement between particular forms of 
action. Repertoires of protest are clearly invented, inherited and learnt… they are 
also produced and shaped by the forms of government they confront” (Death, 2010a: 
241). Death shows that although most “social movement literature has tended to 
conceptualise resistance as the act of opposing power” (2010a: 235), and this 
“Literature on governmentality and resistance have remained largely separated. This 
disconnect can be redressed through a return to Foucault’s lecture series” (Death, 
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2010b: 32). A Foucauldian approach to many protests reveals that “a counter-
conducts approach focuses on practices and mentalities of resistance, rather than 
movements, and also seeks to show how power and resistance, government and 
dissent, are mutually constitutive” (Death, 2010a: 240). Moreover, counter-conduct 
“captures the close interrelationship between protest and the forms of government 
they oppose” (Death, 2010a: 235). Counter-conducts may echo the forms of 
government they confront. They have also developed tactics and strategies that 
“acted as transgressive and carnivalesque spaces in which normal social identities 
and codes of conducts are inverted and subverted. Yet protests have their own 
discursive norms of behaviour- of conduct” (Death, 2010a: 241). Governments and 
protesters depend on an inversion of how the other applies Foucault’s notion of 
conduct – “just as government depends upon the creation of governable subjects, 
such as the liberal citizen, the infirm, the delinquent, the poor, the dangerous and the 
terrorist, counter-conducts subvert, reproduce, and invert these categories” (Death, 
2010b: 32). Death shows that counter-conduct exists through repertoires of protest. 
To take it a step further, the current research found that the repertoires of protest 
exist within a certain space, and once they remove themselves from that space they 
lose any chance of challenging governmentality. It is within a heterotopia that these 
“revolts of conduct” (Foucault, 2007: 194) (when conducts are linked to other 
conflicts) exist.  
 
Environmental activists create a form of resistance to “power as conducting” through 
the heterotopia of the camp. They resist the green governmentality, top-down, 
economic-led way of conducting individuals to address climate change in favour of 
another form of conduct – horizontal, consensus, deep ecology networks. They 
challenge the power of conducting through their own forms of resistance (direct 
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action, civil disobedience, site of contestation) to offer an “alternative” (heterotopia) 
way to be conducted. This research concurs with Foucault’s argument that the revolt 
of conducts is not “merely dealing with the same phenomena in reverse, from the 
negative or reactive side” (Foucault 2007: 195). To show how UK environmental 
activists act as resistance to governmentality, the next section will discuss how the 
space of the protest camp exists as a heterotopic space. 
  
Protest Camps as Heterotopias 
Foucault argues that each heterotopia acts as a “real place, places that do exist, and 
are formed in the very founding of society – which are something like counter-sites” 
(Foucault, 1986: 24). These counter-sites sit “outside of all places” (Foucault, 1986: 
24) to exist in a space between a utopia and the real. The space acts as a mirror to the 
real world, made from ideas in the real, but the mirror transposes neither a true nor 
utopian reality, but an alternative. The space works as a mirror held up to show how 
existing society works, but as a slightly distorted, opaque image, of an alternative. 
For example, the week-long Camps for Climate Action were devised to show the 
potential of an ecology-based society outside of neoliberalism, as an alternative to a 
green capitalist society.  
 
However, a heterotopia is not a fantasy place, neither is it wholly real – it is 
“connected with all the space that surrounds it, and absolutely unreal” (Foucault, 
1986: 25). Foucault argues (1986) that what differentiates an alternative, counter or 
minority space, are the five principles of a heterotopia, which are (1) crisis, 
(2) determined function within society, (3) several sites encapsulated into one space, 
(4) a slice in time (heterochronies) and (5) openness to manipulation and alternative 
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directions (Foucault, 1986: 24–26). The first principle of a heterotopia is crisis – a 
space occupied by people who live in society but who are in a constant state of crisis. 
For Foucault, crises are “adolescents, menstruating women, pregnant women, the 
elderly” (1986: 24). A crisis heterotopia is a space that is “outside” of society, but at 
the same time held up as a mirror to show the flaws and discrepancies in any society. 
For example, if the state imprisons activists, it places them into a space outside of 
society, but still within a societal system (such as the prison). Heterotopias also play 
a role of having “determined function within society” (the second principle of 
heterotopia).  
 
Each heterotopia has a “precise and determined function within a society, and the 
same heterotopia can, according to the synchrony of the culture in which it occurs, 
have one function or another” (Foucault, 1986: 25). The “determined function” of  
the space current environmental activist movements exist in is to be the radical flank 
in society. Gupta defines the radical flank as the role of “radical groups [who] pose a 
threat to the interests of the State or to other external actors by advocating extreme 
and politically unpalatable goals, and/or by pursuing those goals using transgressive 
(often violent) methods” (Gupta, 2002: 5). Thus it can be argued that the radical 
environmental activist movement (such as horizontal networks) will be seen as the 
most extreme (deviant) elements of environmental discourse. In addition, within the 
movement, the anarchists are seen as the most radical element (radical flank). 
Depending on the cultural or political context, each movement can be framed as 
having different functions over time. Always existing as the radical flank, these 
functions can be “terrorists”, “activists”, “eco-celebrities” or “hippies” (such as the 
first environmental activism), depending on the dominant discourse.  
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Moreover, the radical environmental activist movement is made from a plethora of 
politically diverse collectives. The multiplicity of movements exists within one 
space, because a heterotopia is “capable of juxtaposing in a single real place several 
spaces, several sites that are in themselves incompatible” (Foucault’s third principle 
of heterotopia, 1986: 26). When these various groups gather together with one 
objective (such as a climate camp), the heterotopia works at full strength 
(heterochronic) at the moment when activists “arrive at a sort of absolute break with 
their traditional time” (Foucault, 1986: 26). For example, not all activism is a full-
time role, activists often have jobs or families to raise. Each action takes time to plan 
around the everyday, when they come together it reinforces the heterotopia. The 
protest camp becomes a unifying space that, regardless of external factors, is united 
though a common objective, such as stopping a road building or educating people in 
ecological cultures and lifestyles.  
 
However, one problem with heterotopia is its propensity to be open to manipulation 
and alternative directions (the fifth principle of a heterotopia). A heterotopia “always 
presupposes a system of opening and closing that both isolates [it] and makes [it] 
penetrable” (Foucault, 1986: 26). Szerszynski notes that radical environmentalism is 
a “cultural politics which operates not simply by marking and performing the 
boundary of its own form of life. It does so in such a way that beckons those outside 
its boundary, hailing them with a moral claim that one should be on the inside” 
(1999: 212). This illustrates Roseneil’s ideas about whether activists can ever truly 
be both inside and outside of society. Roseneil (1995) defines this difference as 
“internal” and “external” modes of action. An internal mode of action is how 
individuals act together to constitute a collective, regardless of contrasting 
ideologies; but there are outward representations through external modes of action – 
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the ways they (social movements) confront the outside world and their political 
opponents (Offe, 1987 cited in Roseneil, 1995: 71). For example, the women at 
Greenham Common were physically outside the bases, and outside in the camp, but 
they were also outside of their traditional family or homemaker roles. A more 
contemporary example is the Camp for Climate Action at the G20 Meltdown protest, 
which, in April 2009, set up a camp in the streets outside the European Climate 
Exchange. The European Climate Exchange was set up as a subsidiary of the London 
Stock Exchange to facilitate trading in carbon emissions. The street became a 
heterotopic space because both the Exchange and activists are looking to tackle 
climate change; one through economic means, the other through social solutions. The 
activism exists outside (physically and metaphorically) of the buildings. The camp is 
juxtaposed to the material symbols of wealth, whilst representing an alternative to the 
green capitalism of carbon and emissions trading.  
  
Howarth (2006) observes that “whilst the inside can be constituted through excluding 
or demonizing the outside (an enemy to be demonised or a state of anarchy to be 
feared) the outside is not necessarily an other whose otherness threatens to subvert or 
overflow from the inside” (Howarth, 2006: 119). The Greenham Common peace 
women were demonised by the men to the point of fear in two ways. Firstly, the 
activists demonise the outside, men, in the case of Greenham, the state and big 
business for the global justice and climate camp movements, to constitute the social 
space of the camp. Equally, the state demonises the activists for fear of a state of 
anarchy (through a discourse of deviance) as one activists notes: 
 
A group of international peace people came over and set up a camp 
…after a while there was the most terrible row and a group of men 
rushed into the camp saying we’re going to get these peace people…I 
could hear them slashing tents, you know, knives. When they came to 
mine, luckily they just pulled it up and slashed across – they didn’t 
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either see me or they didn’t think there was anyone in there, but then 
the next guy who was Dutch bloke left his tent unzipped and they just 
kicked his face in, it was, you know he was really badly 
damaged…very quickly the police arrived, somebody, of course there 
weren’t mobiles, somebody outside must have phoned them. 
(interview with CND and Greenham Common activist Barbara 
Tizzard) 
 
Despite the ordeal, there’s a clear distinction between the camp as “inside”, while 
help and others are “outside”. Resistance to governmentality comes from inverting 
the “conduct” through “a counter-conducts approach focuses on practices and 
mentalities of resistance, rather than movements, and also seeks to show how power 
and resistance, government and dissent, are mutually constitutive” (Death, 2010a: 
240). Activists place themselves outside of society, and inside heterotopias as space 
to practise “mentalities of resistance”. They can never remain “outside” as the 
objective is “mutually constitutive” (Death, 2010a: 240) in achieving the same goal – 
the elimination of climate change. Governments achieve this through techniques of 
self and dominance, whereas activists have the same goal through the heterotopia. 
The space is measured, semi-organised, unlike a “temporary autonomous zone” 
(TAZ) (Bey, 1991), spaces that exist as individual islands in society.  
 
Briefly, TAZ are islands of “mini-societies living consciously outside the law and 
determined to keep it up” (Bey, 1991). They are lawless, in an anarchic rule-less 
sense, and neither engage with the state nor remain a permanent situation. A TAZ 
can be a space that emerges only to dissipate just as quickly, and in the process 
“liberates an area (of land, of time, of imagination) and then dissolves itself to reform 
elsewhere” (Bey, 1991). It is easy to see why an environmental protest can be 
understood as a TAZ, for it may appear to be an ephemeral protest that is soon 
disassembled, only to re-form elsewhere. Yet, there is more to environmental protest 
than a “here today, gone tomorrow” spectacle. Each protest draws on strategies, 
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practices and discourses from earlier actions, it re-works old practices (see Plows, 
2006) to re-emerge with new forms, founded in a historical process. Instead of 
defining environmental activism as happening in a TAZ, it is more useful to say it is 
a heterotopia. However, a heterotopia, unlike a TAZ, whilst existing outside of the 
norms of society, also mirrors contemporary society to the point of suggesting an 
alternative, or counter-society (Death, 2010a). 
 
Having set out how activists create a heterotopic space, compared to an ephemeral 
TAZ, the space of the camp attempts to situate itself within the binary position of 
“inside” and “outside” society. What happens within the heterotopias, it will be 
shown, is how and why environmental activists continue to resist green 
governmentality as the dominant environmental discourse of climate change. Each 
heterochron retains the practices, rituals and quasi-organisational structure of the 
movement. Drawing on Hetherington (1996, 1997) and the idea of liminoid 
practices, and Doherty (1999) and Della Porta (1999) the next section examines how 
technological advances have enabled the longevity of activisms to challenge media 
coverage, as discussed in Chapter Five. The internet enables activists to “become 
another device in the strategic toolbox of the environmental movement for gaining 
mainstream news media access”, “bypassing traditional media” (Hutchins and Lester, 
2009: 580–81). The final section will examine what happens when activists change 
their practices and values to move out of the heterotopia, and the subsequent 
consequences for the movement.  
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Environmental Activism and Heterotopias 
The pluralist and egalitarian nature of the environmental activist movements means 
they constantly evolve through repetitive “forms, dramaturgy, and distinct aim” 
(Foucault, 2007: 196). The “act of protest”, the spectacle and “image event” (Deluca, 
1999), rely on a series of strategies and tactics built on the historical evolution of the 
environmental activist movements. These actions can be described as “liminoid”, as 
opposed to liminal, rituals within a heterotopia. Liminal ritual, put simply, can be a 
rite of passage, or a marker that indicates a change in individual status. Liminal 
rituals are associated with ceremonial practices such as marriage, christening and 
funeral and are often ascribed by social order (Hetherington, 1996). Liminoid rituals, 
on the other hand, are “achieved rather than ascribed…weaker as sources of social 
integration…and created out of spaces during particular events” (Hetherington, 1997: 
32). These liminoid spaces are associated with “political protests that have a strong 
carnivalesque element” (Hetherington, 1996: 43). They form the basis of the practice 
of protest. As tactics and repertoires of protest emerge out of the space of particular 
camps a toolbox of tactics is created that forms the foundation of both the heterotopia 
and the movement. For example, activists use “consensus decision making” (Camp 
for Climate Action Handbook, 2009: 10), in which all voting processes are excluded, 
no one wins or loses, decisions are made through a series of hand signals. For 
example, many global justice (1990s) and environmental activist movements (1990s 
onwards) apply hand signals as a non-linguistic communication tools. Five key 
signals are: (1) the blocking of a proposal (a fist); (2) a request to make a direct 
response (both index fingers raised); (3) a point of order or clarity (single index 
finger raised); (4) a technical point (a two-handed “T” shape); and (5) general 
agreement, which is indicated with the waving of both hands (Camp for Climate 
Action Handbook, 2009: 10). Anecdotally, climate camp activists shared such 
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practices with NGOs at the Kingsnorth camps, as HACAN Chairman, John Stewart, 
notes: “they adopted our working practices like consensus decision making. Saying, 
‘It was amazing, we’ve never had meetings like this, they are so fast, so efficient,’ 
you know, they really loved that actually, our working practices” (interview with 
John Stewart, August 2011).  
 
Hetherington draws on the new age traveller movement to show how “the nomadic 
New Age Traveller who travels to sites such as Stonehenge [is] engaging in a 
liminoid rather than liminal ritual process of identity transformation” (Hetherington, 
1996: 37). Moreover, “the use of heterotopic spaces, such as Stonehenge, which act 
as sites of social centrality for those who attempt to transform their identities through 
transgressive and carnivalesque performance…and through the shared sense of 
belonging that underlies their identification with one another” (Hetherington, 1996: 
39). The shared sense of belonging is achieved through liminoid practice to help 
define the identity of the environmental activists’ movement as a heterotopia.  
 
The festival is a liminoid social occasion in which the norms and 
values of society are overturned and a new code of behaviour 
established…such festivals have generally been held on 
common land sites, the sites of old medieval fairs or at a pagan 
site like Stonehenge. It is the sites of such festivals that can be 
described as heterotopia. (Hetherington,1997: 42) 
 
And, as with the Stonehenge and the roads protest, as Doherty notes, the protest 
camp becomes a “a heterotopic space in which it becomes possible to express a new 
way of life” (Doherty, 1999: 13). The physical space itself is part of the process, 
because unlike a lot of protests, environmental activism occurs at the site of 
contestation. Each cycle or heterochron, such as the Greenham Common Peace 
Camps, roads protests, and the anti-capitalist (outside banking institutes) protests are 
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held at the source of the issue. Be it a proposed road route, a new runway, military 
site, the South China Sea, 99% of environmental activism occurs at the site of 
contestation. Thus the protest camps occur at sites of contestation, creating a 
liminoid practice of the environmental activist movement. For example, the first anti-
roads protest against the M3 extension at Twyford Down “saw the first use of an 
action camp at a road construction site, it saw the convergence of the rural ‘New Age 
Traveller’ subculture with the direct action environmentalism” (McKay, 1998: 81). 
Protesting at the site of contestation “allows for identification between an uncertain 
place and marginal and uncertain identities, eclectic, shifting and ambivalent in 
composition, to develop” (Hetherington, 1996: 43). On several occasions 
heterotopias are as seen as liminal spaces held together both by ritualised access and 
by fostering a sense of community through various practices. The site of contestation 
becomes the “symbolic sites of Otherness… through the rituals of festivals, allows an 
identity to be fully expressed” (Hetherington, 1996: 42). That identity is expressed 
by bringing together “a collection of unusual themes (or discursive statements), and 
give them a unity of meaning through the production of a space, that acts 
symbolically as a site for the performance of an alternate mode of social ordering” 
(Hetherington 1996: 38). A further impact was to shift the political ground:  
 
The roads protest, along with some other recent forms of direct action, 
involved a dispersion of politics. On the one hand, political activity 
was spatially dispersed… by developing an inventive form of 
demonstration, it was possible, however imperfectly and momentarily, 
to reveal something which would have been otherwise unknown to 
others. (Barry, 2001: 192–93) 
 
This work suggests that the sites of contestation were the first liminoid practice, 
which acted as “obligatory points of passage within the network of social spaces that 
should be viewed as successful heterotopic sites” (Hetherington, 2001: 52). Each 
protest, from Greenham Common to the climate camps, exists as a heterotopia (that 
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is offering an alternative to nuclear war, green governmentality) by drawing from 
specific historical tactics so that “those who make these places their own…attempt to 
take on attributes of uncertainty and ambivalence presented by the alternate orderings 
of such places when performing an ordering of their identities in liminoid ritual 
practices” (Hetherington 1996: 38–39).  
 
Dominated by direct action as a means to “directly change perceived political, social 
or environmental injustices…by using their bodies to occupy a space or to harm 
people or damage property” (Doherty et al. 2003: 670), activists have developed 
tactics and strategies as a repertoire of protest within the heterotopia. In his paper, 
“Manufactured Vulnerability: Eco-Activist Tactics in Britain” (1999) Doherty 
identifies three factors to have “influenced the development of tactics by protesters” 
(1999: 9). These are (1) situation (site of contestation as this work defines it) – the 
terrain and the relationship with the local residents; (2) values and adopting a tribal 
identity (similar to Hetherington’s rituals argument); and (3) the ability “of 
opponents to adapt to earlier tactics” (Doherty, 1999: 9). Many of the road protests 
were situated at places of outstanding natural beauty, wildlife habitats, or, in the case 
of the Claremont Road, Leytonstone, east London, understood in terms of “social 
destruction of an east London community, bisected by a road intended to bring 
commuters from outside London” (Doherty, 1999: 9). Once the space was defined, 
within that space, tree-camps and tree-top walkways would be built. Homes would 
be established in the tree tops, a practice also common in Australia and North 
America. Activists tended to either live in trees or tunnels, each working as a 
demarcation of the space, without the necessity of a physical fence or wall.  
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Alongside the protest camps, which make environmental activism unique within 
environmental discourse, the second most common tactic at the heart of 
environmental activism is direct action. Van Der Zee notes “direct action is not one 
specific tactic but rather a spectrum of them” (2010: 172). Direct action is a practice 
shared with the vertical environmental organisations such as Greenpeace, and for 
radical environmental activists is a tactic that reinforces the heterotopia through 
historical practices and “liminoid social occasion” (Hetherington, 1996: 43). For 
example, the Newbury bypass protest (1996) reworked “forms of spectacular protest 
remembered and developed at Greenham [and] figured in the Newbury action” 
(Barry, 2001: 181); Plows (2006) notes in her study on the Blackwood protest,
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“tactics remembered by older activists were passed onto new ones, from camp 
maintenance, section 6's, tree climbing and walkways, fighting the legal process, 
through to the simple joys of stopping work by getting in the way of machinery” 
(Plows, 2006: 13). The emergence of the anti-capitalist/global justice movement 
(from 1999 onwards) meant the “tactical repertoire of the environmental movement 
was expanded in the 1990s by alliances forged in the course of the roads protests, 
and direct-action was legitimised by their apparent success” (Rootes and Saunders, 
2007: 131). Direct action in the space of each protest camp worked as a heterochron 
when activists “came to realise that each direct action was raising the cost of the 
subsequent construction and that, in the end, though they might not save one 
particular woodland, the struggle might save a woodland in the future” (Jordan, 
2002: 64). In the most recent cycle (Tarrow, 2005), some members of the climate 
                                                   
66 A road protest at Blackwood, South Wales, during February–April 2004. Approximately two miles of road, 
costing £56 million pounds, were scheduled to destroy an ancient, and extremely beautiful, stretch of woodland. 
Extremely well-informed local campaigners had contested the scheme for 11 years through the usual legal 
channels, and 11,000 people signed a petition (Plows, 2004: 464). 
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camps’ (2006–10) media team were children at the Greenham Common Peace 
Camps.
67
  
 
Other repertoires of protest include tripods and locking–on (both borrowed from 
North America and Australasia) (see Chapter One), and “spiking”,68 borrowed from 
the Earth First! movement. Each of these tactics over time shapes the heterotopia. 
Moreover, Della Porta claims that, as tactics, there needs to be a series of “logics”, or 
“modes of operation that shape how protests form and succeed” (1999: 172). These 
are (1) numbers, (2) material damage, and (3) bearing witness. The logic of numbers 
is very simply the greater the number of people protesting, the more power there is as 
an “indication of how much support the dissidents enjoy” (DeNardo, quoted in Della 
Porta, 1999: 174). The logic of material damage is “developed alongside those based 
on the logic of numbers or the logic of inflicting damage…activists are willing to run 
personal risk to demonstrate their convictions. Bearing witness is expressed through 
participation in actions which involve serious personal risk or cost” (Della Porta, and 
Diani 1999: 178). These may involve targeting machinery or the offices of large 
corporations, but rarely human life. The result is that environmental activism as a 
movement has developed as a discourse through liminoid practices, language, codes 
and rules (see Chapter Two). A person can arrive at a camp predominantly in the 
global north and, providing they know the discursive language and liminoid 
practices, can easily live within the heterotopia of that camp, regardless of 
geographical location.
69
 Whilst this work shares with Doherty (1999, 2003), Della 
Porta (1999) and Jordan (2002) the argument that direct action camps, logics, and the 
                                                   
67 Interview with Hamish Campbell, 9 August 2011. 
68 Spiking is the insertion of nails into a tree trunk designated for removal, The nails acts a barrier to the 
chainsaw, preventing the cutting down of trees.  
69 This observation is based on informal research by the author at the Florentine Camp, Tasmania, Australia. The 
Florentine Camp, along with the nearby Styx Valley protest is about logging in World Heritage Tasmanian 
forest. The second experience comes from observations at camps against logging for the 2010 Winter 
Olympics in Vancouver, Canada. 
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practices of protest remain stalwarts of environmental activists’ discourse, the role of 
the media, new media and cyberprotest (Pickerill, 2003) is central to how activists 
resist and challenge green governmentality.  
 
Media, New Media and Heterotopia 
New media provides two roles for the protest camp. Firstly, it enables activists to 
have both a physical space (that is, a heterotopia) and a virtual space. A recent 
development in the heterotopia of protest camps is the introduction of a media tent, 
media team, and the practice of embedding journalists in the camps to introduce a 
media discourse into the heterotopia. The virtual space provides a platform to 
challenge environmental discourse and the neoliberalism of green governmentality. 
Activists can create their own media, space and presence, whilst using the internet to 
organise and co-ordinate global protests. Both the physical and virtual exist within 
the space of the protest camp to reinforce the heterotopia of the protest camp, whilst 
challenging media discourse (as discussed in the previous chapter). The following 
section illustrates these ideas through a series of discussions on the role of social 
media within environmental discourse. 
 
As the earlier discussion by Death shows, a counter-conduct protest often “inverts” 
and “subverts” “normal social identities and codes of conduct” (2010a: 241). Protest 
camps, such as those that take place at a site of contestation, invert and subvert the 
relationship between activists and journalists. The heterotopia does not “exist in the 
order of things, but in the ordering of things” (Foucault, 1996: 38). The protest camp 
re-orders the relationship between journalists and activists by drawing journalists to 
the site of contestation, away from what Couldry terms the “media eye” (2000). 
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Media eye refers to spaces with a greater concentration of journalists and politicians. 
This means a higher chance of media coverage (Couldry, 2000: 156). For example, 
many non-environmental protests held outside the Houses of Parliament or in 
Downing Street are close to the media hub of the Parliamentary Press Centre, home 
to 300 journalists, and Millbank Tower with BBC and ITV studios. The anti-war 
protest against the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Countryside Alliance march in 2002, 
the Pensioners Rights protest in 2006, and the Make Poverty History
70
 campaign 
(2005), all occurred at “sites in the media eye” (Couldry, 2000: 156). None of these 
protests  is disconnected from the environmental heterotopias because, although they 
have the paraphernalia (banners, whistles, placards) of protest, they are, as Foucault 
observes, protest against economics, policy, work-force related, political decisions, 
and not about governmentality. Such protests are not suggesting an alternative 
discourse, as opposed to the heterotopia of the environmental activists’ camps, which 
are suggesting an alternative way of being governed.  
 
There is one exception to this rule in the direct action of the Plane Stupid collective. 
Plane Stupid, the anti-aviation expansion collective, utilised the media eye of 
Parliament to stage a protest against the proposed third runway at Heathrow Airport 
(February 2008). Activists climbed onto the roof of the Palace of Westminster to 
unfurl a banner proclaiming that Parliament was “BAA Headquarters”, while a 
second banner carried the web address for Plane Stupid. It could be argued that the 
protest created a heterotopia, because they drew on liminoid practices of the 
                                                   
70 The Make Poverty History campaign (aimed at cancelling the debt owed to the UK government by developing 
countries) is significant for its strategy solely of gaining media coverage, without including any people in the 
protest. The campaign involved painting their slogan (Make Poverty History) onto the grass of Parliament 
Green in Parliament Square. The only way to see the slogan was from the news cameras mounted on a 
building opposite the Houses of Parliament, which then framed the slogan with the Houses of Parliament in 
the background, without any need to organise protests. The Make Poverty History campaign thus effectively 
utilised the media eye to gain publicity.  
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carnivalesque, direct action and “locking on”. Activists intentionally dressed in 
tweeds to represent what they felt were the gentry of Parliament, and handcuffed 
themselves to roof railings. As Plane Stupid activist and HACAN chairman, John 
Stewart, notes: 
 
when the five or six people who went onto the roof of The House of 
Commons, they were very clear in the early meetings that we didn’t 
want headlines like that [points to London Evening Standard language 
of militant to describe activists] so even to the extent of what they 
would wear. A decision was taken that they would dress up like the 
sons and daughters of Daily Telegraph reader to attract those 
papers…it so happened that the Daily Mail actually came to them and 
wanted to do a feature. (interview with HACAN Chair, John Stewart, 
2011) 
 
There are similarities of liminoid practices, the carnivalesque, consensus decision-
making as tools “to try and use the media by subverting it, by using their own tools” 
(interview with John Stewart, 2011). Plane Stupid deliberately attempted to subvert 
the media by taking protest to the media eye to gain coverage from the many 
journalists and permanent television cameras around Parliament Square. In one 
sense, such action could be a heterotopia. The house was debating the proposed third 
runway, so theoretically it was at the site of contestation, although the direct action 
could be understood as a TAZ. The protest lacked the counter-conduct, it echoed the 
other protests in the media eye – calling for policy change, not an alternative, and 
this was reflected in the media coverage. Although the action gave Plane Stupid 
front-page coverage, much of the language focused on a discourse of terrorism (as 
discussed in Chapters Four and Five). The London regional newspapers: London 
Lite, the London Evening Standard and the London Paper all ran with an image of 
the protesters on the roof. Headlines announced, “Airport protesters make a mockery 
of Commons security” (Murphy, 2008), and “The graduate eco-warrior in Commons 
raid” (Mendick et al., 2008). The London Paper called the protest the “Storming of 
Parliament” and “Security alert at Commons: protesters scale Parliament” 
(Sutherland, 2008). However, in general, environmental activists’ heterotopias are 
often at places and areas “not usually open to media coverage” (Couldry, 2000: 156).  
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The effect is that the story or protest becomes a novelty for journalists, and there 
emerges an inversion of control over media and political discourse. The anti-nuclear, 
roads protest and later global justice protest all brought to public attention 
“something that would have otherwise been unknown to others” (Barry, 2001: 193), 
because, prior to the Twyford Down protest, “there was no national roads protest 
campaign at grassroots level” (Connelly and Smith, 1999: 99). A further reason the 
protest gained media coverage was the geographical locations. Barry notes that when 
direct action occurs away from the “centres of political authority, but in a diverse set 
of sites” the sites themselves become “places of political activity” (Barry, 2001: 
192). The Newbury and Twyford Down roads protests, as well as Greenham 
Common Peace Camps, were “only an hour’s drive from London and therefore easily 
reached by journalists” (Barry, 2001: 180). The geographical locale of the Newbury 
and Twyford meant more journalists were willing to travel to the story (within the 
south-east of England) and that gave the roads protest news value. In contrast, the 
A30 protest near Honiton, Devon (in 1997), received less media coverage, with most 
national newspapers taking reports from the Press Association, and only the 
Guardian sending one journalist down to the site (Barry, 2001: 258). Thus, by 
drawing journalists away from the media eye, and resisting governmentality through 
heterotopias and liminoid practices, the effect is to subvert the “symbolic hierarchy 
of the media frame” (Couldry, 2000: 163). The protest no longer presents itself to 
journalists and politicians; they have to come to the party. Yet, as the discussions in 
Chapter Five showed, even the techniques of “inversion” and “subversion” fail to 
remove activists from a discourse of deviance.  
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The emergence of the internet, websites and social media provided a new platform 
and new liminoid practice that activists could use to provide an alternative, 
predominantly through citizen journalism as a repertoire of protest. The internet 
enabled activists to challenge green governmentality by bypassing traditional media, 
and building global networks between activist groups. The strength of “different 
networks and campaigns [that] share the same struggles” consolidated “the ground 
from which anti-globalisation action springs…through continued focus of generating 
and building capacity at local group level; eco camps are useful way of doing this” 
(Plows, 2006: 26). The internet provided the next step for the movement to contest 
green governmentality. The next section will examine how the internet aided the 
global growth of environmental activists’ movements.  
 
The Internet, Social Media and Activism 
New technological developments aided the environmental activist movement, but the 
internet also aided the application of green governmentality. Initially created as a 
communication tool by the American military, the internet has subsequently aided 
the advance of capital and global communication. Creating new forms of 
communication and developing new technologies as part of “capital’s dream of 
superfast networks that will spread consumerism across the planet” (Notes from 
Nowhere, 2003: 65), the internet, and later, the world wide web, gave new 
opportunities for wider communications, greater networks and organisational 
structures – not just for capitalists but also for the activists’ movements. Whilst the 
creation of the internet allowed the spread of consumer capitalism, it also meant that 
activists could flourish in the “public part of cyberspace” (Lovink, 2002: 254). 
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The growth of the internet has benefited environmental activist movements by 
expanding their numbers (logics of numbers, to borrow from Della Porta) and aiding 
the easier co-ordination of tactics and skills. Two key global justice movement 
actions served to aid the global growth of activism: in the UK, the Global Justice 
Movement’s J18 protest, Carnival of Capital (London, 18 June 1999); and in the 
USA the Anti-World Trade Organization protest (Seattle, 1 December
 
1999). Seattle 
and London were united by what appeared to be a spontaneous anti-capitalist protest 
that emerged from nowhere. In reality, the two events were a highly organised 
protest as a “result of clear sets of mathematical principles and processes that govern 
a highly connected network” (Notes from Nowhere, 2003: 68). The protests had in 
part  been co-ordinated through a network of internet sites, emails and websites. The 
structure of the internet mirrors the networks of protest movements.  
 
This growth in communication meant activists’ networks in the UK could learn from 
other activists’ movements around the world, as “global networks of power and 
counter-power landed simultaneously to confront each other in the spotlight of the 
media” (Castells, 2009: 340). The most notable example is the Zapatista 
movement,
71
 which partly inspired the Global Justice Movement. The Zapatista 
movement was effective for its combining of “broad-based, local and national 
networks, run by communities, and linked internationally, by the Internet, have 
proved themselves capable of bringing together very large groups of people in very 
short spaces of time” (Kingsnorth, 2003: 75).  
                                                   
71 Canadian, Mexican and American governments drew up the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
framing it as an opportunity to lower trade barriers and provide opportunities for export . In reality, it led to 
lower subsidies to the indigenous populations, whilst opening up opportunities for large corporations. To 
appease the indigenous population, the Mexican government agreed to an amendment to the Treaty, and when 
the newly elected president, President Fox, sent the Indigenous Rights Bill to be passed in 2001, the Zapatista 
army (a group of farmers) travelled the 2,000 miles to the capital to address Congress. When they reached 
Mexico City they were greeted by 100,000 people. The mobilisation of thousands of people through the 
internet showed the organisational potential of the world wide web. By 2001, details of the Zapatistas’ protest 
against NAFTA had spread around the world via email, websites and blogs.  
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The internet provides additional tools for the environmental activists’ movement. In 
particular, it enables activists to bypass the traditional media and avoid the order of 
discourse that favours state over activists. The creation of alternative media (such as 
Indymedia, Schnews, etc.) means that activists can be both producers and consumers 
of news. The symbiotic relationship between activists and the internet shifts any 
action from local to global. Operating a website means that activists can provide 
information directly to journalists. As Castells (2009) notes, besides Indymedia, 
numerous hacklabs,
72
 temporary or stable, populated the movement and used the 
superior technological savvy of the new generation to build an advantage in the 
communication battle against their elders in the mainstream media (Castells, 2009: 
344). Indymedia was the first alternative news website for the movements. Activists 
believe they are subverting the original intention of the internet as a tool to spread 
consumerism, by “inverting” social media to bypass the state and police prevention 
measures:  
 
…just being able to upload something we’ve occupied, Manchester, 
Stanstead, Aberdeen airports, it’s been genius. You know, one of the 
things about the Aberdeen protest, they put a Fire Engine in front of 
the cage that we were in so that no media could see us, but by that 
time we’d taken our own photos and sent it out so “I’ve done it 
anyway”. So it’s been really useful. And of course there was the 
Twitter on the whole swoop and everything like that, so it’s been 
brilliant in many ways for organising actions and bypassing, A), the 
police and B), the powers that be, and C), the traditional media. 
(interview with Dan Glass, 9 August 2011) 
 
Thus, activists realise they need to source traditional media to increase citizen 
journalism but, equally, social media enables them to bypass the state. Moreover, 
today environmental activists exist in a virtual heterotopia, allowing them to organise 
                                                   
72 Hacklab is a computer hackers’ space. 
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the physical protest camps, and by giving reporters direct access to “action” through 
their website’s homepage, texts, social networks and citizen journalism. This 
“tactical” media approach allows activism to flourish in the “public part of 
cyberspace” (Lovink, 2002: 254), by blurring the boundaries between the traditional 
binary positions of the media and new media, and journalists and activists.  
 
The internet has become a pivotal tool for organising protests, informing the media 
or voicing opinion, and has become a “key ingredient of the environmental 
movement in the global network society” (Castells, 2009: 316). The World Wide 
Web provides the tools to enable the activist movements to develop their own media 
and political strategies, and has extraordinarily “improved the campaigning ability of 
environmental groups and increased international collaboration” (Castells, 2009: 
316). Activists are now able to use a new “global communications infrastructure for 
something completely different, to become more autonomous” (Notes from 
Nowhere, 2003: 65). Activists are reworking the technology by placing hackers and 
cyber squatters at the “forefront of the movement, freeing activism from the 
limitations imposed on their autonomous expression by corporate control of the 
media networks” (Castells, 2009: 345). The capacity of new technologies to support 
and sustain dispersed coalitions of protestors and new forms of political organisation 
has been witnessed in the anti-capitalism protests (J18 and Seattle in 1999, the May 
Day protests between 2000 and 2004) and similar “summit sieges” at the G8 
Conference in 2005 and G20 Conference in 2009. The internet, Web 2.0 and new 
technologies have aided the co-ordination of action by bringing together “hundreds 
of local organisations and the thousands of activists come to the local from the 
global” (Opel and Pompper, 2003).  
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For example, the 2009 Camp for Climate Action used an earlier activist technique of 
the “swarm” but organised it via SMS, email and blogspots, to co-ordinate a “swoop” 
on a pre-designated organisation in central London. The “swoop” and “swarm” are 
terms coined by the RAND Corporation (2002).
73
 A “swarm”, like the collective 
actions of swallows and similar birds, is used as an analogy to the protest movement. 
Like swallows, many protesters move en masse, each “moves as one, as if it’s one 
organism. Yet no-one is in charge, it seems to happen as if magically” (Notes from 
Nowhere, 2003: 67). Pre-internet days, a swarm would have been organised through 
word of mouth, limited direction and vague instructions based on Chinese whispers 
and a maze of symbols and whistles. For example, during the Carnival Against 
Capital (on 18 June 1990), 8,000 face masks were handed out to activists. The masks 
were of different colours and, on a signal (in this case a whistle) each colour (red, 
blue, green or black) would follow one person with a correspondingly coloured flag 
out of the railway station (Tyler, 2003). Later, with the internet, this was easily 
organised via text and SMS messaging. Technology makes the organising of a swarm 
or swoop much easier, as SMS messaging means that activists can arrange the events 
through tweets and smartphone messaging (Newlands, 2012b). Using mobile phones 
and a social networking site, it opened up the event, enabling anyone with an interest 
(including journalists and the police) to be part of the swoop, either physically or at a 
virtual level.  
 
A simple website is easy to produce and with little need for any “formal organisation 
behind it…used as a node for organising protest campaigns” (Tarrow, 2003: 30) to 
provide journalists with information. At the climate camps, documentary maker 
                                                   
73  The RAND Corporation is a non-profit institution. Its research is commissioned by a global clientele that 
includes government agencies, foundations and private-sector firms. RAND began in 1946 as a research 
project (Project Rand) backed by the US Army Air Forces. 
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Hamish Campbell at visionOntv website encouraged activists to produce their own 
news media. Anti-aviation expansions collective Plane Stupid’s communication 
strategy uses websites to provide journalists with direct access to protesters. Doyle 
(2009) observes how Plane Stupid’s website “constitutes its action…the website is 
action orientated…alongside press releases” (Doyle, 2009: 113). For example, during 
the Westminster Palace roof protest, Plane Stupid provided the mobile phone 
numbers of the activists on their homepage.  
 
“This perspective sees the web as an adjunct to conventional sources, rather than as 
an additional one” (Gavin, 2009: 136). Moreover, in a time-conscious environment, 
the media rely heavily on PR sources, and it could be extended to relying on protest 
websites, as “the pressure placed on them [journalists] to produce additional web-
based copy alongside conventional packages – with fewer resources and an infinite 
amount of time – can lead to a dependence on readily available PR sources that, 
some argue, compromises the quality and integrity of the resultant coverage” (Gavin, 
2009: 136). 
 
Websites, social media as an organising tool, technological developments, and the 
ability to invert media practices provides the radical environmental activist 
movement with tools to challenge the media and state representation that places them 
in a discourse of deviance. However, for the heterotopia to retain a position that 
supports the movement and challenges green governmentality, there needs to be both 
a physical and virtual presence. As activist Dan Glass notes, “You’ve been on the 
internet for 2 hours, 5 days, that’s it, get off! because it’s so easy to get sucked in” 
(interview 9 August 2011 ). The next section will examine how, in order to challenge 
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environmental discourse, activists have begun to engage with journalists to influence 
media discourse.  
 
Media Engagement: A Tactical Change  
A year before the first camp at Drax, activists made a conscious decision to introduce 
a media tent as a practice into the heterotopia of the camps. The climate camps were 
week-long protest camps with the objective of educating new protesters and the 
wider society on alternative ecologically focused lifestyles. The most significant 
moment came in 2005, when activists connected to the Dissent! network felt that, 
although the media are “part of the problem and not part of the solution” (CSC, 2005 
: 322), it would be a “mistake to reject the possibility of strategically using the 
mainstream media outlets to promote our ideas and tackle head on the discourses of 
politicians, corporations/recipients of such media coverage to think differently 
outside their own comfort zone” (CSC, 2005: 322). The activists chose the locus for 
the new encounter: the G8
74
meeting at Gleneagles, Scotland (2005), and the climate 
camp(s) (2006–present) into which the media were invited under specific conditions. 
In 2005, two months before the G8 summit, the “media group” had developed into 
the so-called Counterspin Collective (CSC). The main role of the CSC was to 
“facilitate media relations…like a sort of dating agency for journalists and 
activists…offering a network of translators so that press releases could be distributed 
in many languages” (CSC, 2005: 324). CSC introduced an “open hour” (CSC, 2005: 
324), when journalists were invited onto the site. The term “open hour” is perhaps 
contradictory, as there was a form of control over the space and the journalists. What 
                                                   
74 G8 is a forum for the governments of the eight largest economies. They were meeting at Gleneagles, Scotland. 
At the same time, Live Aid Two was taking place, bringing a greater number of international journalists to the 
UK. 
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emerged from this strategy was a clear definition of space and boundaries between 
activists and journalists, and also a form of control of the activists themselves. 
 
Like the direct action that marked out the early days of Greenpeace, the post-2005 
collectives such as Plane Stupid, the Climate Camps, So We Stand, Climate Rush, 
and others are actively engaging with traditional media. These contemporary 
collectives are repeating the much earlier media tactics of environmental activist 
movements, by providing good copy to journalists. Environmental activists 
understand that a “self-imposed isolation”, a tactic of non-interaction with the 
mainstream media, was a “luxury that we [activists] could not collectively afford” 
(CSC, 2005: 322). What was clear at the camp was how different groups utilised the 
space to conduct their own media strategies and campaigns. Additionally, creating a 
media team and engaging directly with journalists they are, to quote one activist 
“preaching to the converted” (interview with Nim Ralph, 9 August 2011). Activists 
engage with journalists from the Guardian newspaper knowing they will gain media 
coverage – “there’s always …Aww, just go to the Guardian” (interview with Dan 
Glass).  
 
In the initial days of the camp there was collegiality between the different radical 
groups. All the collectives agreed to exclude the larger professional environmental 
groups, such as Greenpeace, fearing it would detract from their purpose. Activist 
Steve notes at the earlier Heathrow climate camp: 
 
everybody wanted to get involved, including the mainstream NGOs 
[non-governmental organisations], some quite clumsily, like 
Greenpeace and some not quite as clumsily, like Friends of the Earth, 
and it culminated in, when we actually got to the camp, it was a media 
scrum, you know, the whole street was full of media and we had 
volunteers from NGOs in their personal capacities who did media for 
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those NGOs who came and helped us. (interview with Climate Camp 
and Rising Tide activists, Steve, 9 August 2011)  
 
The result was that the activists created their own media tent, firstly outside the 
camp, but over time the tent moved into the protest camp (McCrudy, 2009) and the 
role of gate keeping was brought inside of the protest camp under the remit of the 
“media tent” team. The tent formed the press centre for journalists, and was a nexus 
for the numerous media classes taking place. Protesters were offered workshops and 
leaflets on citizen journalism and its potential to shift away from negative 
representation. Workshops were run to “do media work, from making an online 
sensation with your mobile phone to staying on message” (Anon, 2009: 9). Footage 
was then uploaded with collaborative partners visionOntv. Climate Camp TV, part of 
visionOntv, ran a series of workshops at the camp, to encourage and train activists to 
produce their own news and commentary footage. Activists were given three 
different pamphlets, each setting out how to record a one-minute news item 
following the inverted pyramid structure. The media tent recommended adoption of 
the inverted pyramid form in order to maximise the chances of radical content being 
aired on the mainstream media. The media team were advised that “TV crews and 
press photographers are allowed in the camp between 10am and 7pm, so long as they 
have a friendly guide from the media team” (Media Team advisory, 2009: 12). Media 
spots could be arranged outside of these hours, providing journalists “are 
accompanied on and off the site” (Media Team advisory, 2009: 12).  
 
However, a consequence of media engagement was the focus on individual rather 
than collective action (see Chapter Five), which led to a depoliticisation. Activists 
therefore devised techniques to counter the focus on individualism. In order to 
prevent a repetition of what some activists felt was an embarrassing relationship with 
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the media during the Swampy reports, the aim was to challenge the reliance on 
journalists to define the protest camps.  
 
Swamp(ing) the Media: Lessons Learnt from the Road Protest Movement 
(1990s) 
Post-2005 environmental activists learnt from the media discourse around roads 
protester Swampy (see Chapters Two and Five for discussion on Swampy). Activists 
countered such depoliticisation with a media strategy to ensure their objectives 
remained. The move away from autonomous collectives to a personality-led focus 
made “Swampy a household name, as well as altering public perceptions of new 
environmental movements and their objectives” (Griggs and Howarth, 2000: 62). 
The climate camp media team, and other collectives such as HACAN and Plane 
Stupid, learnt that a focus on one activist could become problematic for the whole 
movement. 
 
One of the things was, if someone was in the media for a while, we 
accepted that for a they would go back…having been through the 
roads protest thing where the media did mess us up, kind of, big time, 
is, we had a very clear strategy from the very beginning how to do it, 
so we tried to be in control of what we were doing and without that 
strategy, of course we messed up from time to time, but without that 
strategy and that clear kind of vision it would have been quite 
difficult. (John Stewart, 9 August 2011) 
 
Dan echoes John’s views on the importance of differentiating between media 
strategies and other objectives as 
 
having a press strategy and movement building are often, 
incompatible. If you’re appealing to the press and movement building 
is often incompatible. So with Plane Stupid, which was a lot more 
media orientated than So We Stand. Plane Stupid never really claimed 
to be movement building, it clearly was a small group of people from 
quite similar demographics, and for me that was ok, but where, 
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because, So We Stand and Climate Camp and stuff; if you’re claiming 
to be joining the dots, supporting, movement building or stuff, you’ve 
got to pay vigilance to that, and you can’t be the same demographic of 
people, you can’t be empowering a few people, and so that’s why, I 
think it’s very, in terms of having media engagement, its, you’ve got 
to be very careful how it aligns with movement building or stuff like 
that. (interview with Dan Glass, 2011) 
 
Activists learnt from the “Swampy” episode to counter the depoliticisation and 
personality-led reporting by rotating “who’s in the media for the actions and then 
take a step back from the limelight, so it doesn’t become about the person but 
becomes about the issue” (Dan Glass, Plane Stupid, August 2011). A media strategy, 
media tent and the lessons learnt all adapt the liminoid practices within the 
heterotopy of the climate camp, and for activists meant that:  
 
Climate Camp only really had two things that I would call a success. 
That’s not to say that there weren’t other good things that came out of 
the two successes of it, and one is that, was Heathrow, cos I don’t 
think any of the other camps, none of them achieved their day of 
actions, none of them were long-lasting, none of them were engaged 
with the local community beyond the actual week of the camp and 
some of them more likely did more damage than good in that sense. 
Erm, and the other thing is that between Drax and Kingsnorth, I think 
it really did transform the discussion and the narrative of media 
around environmental and climate change issues. (Nim, So We Stand, 
interview August 2011) 
 
Activists believe that the media were less inclined to place activists into a discourse 
of deviance due to the increased use of citizen journalism. Citizen journalism was a 
way to adapt earlier repertoires of protest by inverting journalistic practice. Citizen 
journalism enables activists to apply journalism without professional markers, using 
inverted-pyramid journalistic techniques, sub-editors, and so on. Engaging with 
professional journalistic practices, the internet and associated technologies offers a 
way of altering mainstream media representation of radical protests. Today, activists 
are utilising the internet and Web 2.0 technology to produce their own news reports 
through citizen journalism. 
250 
 
 
Guardian journalist Paul Lewis’s article “Climate Camp gets a lesson in citizen 
journalism” (28 August 28 2009: 19) sets out the increased use of social media and 
citizen journalism as a repertoire of protest. The article focused on the use of social 
media by the activists and the workshops on citizen journalism. Focus group 
participants Hamish and Richard were both quoted directly – and feel they were 
misrepresented:  
 
Almost all the quotes in there I didn’t actually say. It’s very 
noticeable. I was going nuts…his [Lewis’s] attitude has changed; he 
was very dismissive of the radical media…He started out his career as 
a politician, dissing radical media to try and get himself onto this 
greasy pole, which he did make it up the top of, impressive. Doing a 
good job on the top of the greasy pole but actually completely 
misquoted just about everything. (interview with Hamish Campbell, 9 
August 2011) 
 
Fellow visionOntv activist Richard feels slightly differently, believing that 
mainstream journalists working with the media team aided the use of citizen 
journalism:  
 
The Climate Camp media team had strong connections with 
journalists, with traditional media journalists and knew the editor of 
The Guardian was interested in citizen journalism and therefore 
managed to get this piece. What I generally say is, not that I am 
misquoted there but when we do a presentation we like to try and be 
funny and they never put in anything funny… I’m quoted as saying 
something entirely boring, which I probably did say because it was 
important at the time. (interview with visionOntv activist Richard, 9 
August 2011) 
 
Despite a realisation that activist’ voices can be altered or “boring”, Richard noted 
the importance of traditional media coverage “we can’t do citizen journalism if we 
don’t get mainstream media pieces. Can’t get anybody to go to the courses because 
people don’t know anything about us, don’t trust us. Once you’re in the 
Guardian…then you’ve got a hundred more citizen journalists taking better reporting 
than Sky” (interview with Richard, 9 August 2011). Echoing the earlier discussions 
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on how activists are moving towards capitalist ventures, here Richard’s comments 
reveals that, despite being misrepresented, the media attention still produces capital.  
 
Not All Good News 
Pickerill (2003: 24) notes, “cyberspace has been likened to that of a rhizome”, where 
a “rhizomatic structure provides multiple entryways, facilitating potential 
participants’ entry into environmental activism through connections to their 
rhizomatic online networks”. The hypertextual architecture (Kahn and Kelner, 2003) 
of the internet as a non-hierarchical “rhizome”75 (Deleuze and Guattari, 1989: 7) is a 
linear network which connects any point to another point, understood in terms of a 
“non-signifying system without an organising memory as the Internet is reducible 
neither to the one or the multiple” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1989: 7). The rhizomatic 
pattern of the internet was and is useful for movements as it echoes the consensus 
politics of environmental activism. The internet is viewed by some activists as a 
mimetic platform for new social movements that correlates with like-minded, non-
hierarchical groups of people, linked through similar interests. However, others see 
problems of adapting mainstream media discourse into activist politics. The internet 
and World Wide Web may have opened up new media platforms, but they have also 
created divisions between the “older” and “younger” activists, and the radical flank 
of anarchists, who rejected total engagement with journalists at the camp.
76
 Saunders 
and Price (2009) note “within the [climate] camp, the main tension is between the 
                                                   
75
 The rhizome has been defined as“[a] multiplicity that has no coherent and bounded whole, no beginning or 
end, only a middle from where it expands and overspills. Any point of the rhizome is connected to any other. It 
has no fixed points to anchor thought, only lines, magnitudes, dimensions, plateaus, and they are always in 
motion (Deleuze and Guattari, 1996: 377).  
 
 
76 Some of the tents had a sign outside saying “No Media”.  
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ideal anti-authoritarian self and those more sympathetic to corporate – or state led 
solutions” (Saunders and Price, 2009: 118).  
 
Saunders and Price (2009) observe that there lies a tension which “will prove 
difficult to resolve: between those who believe states and corporations alike will end 
up hijacking the movement with promises of false, profit-orientated solutions, and 
those whom Monbiot accuses of seeking to ‘create an anarchist utopia and to use 
climate change as a way to achieve it” (Monbiot, 2008, in Saunders and Price, 2009: 
120). Journalists clearly felt the tension in the camp, exacerbated by the gatekeeping 
tactics of the media team. Journalists were advised by media tent members of rules 
such as asking permission before speaking to participants, observing the “media-free 
zones” and, if they chose to “stay for the duration of the camp…to wear press badges 
at all times” (Camp Handbook, 2009). Such gatekeeping practices led some 
“journalists to complain about being asked to sign ‘codes of conduct’…even though 
it is common land” (West, 2009).  
 
Going Online to Get Offline  
Environmental activists can “increase their chances of enacting social and political 
change – even if they start from a subordinate position in institutional power, 
financial resources, or symbolic legitimacy” (Castells 2009: 302). As Hamish 
Campbell notes, social media “are the best tool we have ever had”, but he is very 
cautious about embracing social media: 
 
I think, activists relying on them wholesale with such national naivety 
that I want to scream and jump…and the success of the corporate stuff 
comes at the price of the failure of the radical alternative stuff and the 
radical, alternative media is in the doldrums nowadays. I mean, 
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Indymedia almost doesn’t exist. (interview with Hamish Campbell, 9 
August 2011) 
 
Morozov argues (2011) that “the problem with political activism facilitated by social 
networking sites is that much of it happens for reasons that have nothing to do with 
one’s commitment to ideas and politics in general, but rather to impress one’s 
friends” (2011: 186) The internet shouldn’t be a solitary force for mobilisation of 
new political forms, but one factor of it, and “success is conditioned by many factors 
that have little to do with the internet” (Gavin, 2009: 130). Gavin (2009) observes 
that if traditional media sees the web as an add-on “an alternative transmission 
mechanism for these media, which are far and away the public’s most trusted and 
most often used source of political information” (Gavin, 2009: 138). The internet and 
various sources on the web “does not in itself constitute usable information, any 
more than usable information constitutes a contribution to knowledge or to rational 
debate” (Gavin, 2009: 138). Activist Dan Glass has similar ideas:  
 
I don’t think it’s the question social media is the problem in terms of 
intercultural organising for political change. I just think in Britain, we 
don’t have that cultural, intercultural organising; people stay in their 
different issues. Whereas in America you can say there is a lot more 
overlap between racial justice, environmental justice, gender justice, 
de, de, de, de, you use social media for the context whereas here, 
we’re all fighting our own battles and not. And now I think there is a 
change, and this is what So We Stand is about as well, it’s joining the 
dots and seeing the power structures and I think social media could be 
used for that, for intercultural organising, I can’t really see why not. 
(Dan Glass, 9 August 2011) 
 
Activist Steve adds that there is a need to: 
Do more face-to-face stuff and, whatever means necessary, we are 
going to go to the actual mainstream media is, with all the growing 
things that are coming, we need to continue to expose the role of the 
state, The state are complicit in this scheme with the media and with 
multinational corporations, and the power, the power that is out there 
isn’t held by governments, governments just set the parameters and if 
multinationals don’t like it in that little parameter, they’ll move 
somewhere else into another parameter. And I think the, ourselves 
need to do our own investigative journalism … I mean, for the Drax 
camp, we had a long, really long, difficult debate in Rising Tide as to 
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whether we should fly over 2 activists from the US, who were going 
to set up Rising Tide and the Climate Camp movement in the US. 
Eventually we did and, obviously sometimes you’ve gotta take a 
chance. Anyway, they went back and within 6 months, they had set up 
a 200 group network, in six months. And the way they did it was by 
tapping into existing networks, mainly of native communities, mainly 
of native communities that were already engaged in fighting 
something that they didn’t see as climate change, like mountain top 
removal for coal but was climate change and was literally as grass-
roots as you can get; and not just join these up within a Rising Tide, 
climate change, direct action network but put them in touch with each 
other. Amazingly, they weren’t even in touch with each other. 
(interview with Steve, August 2011) 
 
Put another way, “one cannot start with protests and think of political demands and 
further steps later on. There are real dangers to substituting strategic and long-term 
action with spontaneous street marches” (Morozov, 2011: 196). The internet and 
social media networks are a good reorganising tool, although “what people have lost 
in the social media hype, is the ability to have a chat. Too busy, got 3000 email to 
answer. No, no I’m not friends with you because you’re not on Facebook” (interview 
with Dan Glass, August 2011). As Morozov observes: 
 
While Facebook-based mobilization will occasionally lead to genuine 
social and political change, this is mostly accidental, a statistical 
certainty rather than a genuine achievement. With millions of groups, 
at least one or two of them are poised to take off. But since it’s 
impossible to predict which causes will work and which ones won’t, 
Western policymakers and donors who seek to support or even 
prioritize Facebook-based activism are placing a wild bet. (Morozov, 
2011: 180) 
 
Despite lessons learnt from the roads protests and heterochronic periods, such as 
rotating activists in the media spotlight, the reporting continued a depoliticisation of 
the movement. The presence of gatekeeping, the stalwarts of a media team and press 
officers led to antagonism with journalists and between activists, with the 
consequence that the protest camp was no longer a heterotopia.  
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Activists have come to realise that engaging with mainstream media brings a new set 
of problems, problems that have led to the dismantling of the kind of heterotopia that 
has protected and supported the movement since the days of the Greenham Common 
Peace Camp. The engagement with mainstream media discourse, the adoption of 
mainstream media practice, and the negating of earlier liminoid social occasions does 
in fact create another form of governmentality. The media tents create a hierarchy of 
top-down politics that begins to conduct the climate camp. The objective and history 
of the movement becomes lost, replaced by branding. In the next and final section of 
this chapter, this work will set out why it believes that climate camps, and 
specifically the Blackheath climate camp, shows that the movement is no longer a 
“revolt of conducts” or “counter-conduct”, or even a heterotopic space, but is a form 
of governmentality that the very values of the movement are attempting to offer an 
alternative, or counter-conduct to.  
 
Conformity, Non-places, and a New Governmentality 
The Blackheath Camp for Climate Action was the penultimate camp before a 
decision was made to end the annual national gatherings. Although the camps took 
place over a five-year period, over time, many of the original objectives were lost, 
diluted or disappeared. Slowly the camp began “losing touch with its anti-capitalist, 
anti-authoritarian roots and appears as a gathering that lends its support to top-down, 
state-centred response to climate crisis” (a group of anti-authoritarians, 2008 cited in 
Saunders and Price, 2009: 120). Those behind the camp realised it was fragmenting 
and dislocating from its original objectives. The end of the camp was announced 
through the common media practice of a well-crafted press release. The camp noted 
that as a movement it had ceased: 
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to be relevant, we need to move with the times…this closure is 
intended to allow new tactics, organising methods and processes to 
emerge in this time of whirlwind change, which they plan to achieve 
through the creation of interim working groups to manage the 
transition. The end of the camp was announced through a press release 
onto a list serve, and stated the camp although not finished it would be 
going through a phase of metamorphosis. (Climate Camp Media 
Team, 2011)  
 
The press release goes on to say they would develop “working groups” to address 
“ongoing communications plus learn from and document our experiences over the 
past few years” (Climate Camp Media Team, 2011). Each working group would 
investigate “new organisational forms, structures and tactics for possible next 
experiments”. 77  The language is not one of autonomy, or even environmental 
discourse, but a managerial, business language. The “working groups” are not 
offering alternatives to green capitalism or even green governmentality but appear to 
be searching for a move away from governing themselves and more towards a 
“different form of conduct” (Foucault, 2007: 194). They are no longer rejecting the 
notion of being “conducted”, but are looking to “be conducted differently, by other 
leaders and other shepherds” (Foucault, 2007: 194).  
 
The need to “metamorphosise” emerged when after five years the camp was no 
longer about challenging green governmentality; instead it was shifting its focus 
towards movement building. This work identifies a series of elements that led to the 
spilt, from the formation of a hierarchy, to generational differences, a lack of 
historical understanding of the movement and removal of politics. In addition, the 
issue of class became increasingly prominent. Activist Mike Camden notes:  
 
                                                   
77 This information was sent on 1 March 2011 via email to those signed up to a listserve. The email, entitled 
“Metamorphosis: A Statement from the Camp for Climate Action” sets out the rationale for not continuing with 
the camps. 
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After Kingsnorth there was such an obvious split, where you had 
some, debutante type, who was controlling the media and the 
spokesperson, and then when they finally got to the site, it was the 
stewards or whatever they were called, kept the group and made them 
turn around and march back which left a group of 20 to 30 people to 
scale the… and do the direct action… And by the time we got to 
Blackheath, it just seemed like the Climate Camp label was going to 
be a summer fixture. (interview with activist Mike, 2011) 
 
Echoing Mike’s comments, Rising Tide activists reaffirm his comments and note 
how the loss of liminoid practices led to the depoliticisation of environmental 
activism discourse by removing the objective of the gatherings.  
 
After Kingsnorth, it was such hell being there, that everyone was so 
exhausted that it defined a new definition of exhaustion really. It 
created a vacuum into which a lot of new people with different ideas, 
without any sense of history at all and without a lot of sense of 
consensus. I would say, and it became immediate, it became part of 
what I’ll call a marketing strategy up to and including the Blackheath 
Camp, complete marketing strategy: t-shirts, badges, stickers, 
participation in festivals and then when we get to Blackheath it 
became a festival. We had a sub-group, whose sole purpose was to 
book bands for the entertainment, and big bands came, named people 
came because it was cool to play at Climate Camp. (interview with 
Steve, activist,  August 2011). 
 
The “festival” of environmental activism discourse no longer has a politically 
determined function in society, as the camp’s role of resistance has been removed. 
As Steve notes, the camp lacked any sense of a history or historical practice. The 
liminoid social practices are lost as the camp moves away from a heterotopia. The 
“marketing strategy” is reiterated in the “Media Q and A: Camp for Climate Action, 
Summer 2009” leaflet given to activists. The nine-page handbook (Media Team 
advisory, 2009), covers the “key message and general guidelines” and advises 
activists on questions under various subheadings, such as “The Camp”; “Why 
London?”; “The Economy and Workers”; “Copenhagen”; “Policing”; “Direct 
Action, Disruption, Risk”; and “Solutions” (p. 1). A key theme to emerge from the 
document is the ideology that the camp was “building a new movement” (p. 1), a 
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term mentioned nine times in total. When speaking to journalists, activists are 
advised to “take control of the interview by bridging the key message” of linking 
political economy with climate change. The camp has four main objectives, with 
movement building a common theme in the media tent literature. The aims are to  
(1) take collective action, (2) demonstrate alternatives, (3) educate ourselves, and 
(4) build a movement for radical change.  The first three chimes with a heterotopia, 
the last aim is an indicator to why the camp disbanded. 
 
This form of conduct and “mentality” begins to indicate the shift towards the camp’s 
own form of governmentality. Activists are able to give their own responses, but the 
language guides them to “try and get as much of these as possible” (p. 1), “things to 
keep in mind” (p. 2); “current key messages” (p. 4) is the direction for discussing the 
key messages of the camp. The shift towards movement building means it can no 
longer act as a mirror or exist in the world between the real and unreal, it can no 
longer be a heterotopia (Foucault, 1989). At Blackheath, in particular, alongside 
activists there emerged a series of leaders who were unaware or uninterested in the 
history of the movement. However, as discussed earlier in this chapter, any 
heterotopia is both open and closed, both isolating and penetrable (Foucault, 1986). 
The challenge for the activists was not the control of their space but the fact that 
opening the site to journalists made them vulnerable to criticism that often cast them 
back into a place of “deviance” and depoliticisation of the movement. Reactions, as 
indicated above, ranged from acts of aggression against individual journalists to 
general ambivalence towards the media. Yet, far from regulating access for those 
attempting to enter from the outside, the “entry” requirements applied equally strictly 
to those on the “inside”. At the same time, openness has provided some activists with 
the opportunity to (1) engage in movement building; (2) alter the camp’s relationship 
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with journalists, thus removing any autonomy; and (3) in the case of Blackheath, 
move away from protesting at the site of contestation. 
 
Thus, the camp is no longer a heterotopia, or even a place of “counter-conduct” 
(Foucault, 2007: 75), nor is it a “movement whose objective is a different form of 
conduct” (Foucault, 2007: 194) looking to be governed – “not to be governed thusly, 
like that, by these people, at this price?” (Foucault, 2007: 75). Instead, it is 
increasingly looking to “capture the close interrelationship between protest and the 
forms of government they oppose” (Death, 2010a: 235). The lack of protest at the 
site of contestation, the creation of a media team and the fostering of a sense of 
community are more akin to managerial training for radical activism. Thus, 
Blackheath was less about a heterotopia and more about conformity.  
 
Journalists reported the camp in dismissive terms. The camp is defined as “the 
cheapest- and chic-est date in the summer festival calendar” (West, 2009: 30).  
Protesters are identified as being “of the “tree-hugging variety” and “children of the 
privileged” (West, 2009: 30), and “nice, white and middle-class…students who have 
made their way to Blackheath via a summer of Glastonbury, Inter-railing, camping in 
the south of France” (Fryer, 2009: 6). The camp is made up “of posh upper-class 
white people” and the camp “looks more like a gentle middle-class festival than a 
political training camp” (Fryer, 2009: 6). The opening-up of the camp to journalists 
meant that news stories were structured as being about young, affluent students 
uncertain of their political conviction, leading to a depoliticisation of any objectives 
to build a new movement. Indeed, much of the coverage asks why the protest even 
exists. If it is to highlight climate change, then it is “hardly a subject that lacks 
awareness” (West, 2009: 30). Yet there seems to be uncertainty in the rationale for 
260 
 
the protest, aside from it being an annual event which runs the risk of forming 
“climate camp, the institution” (Beaumont, 2009: 27). 
 
There are two key indicators that the camp was slowly beginning to conform towards 
a green governmentality approach, as already discussed: (1) the creation of a media 
team and a set of rules for journalists; and (2) the building of a fence around the site. 
Engagement with the media had unintended consequences: it highlighted internal 
divisions, brought to light power struggles running beneath the “common” cause and 
essentially altered the function of the space. What emerges from the above is the 
likelihood of division and dissonance, which seems to undermine the plurality and 
symbiotic heterogeneity inherent in Foucault’s definition. Activists need to find a 
voice or, as Chapter Five discussed, mainstream journalists will continue to position 
environmental protest in a negative framework. However, the media tent created 
friction both inside and outside the camp.  
 
At Kingsnorth we decided not to engage with the Climate Camp 
process at all and just set up the thing [visionOntv] and fuck the lot of 
them…So we were out of the programme or out of everything, but we 
were running this huge big tent, you know, producing tons of content. 
(interview with Hamish Campbell,  August 2011)  
 
Hamish also produces documentaries with Richard Herring, who shares his concerns 
to reiterate a move towards marketing/business discourse over environmental 
discourse. Now through media discourse the camp is mirroring green capitalism, not 
offering an alternative:  
There was a tension within the media team, therefore, because what 
was interesting is, Climate Camp itself then became the brand… 
Rather than it being a No-Brand Space, Climate Camp became the 
brand but we were doing it both as Climate Camp TV and as 
visionOntv. Now, because we do have a life outside Climate Camp, 
which is important as well, and um, um, so, so, so there was this kind 
of tension. I remember we put up a banner, and, and, and someone 
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came and took it down and replaced it with a Climate Camp banner. 
(interview with Richard, visionOntv, August 2011) 
 
This sense of PR and branding appears to have originated at the Heathrow 
Camp for Climate Action two year earlier. Rising Tide activists Steve notes the 
Heathrow camp was:  
 
the moment in time really, because it was when everybody wanted to 
get involved with the climate camp and in fact Drax has become a bit 
like the 1966 World Cup Final, where there were only about 60,000 
people there and about 300,000 people say they were there. But it was 
also then that the divisions grew and the divisions grew as a direct 
result of the media and everybody wanted to get involved, including 
the mainstream NGOs, some quite clumsily, like Greenpeace and 
some not quite as clumsily, like Friends of the Earth, and it culminated 
in, when we actually got to the camp, it was a media scrum, you 
know, the whole street was full of media and we had volunteers from 
NGOs in their personal capacities who did media for those NGOs who 
came and helped us. That really did piss off a lot of people who’d put 
a lot of work into it because it was as John said to stop a third runway 
and make sure that didn’t happen, but it was also to stop it by doing 
what we do with our aims and objectives for the Camp, and that’s 
when it got diluted and that’s when the anti-capitalist stance of the 
camp, which it always had and still does got diluted by these extra 
people, and it wasn’t their agenda at all but they didn’t care that they 
were joining a movement that had an agenda, they didn’t care about 
that, so that’s when those divisions started to occur. (interview with 
Steve, 9 August 2011) 
 
The decision in 2005 to engage with the media had several impacts on the discourse 
of environmental activism. The adoption of media stalwarts, press centres, 
spokespersons, media training, guidance documentation, citizen journalism, open 
hours, and rules of the camp abandons the liminoid social practices that define 
environmental activism. Visually, there are tripods and “workshops” on repertoires 
of protest, but the once quasi-structure is formalised for movement building, 
autonomy has been abandoned, and white-middle class “activists” wearing the 
branding and marketing products of the “climate camp” have come to dominate. 
Such fragmentation emerged early on as:  
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the use of physical space at climate camp is interesting in that the radical 
media and the traditional media team. At the first one, they pretty much 
shared the same space, it was pretty low key; in the second one they shared 
the same space, but I think they might have moved to the tent next door – the 
traditional media team; the third one, they shared the same space for the first 
two days and then I think they separated; and the fourth one they were just… 
(interview with Hamish Campbell, 9 August
 
2011). 
 
 However, unlike subverting the media eye, the camp is adopting the capitalist 
practice epitomised in the fencing around the camp. A perimeter fence was built 
around the entire camp. This was a fairly new development and signals another move 
away from the heterotopia and liminoid social practice. Fences have become 
symbolic of struggles between state and activists, from the Greenham Common 
Women’s Peace Camp “inside” the camp, but “outside” the nuclear base. The cutting 
of fences to gain entry to coal-fired power station, airport runways, etc., played a 
significant metaphorical and physical role in the movement. The cutting of a fence is 
a breakdown of the barriers between activists and another party. Yet at Blackheath 
the camp put the fence up themselves. This is an act of conformity; the activists are 
controlling and containing themselves, without relying on the state or police to 
contain them. The fence was only broken at a controlled point (the entrance) 
monitored by “gate crews and comms team” (Climate Camp Handbook, 2009). 
Activists believed they needed to protect themselves from the police, who were 
taking a hands-off approach through Operation Bentham.
78
 
 
This approach by the police, partly in reaction to the death of Ian Tomlinson at the 
earlier G20 climate camp, was unusual. There had been violent clashes between 
activists and the police in the past. For example, the “Battle of the Beanfield” was a 
                                                   
78 Operation Bentham was the “Met’s response to the Camp for Climate Action 2009” (Metropolitan Police, 
2009). It is surely no coincidence that the name of the operation reflects Jeremy Bentham’s concept of the 
panopticon as a disciplinary method of surveillance (one suspects a Cultural Studies graduate had a hand in the 
title!). Police were “camped’ in a cherry picker overlooking the site, and community officers entered the camp.  
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police raid on a convoy of new age travellers on route to Stonehenge. What ensued 
was a clash between the police and the travellers that led to many converted vehicles 
being damaged. Yet the traveller movement (and later the roads protesters’ camps) 
did not build fences at subsequent protests, and the openness (the fifth element of 
heterotopia) was still central to many environmental activist camps. Seen through a 
Foucauldian lens, the fence can be seen as a means of the activists conforming by 
controlling access to the site, and, as Foucault notes, once incarcerated and observed, 
the “convicts” begin to “behave” (Foucault, 1991: 14). 
 
Conclusion  
The concept of heterotopia provides a useful way to think about the spaces in, and 
through which the environmental activist movement contests neoliberal green 
governmentality. Various liminoid practices such as direct action, provide a media 
spectacle whilst inverting the traditional relationships between activists and 
journalists. Unlike the direct action of realos such as Greenpeace, the fundis or 
activists build short- and long-term camps and communities as an alternative space. 
As activists define an alternative space they create a discourse that challenges the 
neoliberal approach adopted through green governmentality. Despite legislative 
measures to criminalise the protest camps (as heterotopia) the liminoid practice 
developed from generation to generation enabled radical environmental activists to 
challenge environmental discourse.  
 
The internet enables activists both to have a media presence and to turn liminoid 
practices into new strategies. The internet provides a platform on which to turn 
protest from the local to the global, as the rhizomatic style echoes the quasi-
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organisational structures of the environmental activists’ movement. Technological 
developments enhance and aid the creation of heterotopias, such as the 
swoop/swarm.  
 
However, once activists begin to engage with the media within the heterotopia, and 
the media tent moves from outside to inside the protest camps, the media are no 
longer outside of the camps, as they were at Greenham and the roads protests, but 
now they are inside the camp with the activists. This can be interpreted as a 
welcoming in, and acceptance, agreement and conformity by the activists towards a 
green capitalism, and environmental solutions through economics. In inviting the 
journalists, they are inviting normative behaviour into the movement. Activists are 
no longer “outside”, but “inside” society and environmental discourse. Once the 
movement moves out of the heterotopia it can no longer challenge the labelling of 
activists in a discourse of deviance, or green governmentality. The movement must 
retain its heterotopic spaces to challenge and survive.  
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
 
This conclusion will begin by showing what has been achieved by the research. This 
will be followed by a brief discussion on how much the thesis has moved 
professional discussion along. It will then examine the wider themes to emerge from 
the thesis and open them out to a wider discussion on relevant professional debates.  
 
This research on the relationship between radical environmental activism and the 
mainstream media has revealed clear and definite relations of power. The thesis has 
conducted two research practices – the application of a governmentality framework 
to the field of radical environmental activism, and the empirical data derived from 
the focus group. Death’s (2010b) examination of environmental governance at the 
2002 Johannesburg World Summit on sustainable development offers insight into 
relations of power in environmental discourse. This work differs in that it uses a 
similar principle to examine the environmental activism movement in the UK. 
Through Foucault’s governmentality approach, this work has examined how 
relations of power influence media discourse. Moreover, the theoretical position of 
this work is underpinned by an interpretation of governmentality and green 
governmentality applied to the UK political discourse. This theoretical approach is 
supported through the methodological innovation of critical discourse analysis and 
original empirical research. This three-tier approach gives the work a distinct 
understanding into the relations of power.  
 
The concept of governmentality has enabled this thesis to chart the shift in power 
relations in environmental discourse. Moreover, in identifying these power shifts it 
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also reveals how environmental discourse is shaped, formed and constantly 
challenged by media discourse. Drawing on Luke’s and Oels’ interpretations of 
governmentality through a green lens, the work has examined why power relations 
shift. Foucault’s historical approach to discourse has enabled an examination of how 
environmental discourse in the media began with a high concentration of coverage 
on activism. At the same time, there was the fledgling development of environmental 
governance. As activism was in the media spotlight, governance sat back, slowly 
developing new power relations. The creation of the Department of Environment was 
an administrative move that gave power to governments and the state to regulate 
everyday “environmental” issues, from town planning to transport systems. The 
creation of new towns and transport routes gave the government power to decide 
where people would live, how they would travel and what facilities they would live 
by. These techniques could then be applied to influence individual behaviour.  
 
Foucault’s idea about how power persuades individuals to conduct themselves in a 
particular way is useful to explore discursive challenges to environmental discourse. 
Through techniques of self-government rules and regulations are developed that 
guide the individual to act in a way that is of benefit to society as a whole. The 
individual is encouraged to conduct themselves in a way that benefits society before 
they can conduct others (the conduct of conduct). Moreover, institutions such as the 
Department of Environment provide the administrative tools through which 
individuals can conduct themselves. Environmental activism is no longer the sole 
role of environmental discourse. The creation of administrative tools over the 
individual (biopower) creates a platform to challenge environmental discourse.  
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As neoliberal economics began to take hold of British politics with the election of the 
Conservatives in 1979, biopower became more prevalent in persuading individuals to 
act in certain ways believed to be of greater economic benefit to the individual and 
country. Individuals who challenged or rejected a neoliberal discourse, often 
expressed through protest, were criminalised for their “abnormal” behaviour 
(techniques of dominance). Biopower provided the tools (techniques in Foucauldian 
terms) to encourage individual behaviour and contain those who reject this new 
neoliberal approach to a whole range of social problems. Criminal measures mainly 
came from legislative measures, with the Criminal Justice Bill (CJB), later the 
Serious Organized Crime and Police Act (SOCPA). 
 
These new laws were passed to effectively criminalise aspects of environmental 
activism. The CJB and SOCPA were both designed to limit the number of people 
able to organise or attend a protest. The laws also linked together various collectives 
and movements from free music/raves to new age travellers and environmental 
activists. The effect was to criminalise a large portion of radical politics by placing it 
in a discourse of deviance. At the same time, more subliminal and subtle legislative 
measures were used as surveillance techniques on activists’ movements, reinforcing 
the discourse of deviance and practice of criminalisation. Legislative measures gave 
the police powers to use undercover policing practices, and later to access emails, 
databases and mobile phone messages. The rationale for these new surveillance 
powers was that they were needed as preventative measures against potential acts of 
violence. Violence and a fear of violence is epitomised in the increased language 
conflating activist with terrorism. As Rootes’ (2003) study showed, there is little 
evidence of eco-terrorism occurring. However, despite the lack of evidence, the state 
continued to use techniques of dominance. New laws were framed as preventative 
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measures against anyone deemed abnormal by the state and general public. This 
approach was iterated through media discourse on environmental activism, which 
reinforced the power relations by placing activists into a discourse of deviance, thus 
enabling the neoliberal approach to become dominant in environmental discourse. In 
other words, media discourse constructed a narrative around environmental activism 
that reinforced a neoliberal approach in environmental discourse.  
 
Studies on earlier protest marches (the 1960s) found that media discourse focuses on 
the violence or the potential for violence. This is reaffirmed through a language that 
identifies some protesters as “militant”, “yobs” and “delinquent” (see Halloran et al., 
1971; see Chapter Five). These terms are still applied today. This thesis has shown 
that in the reporting of the Heathrow climate camp there is also a conflation with 
security and terrorism. This is not new. Through a critical discourse analysis this 
work has shown that a discourse of security and terrorism has underlined media 
discourse when representing protest and environmental protest. Despite activists 
having a greater voice in earlier days, reflecting their stronger position in 
environmental discourse, there was still a link to terrorism. For example, at 
Greenham Common Peace Camps, the women’s peace camp was seen as 
encouraging violence through Cold War disunity. The Daily Express’s headline “The 
Peace War” (Express Staff Reporter, 1982: 1; see Chapter Five) blames the women 
for any potential violence between Russia and America, with the UK in the middle – 
“as the Soviet cameras rolled, the 30,000 demonstrators milling in the mud appeared 
unwitting dupes of a propaganda coup by Moscow” (Express Staff Reporter, 1982: 
1). Moreover, this article also discusses journalists discussing media discourse. The 
top line of the article shows “A Russian TV crew filmed the mass anti-nuclear 
protest by women at Greenham Common” (Express Staff Reporter, 1982: 1). 
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Therefore, this work has identified that government biopower to persuade individuals 
is propagated through media discourse.  
 
The two themes of violence and pre-emptive violence are joined by a peculiar 
language of journalists observing media practice. Moreover the critical discourse 
analysis shows that these two themes continue throughout the historical period to the 
present. Violence becomes more prominent in the discourse after the 9/11 terror 
attacks but was certainly not in reaction to the attacks, it just provided the platform to 
increase the bio-political approach of placing activists in a discourse of deviance. 
The emergence of the term “eco-terrorism” used by the political right in the late 
1980s shows that neoliberalism has applied biopower to the representation of 
environmental activism. The criminalisation of activism labels activists as 
“abnormal”, and green governmentality as “normative” behaviour of environmental 
discourse.  The shift in power relations through biopower in a governmentality 
framework has enabled advanced liberal government and the creation of new 
economic markets under the dominant position of environmental discourse. 
 
What is problematic with a governmentality approach is its inability to adapt to 
global changes and new forms of communication. In addition, the creation of the 
internet provided a new platform from which activists could challenge the advanced 
liberal government that had crept into environmental discourse. The Indymedia 
website (1999) provided a perfect platform to organise the Seattle and anti-capitalist 
protests. These events shaped the global justice movement and informed many of 
their actions. For example, the Zapatista movement gained global awareness through 
the internet (see Kingsnorth, 2003; Krøvel, 2011, see Chapters One and Six).  
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Moreover, the internet enabled activists to retain their repertoires of protest and adapt 
old tactics and strategies to new techniques (see the discussion on the swarm/swoop 
in Chapter Six). Activists can invert hierarchical power relations between themselves 
and journalists by protesting at the site of contestation, away from the media eye. 
Through their social practices (liminoid practices) activists create not a counter-
space, but an alternative, which demonstrates a way of being ecologically aware. 
However, this thesis has argued that in order for environmental activism to survive 
and challenge the dominant discourse it must retain the repertoires of protest within 
the heterotopia of the camps and actions. As this work has shown, once activists 
remove or alter the liminoid practices of the heterotopia, they also remove the ability 
to challenge advanced liberal governments in environmental activism. Once activists 
look to be “conducted” through counter-conducts (see Death, 2010a; see Chapter 
Six) they are no longer an alternative space to explore other options in environmental 
discourse, but conformed and contained through state apparatus of surveillance and 
building fences. Once activists remove the liminoid practice they are no longer 
inverting media practice, but conforming – they are being conducted through 
biopower and no longer seen as “abnormal”. However, an over-reliance on new 
social media has almost turned environmental activism back into simply a “media 
frenzy” (Hunter 2004, see Chapters One and Five) created with the first ever 
environmental activism. As the empirical data revealed, the activists are aware that 
there is too much focus on media tactics and not enough on political strategies to 
challenge advanced liberal government. In order to keep challenging and surviving 
biopower and green governmentality, activists must remain within the heterotopia.  
 
Wider themes of the Thesis  
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The key themes in this thesis have been biopower, power, deviancy (increasingly 
linked to terrorism) and criminalisation. How far have these discussions addressed 
the four research questions 1) in what ways do the mainstream media frame 
environmental activism? ; 2) How do journalists report environmental discourse?; 3) 
In what ways do reporters construct narratives around environmental activism in the 
mainstream media?; and 4) What kind of relationship is there between environmental 
activism and mainstream politics?   
 
This thesis has examined the relationship between the radical environmental activist 
movements and the state, through the lens of media discourse. The research shows 
that the mainstream media frame environmental activism as part of environmental 
discourse, but excluded from mainstream party politics. Knowledge of environmental 
activism as part of environmental discourse, is formed through language to provide 
meaning, or ‘maps of meaning’ as Hall defines discourse (see Chapter Two). In other 
words how we generate knowledge over time about a specific subject/discourse. In 
relation to the mainstream media and environmental activists, this thesis has argued 
that the relationship between political and environmental activists discourse has 
influenced the various ways the media frame environmental activism. The effect is 
that power relations between activists and journalists are framed by media, 
environmental and political discourse. How these three discourses interact, and 
challenge each other affects the ways environmental activists are represented. Thus, 
this thesis has argued that when the political discourse of the Conservative political 
parties, both Margaret Thatcher’s administration (1979-1992) and David Cameron 
(2010-present) co-opted environmental discourse into party politics, it changes the 
way journalists frame environmental activism. Thus one way journalists frame 
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environmental activists is from a passivity, and at times negative frame, to activists 
as deviant.  
 
With the increasing application of biopower through policies of global, national and 
local environmental governance, and their associated techniques of self, journalists 
reflected a increased labelling of activists within a discourse of deviancy. As 
discursive struggles over the hegemonic position of environmental discourse became 
more apparent, tensions between activists and the state (such as the anti-roads and 
CJB) was reflected in the reporting of activism. Unlike the scepticism of Thatcher’s 
embracing of environmental discourse (see Chapter Three), media coverage of the 
Conservative party election campaign, Vote Blue, Go Green (2006) acknowledges 
the shift to ‘green’ as an electioneering tactic. The Sunday Times’ headline, Cameron 
goes in search of green credentials at Ice Station Dave (White,2006);  whilst the 
London Evening Standard and  The Sun both saw the shift towards environmentalism 
as a political move. The London Evening Standard defined the move as ‘Brown and 
Cameron vie for green vote’ (Waugh,2006) and The Sun  ‘Green for Go, Dave’ 
(Anon, 2006). 
 
The development of party political discourse into environmental discourse led to 
struggles over the best solutions to climate change. The co-opting of environmental 
discourse by mainstream parties increasingly became the dominant position within 
environmental discourse. The media’s support for the co-opting of environmental 
discourse was reiterated with the emergence of global environmental governance. 
The move by the Conservative party to Vote Blue, Go Green, meant most journalists 
supported the move, in the context of a global shift (such as the Kyoto Protocol ) 
towards economic led solutions as the central tenet of environmental discourse. 
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Moreover, there was no evidence of activists’ engagement with the reworked green 
capitalism of environmental discourse. The media reports of the Vote Blue, Go 
Green Campaign lacked any reference to NGO such as Greenpeace or Friends of the 
Earth. Equally there was no reference to any previous horizontal radical 
environmental activism.  
 
Journalists reflected this shift in their reporting of activists as deviant. As activists 
resistance (as discussed in Chapter Four) to green capitalism enabled journalists to 
place activists into a signification spiral (Hall 1978), with terrorism (see Arnold in 
Chapter Four). The horizontal quasi-structure of radical environmental collectives 
meant that journalist could bypass the activists and reflect the legislative changes that 
criminalise environmental activism. Activists attempt to challenge such media 
discourse through social media and web 2.0 (see Chapter Six). The dichotomies are 
analysed in discussion on how language and discourse reflects the relationship 
between media, politics and environmental activist discourses.  
 
Chapter Two explored the various interpretations of environmentalism as a 
discourse, with particular focus on John Dryzek’s categories of environmental 
discourse.  Dryzek outlines four different definitions that shape environmental 
discourse; 1) problem-solving, 2) survivalism, 3) Realos and 4) Fundis. This thesis 
began by arguing that the green radicalism of Realos and Fundis were prominent 
within environmental discourse. Many of the tactics and strategies of Realos were 
found in NGO’s such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth. These NGOs also 
shared media strategies and tactics with the more radical horizontal collectives of 
environmental activism. For example, see the discussions in Chapters Two and Four 
outlining Friends of the Earth legal assistance with the collective Critical Mass. 
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Through the concept of green governmentality it can be judged that shifts in power 
have moved environmental discourse from the green radicalism to Dryzek’s 
definition of problem-solving (within the boundaries of liberal capitalism). Lord 
Stern of Brentwood’s report (see Chapter Three) clearly links the solution to 
problems of high carbon society with economic solutions.  Thus, problem solving 
has replaced green radicalism as the dominant position in environmental discourse. 
The consequences of this power shift, between activists (green radicalism) and 
governments (problem-solving) results in the activists increasingly placed into a 
discourse of deviance. The move away from the dominant hegemonic position once 
held by radicalism, towards problem –solving through economic solutions is 
epitomised by the Wise Use movement and Heritage Foundation, conflating 
environmental activists with terrorism (eco-terrorism, see Chapter Four). Moreover, 
the evidence has shown that despite environmental activism’s nascent position in 
environmental discourse the historical discourse analysis shows that shift in power 
has resulted in removal of radical environmental activists voice and actors. This loss 
of voice is evident in the narrative which journalists construct around environmental 
activists.   
 
The finding from the critical discourse analysis reveals several narratives and themes 
that journalists draw from when representing environmental activism in the 
mainstream media. The narratives focus on political passivity (activists are framed as 
lacking engagement with mainstream politics, which seems to devalue the political 
message of action); deviance, terrorism; violence; criminality and class. There are 
limited positive narratives found in the analysis, and those found focused on the 
individualisation of Swampy, and not the collective ‘conduct’ of grass roots radical 
politics ( see discussions in Chapter Five).  
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Class emerges very strongly in the reporting of the Blackheath camp. Class is 
another indicator of the shift away from historical liminoid practices of the 
movement. Activists Dan Glass believes that if protesters only engage with the left 
newspapers, such as The Guardian, the result is limited demographics to appeal to as 
“white liberal press and you have predominantly white people at the Camp” (activists 
Dan Glass interview August 9
th, 
2012).  Schlembach (2011) observes, that debates 
around ‘clean coal’ and aviation exposes conflicts between different agendas, and the 
problems and possibilities of maintaining a radical focus on social justice within the 
environmental movement, as the climate camps “explicitly sought to re-introduce a 
political space” (2011). 
 
Analysing the relationship between activists, the state and media reveals discursive 
challenges by mainstream party politics that shifted power relations in environmental 
discourse. Media discourse supports this power shift, supporting the government 
position over NGO and radical activists. The examples of Greenham Common Peace 
Camp, Swampy, May Day and G20 protest show that media discourse initially gave 
activism a voice (boundaries of representation in Fairclough's terms). Over time 
through the signification spiral (Hall, 1978) the activist voice is replaced. Journalists 
move away from the activists to either a third person, or the journalists speaking on 
behalf of the activists. The key shift emerges around 1997, when prior to this date, 
the order of discourse has less focus on deviancy or militant. Post-1997 and the 
incorporation of global justice movement and anti-capitalist rhetoric into 
environment activists discourse there is a clear power shift in environmental 
discourse. This shift is reflected in the relationship between activists, the state and 
media discourse.  Thus the media supports the state over the collectives, but will 
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occasionally support the individual (as indicated, for example, by the discussion on 
Swampy).  
 
Relationships between environmental activism and mainstream 
politics. 
The media reflect a negative or dismissive representation of environmental activism 
through either a focus on violence or discussions on class, or individualism. 
Although the media support the power shift towards economism and problem-
solving, this has little impact on the collectives. This thesis began by asking what the 
relationship between activists and mainstream party politics is. Yet, as discussions in 
Chapters Four and Six show, there is no relationship for three reasons. Firstly, 
horizontal politics negates the traditional Realos strategies of lobbying and engaging 
with party politics. Second, horizontal activism is reactionary not ‘movement 
building’ to challenge legislative measures. The movement takes civil disobedience 
against legislative measures once they begin the parliamentary process (as discussed 
in  Chapter Four). Protest at Greenham Common was against the UK and American 
nuclear policy, the anti-roads were against the trans-European Networks plan (as 
discussed in Chapter Three). Protest against legislation, CJB, SOCPA and so on were 
also reactionary not a spring board for movement building. Third, environmental 
activism exists within heterotopias, and as such is not counter to green 
governmentality but works as an alternative space. The protest camps are a mirror 
held up against green capitalism, as an alternative solution to climate change. For 
example, composting toilets, communal cooking, communal living, consensus 
decision-making, and wind and solar power. 
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When the protest camps remove themselves from heterotopias, then they begin to 
have a relationship with mainstream party politics. In conforming through media 
discourse to create a hierarchy of working groups, spokesperson, and movement 
building then the protest camp begins to engage with party politics. The creation of 
media tent and fences means the protest camp is not longer an alternative space, but a 
space of counter- politics. To paraphrase Death’s interpretation of Foucault –there is 
now a desire to be governed not like that, but in terms of another form of counter-
conduct. The protest camp shifts from an alternative space to one that wants to be 
governed by a top-down hierarchical system, led by the media team, which forms its 
own  a green governmentality but one founded on civil disobedience and direct 
action.    
 
The consequence of being governed ‘thusly’ has been detrimental to the movement. 
The introduction of managerial techniques,(working groups, workshops, and media 
stalwarts of PR and branding)  and a language led to fracturing of the movement. The 
creation of a media tent, first outside the protest camps, and slowly become 
integrated into the camps led to antagonism between journalists and activists, and 
between activists and activists. The media tent generated a hierarchy within the 
camps that was transferred to other protests (such as Occupy LSX which also had a 
media team). Therefore, it can be concluded that protest camps must remain a 
heterotopia to survive. Whilst climate camps remain a heterotopia, it provides a 
spatial zone in which to offer alternative ways of living and social relations. The 
heterotopias acts as an alternative, a mirror, not a counter space, but an another way 
of addressing climate change.  
Implications for Environmental Activist Movement and Journalists 
278 
 
This study has explored the various relationships between environmental activists, 
the state and the media. Social media has provided the platform to activists to contest 
mainstream journalism. Activists realise that social media needs to be supplemented 
with the face-to-face practice of protest camps. The horizontal radical environmental 
politics enable anyone with a website or smart phone to challenge mainstream 
journalists. Although as the activists note this often only results in preaching to the 
converted.  So We Stand activists Nim notes : 
 
I think it’s about having a critical relationship with it, understanding it and 
knowing its strengths and its pitfalls and who the audience is and who the 
audience isn’t… it’s about understanding where the overlaps can come and 
how you can use both situations there to your advantage (interview with Nim). 
 
Nim’s observations are  echoed by Richard, in that “there needs to be a constant 
awareness that “there’s a permanent of back to nature kind of thing which 
environmental activists used to get into”  (interview with Richard Herring), although 
as discussion in Chapter six shows, today’s activists have a strong  focus on social 
media to generate media spectacles.  Hamish Campbell notes activists should not 
reject technology:  
 
Don’t get offline yourself because you lose a huge amount of organising 
power, build tools which their purpose it to get people offline, we need to 
concentrate on that.  We’ve got to get people out of the hamster cage,  so we’ve 
got to build better tools, tools which work in ways which people would like to 
work.  On-line openness is the only solution, so stop building secure online 
communities because they’re fantasies, there is no security on-line, it’s digital, 
all information just wants to be free (interview with Hamish Campbell) 
 
Moreover, he pleads to activists to be aware of how information is shared, especially 
in light of the PC Mark Kennedy incident 
 
Please activists think about security models and what’s appropriate…we’ve got 
to build better tools so that activists, so that real people might actually want to 
use our media and might want to, use these tools we build.” (interview with 
Hamish Campbell)  
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Activist John Stewart reiterates Hamish idea of working both off line and within the 
community: 
 
to get across to ordinary householders was that you can make a difference 
because most people think they can’t make a difference with something as big 
as that, and so I that sense it’s hope that, not that we would do it for them but 
that they could be part of something [inaudible] changes, that they should help 
to change things… hope that they can take action because if people feel no 
hope at all, then actually, they feel, “Well, what’s the point?”  You’ve got to 
give them hope that they can make a difference (interview with John Stewart) 
 
Thus this knowledge and combination of online tactics can continue to challenge 
media discourse that supports the state and offer an alternative to green 
governmentality.  
Contribution to the Field 
The outcome of this research contributes to and derives from the niche field of 
environmental activism and the media. As discussed in Chapter One, the field of 
media and the environment is relatively new. Anderson’s book (1997) Media, 
Culture and the Environment provided the first in-depth analysis of how journalists 
report on environmental discourse. Lester’s work (2007 and 2010) provides insight 
into the practice of environmental activism and media discourse in Tasmania, to 
show how Australian environmental activist collectives relate with the media. Both 
Lester and Anderson conduct empirical research with journalists and activists. There 
are several texts that examine “alternative” politics using environmental activism as a 
case study. Seel, Paterson, and Doherty’s (2000) important work on Direct Action in 
British Environmentalism draws on media discourse without exploring the 
relationship between the two fields. More recently, Doyle and Carvalho have 
published studies on the representation of climate change and the use of images by 
NGOs such as Greenpeace. Boyce and Lewis’s (2009) edited collection Climate 
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Change and the Media charts recent developments between media and 
environmental discourse. This work builds on Lester’s (2007 and 2010) work on 
Tasmania, to focus on the UK focus and new empirical data. It also brings up to date 
the work of Anderson (1997), and Seel, Paterson, and Doherty (2000) in examining 
the radical environmental activism movement. Moreover, this work’s significant 
contribution to the field is the use of a theoretical position often reserved for 
examining governance, government and governmentality. Foucault talks about 
governmentality to understand relations of power between the state and individuals 
to examine social relations. This thesis draws on governmentality to unpack the non-
hierarchical relations of power between horizontal activist movements, the state and 
the media. Moreover, the rapidly evolving social media discourse means activists are 
theoretically able to challenge environmental discourse. This work brings new 
knowledge on how activists view social media, and the realisation that, as Foucault 
notes, it is important to retain knowledge of the past to understand and contextualise 
contemporary.  
 
This thesis fills a gap in the knowledge of how relations and shifts in power between 
environmental activists and mainstream party politics impacts on media discourse 
and language when reporting environmental action. It also has shown how the 
relationship between environmental activists and mainstream politics is defined by 
discursive struggles. Environmental activism began in the dominant role of 
environmental discourse, only to be challenged by the neoliberal policy of the 
political right. The shift towards new environmentally focused markets, juxtaposed 
with the application of biopower frames, environmental activists as abnormal. 
Moreover, a consequence of this is that it depoliticises any environmental activist’s 
demands, whilst persuading the individual to consume their way out of 
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environmental problems. Thus the thesis fills the gap in knowledge around the 
shaping of environmental discourse. 
 
The work reported here also interprets original data and adds new knowledge on how 
activists use traditional media practices (such as the media eye) to invert media 
discourse. In bringing together the different collectives to show the lessons learnt 
from earlier encounters with journalists, it shows how activists are aware that social 
media is just another platform to communicate. Activists understand that media and 
direct action strategies that rely on Facebook and Twitter are often naive and 
vulnerable. Social media is useful in challenging the dominant positions, as shown in 
Glass’s observations on the ability to get media images out that challenge a dominant 
position. However, they also realise that for the movement to survive they need to 
combine the tactics of social media with face-to-face planning of direct action to 
ensure objectives aren’t lost in the media frenzy.  
 
This major findings of the study have implications for both the environmental 
activist movement in the UK and journalists. The analysis shows that journalists 
continue to echo the mainstream political positions, whilst returning to linguistic 
traits that frame environmental activism as deviant. Technological advances in 
communication should make it increasingly difficult for journalists to retain this 
position, as websites, blogs, smartphones and the internet enable activists to bypass 
mainstream media. The internet also takes local protest onto the global stage to 
generate more interest and more individuals to challenge the advanced liberal 
government approach to environmental discourse. At the same time, this thesis will 
inform activists of how power relations place them into a discourse of deviance. 
Moreover, the empirical data provide knowledge for other transnational movements 
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to learn lessons from the demise of the climate camp to challenging media discourse 
(see discussion on the PCC, see Chapters One and Six). Just as contemporary 
activists have learnt from the past power relations between activism and media 
discourse, so too can transnational protest collectives learn from the UK experience. 
The findings of this research indicate that journalists continue to repeatedly construct 
a narrative that pre-empts or concentrates on violence when reporting protest. 
 
Employing a variety of investigative and analytical techniques, this research on 
media and the environment provides new knowledge that charts power relations 
between environmental activists, environmental politics and the media. The thesis 
has shown how historical processes have led to negative representation of 
environmental activism. The mainstream media frame environmental activism as 
deviant, encouraged by laws and surveillance techniques to iterate a discourse of 
deviance. I hope that this study encourages future research in this area which is 
important in understanding what shapes our cultural and political fields of 
knowledge. 
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